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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on defined benefit (DB) 
pension provision in the United Kingdom (UK). In particular, in the first paper, I 
examine the effect that labour market incentives, managerial incentives and the 
adoption of FRS17 by UK firms, have on DB plan retention decisions. In this 
paper, I also examine the role of insider trustees, defined as trustees that are also 
company executives, on the firm’s decision to keep DB plans open. I find that 
firms for which human capital is especially important are more likely to retain their 
defined benefit plans. In addition, CEO and CFO membership in the same 
pension plan that is provided for other employees positively influences the 
retention of defined benefit pension plans. Additional analysis using a subsample 
for which data on pension plan trustees are available suggests that being a CEO 
and a trustee increases the probability of DB plan retentions. Moreover, being a 
CEO/CFO trustee and a member of the DB plan offered to all employees 
increases the likelihood of DB plan retention. However, I do not find any evidence 
that voluntary adoption of FRS 17 influences DB plan retention. In addition, I find 
that insider-trustees have a positive influence on the decision to maintain DB 
plans, especially when they are members of these plans.  
In the second paper, I look at the effect of DB plan retentions and executive 
membership in them, on corporate credit ratings and the investment and dividend 
decisions. Empirical findings suggest that firms which continue to sponsor DB 
plans are more likely to have lower credit ratings which are exacerbated when 
these plans are underfunded. Despite the above effect however, I find that if the 
CEO is a member of the DB plan, it positively affects credit ratings. In addition, I 
find some evidence that the participation of CEOs in the main DB plans in 
conjunction with overfunded pension plans, negatively affect investment 
decisions when these schemes remain open. I do not find any association 
between CEOs membership in the main DB plan and dividend payments which 
may be explained by the market signalling effects of dividends.  
Finally, in the third paper, I provide a thorough analysis of the pension buy-
in and buy-out market in the UK, and I empirically examine the determinants of 
such transactions from a firm and plan perspective. I find that firms that implement 
buy-ins have larger and more funded pension plans, are more profitable and have 
higher union densities. Moreover, firms that complete buy-outs have larger 
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pension plans and allocate less pension assets in equity. Moreover, the number 
of employees is negatively associated with both transactions implying it is costlier 
for firms to conduct either a buy-in or buy-out transaction. While union density is 
positively associated with buy-ins, it has a negative effect on the likelihood of buy-
outs suggesting that unions support buy-in but not buy-out transactions. This may 
be potentially explained by the fact that the latter are associated with with plan 
winding-ups. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and synopsis  
This thesis is motivated from the enormous economic significance that defined 
benefit (DB) plans and their associated risks have on corporations, governments 
and individuals. The issue of retirement funding in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
elsewhere has never been more relevant. Demographic statistics show that life 
expectancy has increased significantly and there is an on-going concern about 
the welfare of retirees (Blake, Cairns, Coughlan, Dowd and Macminn, 2013). In 
most economies, occupational pension schemes are seen as an important 
source of retirement income and typically receive preferential tax treatment 
(Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). Traditionally, most companies have sponsored final 
salary DB pension schemes, which offer a high level of income security after 
retirement (Yermo and Severinson, 2010). However, new regulatory and 
demographic changes as well as recent developments in the general economic 
climate have significantly increased the cost of those schemes (Yermo and 
Severinson, 2010; Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). These changes have ultimately 
led to the reduction of benefits provided to new and/or existing members or even 
the termination 1  of DB plans during the last three decades (Munnell, 2006; 
Glaum, 2009; Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). Existing literature has extensively 
examined the determinants of DB plan closures and among others identifies 
managerial incentives (Hamdallah and Ruland, 1986); cash needs (Thomas, 
1989); avoidance of future obligations (Petersen; 1992); changes in accounting 
regulation (Munnell and Soto, 2007; Beaudoin, Chandar and Werner, 2010; 
Comprix and Muller, 2011); and changes in labour characteristics and 
preferences (e.g., Cowan and Power, 2003; Coronado and Copeland, 2004; 
Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; Kapinos, 2012; D’Souza, Jacob and Lougee, 
2013). Notwithstanding, the benefits emanating from the termination or 
conversion of DB pension plans, 2  are still an important component of the 
compensation package as this deferred component of compensation is a 
motivational tool and retention mechanism for employees. Despite the decline in 
                                                          
1 The terms ‘termination’, ‘closures’ and ‘freezing’ of defined benefit plans are used 
interchangeably. 
2 It should be emphasized that termination or conversion of DB plans involve significant costs 
for the firm. In particular, the costs associated with pension provision do not decline immediately 
following closures of DB plans given that contribution to DC plans will increase at the same time 
(Rauh and Stefanescu, 2009). 
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DB pension provision, the Occupational Pension Scheme Survey from the Office 
for National Statistics (2011) notes that there are 12.1 million members of DB 
pension plans in the private sector in the UK compared to 2.4 million members of 
Defined Contribution (DC) plans.3 In addition, findings from a recent survey from 
Willis Towers Watson shows that DB plan assets represent 68% of total pension 
plan assets while 32% belong to DC plans. The relevant proportion in the US is 
40% and 60% in DB and DC plans respectively (Willis Towers Watson, 2016). 
Even though prior studies have examined the factors influencing firms’ decisions 
to close a DB plan, there is little research on the motives underlying firms’ 
decisions to maintain DB plans.  Understanding the factors underlying plan 
retentions is not obvious or straightforward for several reasons. First, considering 
this issue from a research conceptualisation perspective, studies examining DB 
plan closures are motivated by the risks and subsequent costs associated with 
these plans. Focusing on costs does not explicitly consider benefits emanating 
from DB plan retention (for example attraction and retention of highly skilled 
employees). Second, identifying the determinants of DB plan closures does not 
necessarily mean that the opposite will be the case for DB plan retentions. For 
example, a number of studies suggest that plans with funding shortfalls are more 
likely to close (e.g. Munnell and Soto, 2007; Atanasova and Hrazdil, 2010). 
Therefore, it should be expected that plans with no shortfalls are more likely to 
remain open. However, this might not necessarily hold. For example, Comprix 
and Muller (2011) find a positive association between DB plan freezes and 
funding, which is defined as the ratio of the pension plan assets to the projected 
benefit obligation. Moreover, existing literature examines CEO incentives in the 
context of DB plan freezes (e.g Comprix and Muller, 2006, 2011; Bergstresser et 
al., 2006). As a result, they mainly focus on how CEOs are motivated from their 
equity-linked incentives and fail to consider executives’ pension compensation 
incentives and subsequent DB plan retention decisions. In particular, previous 
literature shows that managers use their discretion in the choice of pension-plan 
related assumptions to show higher pension expense and pension liability to 
exaggerate the economic burden of pension plans and justify pension closures 
(e.g. Comprix and Muller, 2011) while other studies find that managers 
opportunistically select pension assumptions to boost income prior to undertaking 
                                                          
3 These numbers refer to total members (i.e. the sum of active, deferred and pensioners). Active 
members were 1.9 million and 0.9 million in DB and DC plans respectively.  
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acquisitions and CEO option exercises and to reduce income prior to CEO option 
grants (Bergstresser et al. 2006). Similarly, Comprix and Muller (2006) show that 
managers opportunistically select pension-related assumptions to boost income 
when pension income is reported, in periods prior to CEOs selling shares in the 
open market, and when leverage is high. The above studies show that executive’s 
pension compensation and associated retention incentives have been 
overlooked in the (pension) literature. Examining the factors that have an impact 
on DB pension provision is interesting given advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the sponsoring of DB pension plans from a corporate perspective 
as well as the importance of DB plans from a social welfare viewpoint. Hence, a 
study that directly addresses the reasons why companies retain DB plans is 
topical and likely to provide new insights. The present study examines this issue 
in the following ways: (a) by examining the determinants of DB plan retentions, 
(b) the economic consequences of DB plan retentions and (c) the determinants 
of pension buy-in and buy-outs.   
Chapter 2 provides the background to the study and discusses DB plan 
characteristics and associated risks of those plans as well as well as provides an 
overview of the pension regulation and accounting standards for pensions.  
Using hand-collected data for a sample of the FTSE All-Share UK firms 
sponsoring DB plans, chapter 3 provides a descriptive account of DB provision 
over time from 1999 to 2013 by identifying plans that are fully open, partially open 
and closed. Moreover in chapter 3, using a duration hazard model I empirically 
examine the effect that labour market incentives, managerial incentives and the 
adoption of FRS 17 by UK firms have on the decision to keep DB plans open. I 
find that firms in industries with highly skilled human capital are more likely to 
retain DB plans. In addition, the likelihood of DB plan survival increases when 
chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) are members 
of the same DB plan as the rest of the employees, irrespective of the plan funding 
status. On the contrary, if executives are members of an exclusive executive DB 
plan, they are less likely to keep main DB plans open. I do not find any evidence 
that the voluntary adoption of FRS 17 has any effect on DB plan retention. 
Moreover, the UK provides a special setting4 to examine the effect that insider 
                                                          
4 In the United States, the pension trust is fully an asset of the corporation and the directors of 
the sponsoring company usually make decisions regarding the pension plan (e.g., how to invest 
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trustees (i.e. corporate executives that are also trustees) have on DB plan 
retention decisions. Using a sub-sample of firms for which data on pension 
trustees are available, I find that CEO-trustees are more likely to positively 
influence the retention of DB plans, suggesting that insider-trustees have a 
significant impact on such decisions. This evidence supports the view that insider 
trustees act in the interests of pension plan members. 
A question that arises is the potential implications of these results and, in 
particular, if there are any repercussions on shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Existing literature shows that DB plan freezes have an effect on stock markets 
and firms that terminate their DB plans exhibit positive abnormal returns (e.g. 
Rubin, 2007; Milevsky and Song, 2010). However, the literature does not directly 
address the effect of DB plan retentions which as explained above might not 
necessarily be the opposite. In addition, Givoly, Hayn and Katz (2016) argue that 
the shareholders’ perception is not necessarily the same to that of bond holders. 
They face different risks and rewards and as such their perspectives might be 
different. Corporate credit ratings are important determinants of a firm’s capital 
structure and its overall financial reputation (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Kisgen and Strahan, 
2010). Therefore, in chapter 4, I examine the potential consequences of DB plan 
retentions and CEO membership in them on firms’ credit ratings. In addition, 
existing literature shows that funds required for pension plans might restrict the 
allocation of funds for other uses (e.g. Rauh, 2006; Liu and Tonks, 2013). Another 
stream of literature documents the importance of DB plans as part of CEOs’ 
compensation and how this can affect their incentives (e.g. Bebchuk and 
Jackson, 2005; Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Cadman and Vincent, 2015). Building on this literature, I also investigate whether 
DB plan retentions and CEO’s participation in the firm’s main DB plan influences 
dividend policy and investment decisions given that CEOs can affect the riskiness 
of corporate decisions (Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003). The results show that the 
retention of DB plans has a negative effect on credit ratings. However, when 
CEO’s are members of these plans, I find that credit ratings are positively 
affected. The latter suggests that credit rating agencies incorporate the fact that 
CEOs are members of these plans in their credit rating assessments. In addition, 
                                                          
its assets). In contrast, in the UK, trustees manage the pension plan, and they are required (in 
theory) to act in the interests of the plan beneficiaries. The number of the directors that also act 
as trustees varies among firms and this variation provides an exclusive setting to examine this 
issue.  
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this result may reflect the fact that executives that participate in DB plans are 
more risk averse (e.g. Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and 
White, 2015). Therefore, they are awarded more favourable credit ratings.  
In response to the challenges associated with DB plans, companies have 
taken significant steps to reduce the pension risk. Recently, pension de-risking 
strategies are gaining ground among UK’s largest companies. The most common 
de-risking strategies involve shifts in pension assets from risky equities to bonds, 
pension buy-ins or buy-outs (partly or fully) and longevity swaps (Monk 2009; 
Blake et al., 2013). A pension buy-in is a process where the trustees buy an 
insurance policy to cover a group (usually pensioners) or all members. The 
trustees hold the policy as an asset and remain responsible for paying pension 
promises. On the other hand, with a pension buy-out a firm transfers all its 
pension assets and liabilities (usually paying a cash premium) to an insurance 
company which is then liable for paying pensions. In chapter 5, I provide a 
thorough analysis of the developments in the pension buy-in and buy-out market 
in the UK and compare it with the US market. In addition, I empirically examine 
determinants of these transactions focusing on firm and pension plan 
characteristics. I find that firms with large pension plans are more likely to 
implement a buy-in or buy-out transaction. Moreover, companies with higher 
funding ratios and higher profitability are more likely to implement a pension buy-
in; while firms that complete buy-outs allocate less pension assets in equity 
investments. Even though union density is positively associated with buy-ins, it 
has a negative effect on the likelihood of buy-outs suggesting that unions support 
buy-in but not buy-out transactions possibly because buy-outs are usually 
followed by plan winding-ups. 
1.2 Contribution 
I contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, this study 
contributes to the limited empirical literature on pension provision by documenting 
the determinants of DB plan retention in the UK context. This is the first study, to 
the best of my knowledge that addresses this question explicitly. As discussed 
above there are several reasons why an analysis of the retention is different from 
the analysis of DB plan closures. Given the importance of pension plans from a 
welfare standpoint and the magnitude of pension obligations, understanding the 
underlying motives for DB plan retention is of interest to regulators, shareholders, 
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plan members, academics and other stakeholders. Moreover, the study 
contributes to the newly emerging literature of risk shifting versus risk 
management in corporate decisions (e.g. Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) by 
providing evidence on the impact of CEOs and CFOs on decisions to retain DB 
plans in the UK. In addition, it extends prior work on DB plan corporate 
governance (e.g. Cocco and Volpin, 2007) and provides evidence that CEO-
trustees are more likely to positively influence the retention of DB plans, 
suggesting that insider-trustees have an important impact on such decisions. 
Second, it is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to explore the economic 
consequences of DB plan retentions and CEO participation in these plans on 
pension provision decisions as well as any credit rating effects. Credit ratings 
have significant effects on firms’ overall financial reputation as well as capital 
structure. Therefore, it is essential to understand the impact that decisions related 
to DB plans have not only on the stock market but on credit ratings as well. 
Moreover, I contribute to the emerging literature on the sophistication of credit 
rating agencies in incorporating complex firm non-financial characteristics into 
their credit rating evaluation (e.g. Lee, 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFond, 2006; Bradley and Chen, 2011; Kuang and Qin, 2013). In particular, the 
current study contributes to our understanding of the credit rating process from 
the perspective of incentives provided by managerial compensation and in 
particular DB pension plans. The findings also have implications on the role of 
accounting in restraining (or encouraging) managerial risk taking through 
improved disclosures on managerial compensation. Furthermore, it contributes 
to the emerging literature on the agency effects of inside-debt compensation by 
examining the importance of tax qualified DB plans and the possible 
repercussions that their retention has on firm’s investment and dividend policies. 
Finally, this study contributes to the emerging literature on pension de-risking 
strategies by being the first study to empirically examine the firm and plan 
characteristics that influence such transactions. Pension de-risking strategies are 
considered important in protecting the sustainability of DB plans (Monk, 2009; 
Blake et al., 2013) and therefore understanding the determinants of these 
strategies is important not only for market participants to be able to make 
informed investment decisions, but also for policy makers to be able to make 
relevant adjustments which encourage such transactions. Additionally, the study 
extends findings of existing literature on corporate demand for hedging/insurance 
18 
 
(e.g. Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; Dalton and Holland, 2017) by documenting 
characteristics of firms that hedge against pension risk. 
To summarise, the present thesis contributes to our understanding of 
pension provision decisions. In particular, I examine the impact of managerial 
incentives, existence of insider trustees and accounting standards on DB plan 
retentions as well as associated effects on firm credit ratings and dividend and 
investment decisions. In addition, I provide a rich descriptive analysis of pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs and their determinants.  
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the main features 
of DB plans and describes developments in the legislative framework on private 
pension provisions as well as accounting standards on pensions in the UK in 
general and relevant to this study in particular. Chapter 3 examines the 
determinants of DB plan retentions; Chapter 4 analyses the effects that DB plan 
retentions and CEO participation in them has on credit ratings and other 
corporate decisions; Chapter 5 provides a thorough descriptive analysis of 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs and examines their determinants. Chapter 6 
concludes and provides ideas about future research.  
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Chapter 2: Institutional background 
2.1 Overview of defined benefit (DB) plans features. 
 
Generally, pension plans can be classified as defined contribution (DC) or 
defined benefit (DB) plans.5 In a DC plan the firm contributes a certain amount to 
the employee’s retirement account. The firm’s contribution can be based on 
several factors including years of service, the employee’s age, compensation and 
profitability among others. However, the value of future benefits is uncertain. 
Thus, in a DC plan the employee bears the investment risk of the plan. The 
employer has no legal obligations beyond that of regular contributions to the plan. 
Contributions made by the companies at a given period to pension plans must be 
expensed as pension costs (see IAS 19, paragraph 43-47 for more information). 
If the contributions paid on the balance sheet date are higher than services 
already rendered, then an asset for prepaid expenses is recognized. If these 
contributions are not fully paid, a liability for accrued expenses is recognised. 
In a DB plan, the company promises to make defined pension payments 
to the employee after retirement. The amount to be paid is usually based on age, 
years of service, and the salary levels immediately before the retirement or the 
average salary during their career (Glaum, 2009). The future pension payments 
represent a liability or obligation of the sponsoring company. Contrary to a DC 
plan, in a DB scheme the company bears the risk of the pension plan. Firms that 
sponsor DB plans are exposed to all risks associated with these schemes such 
as longevity risk, interest rate risk, inflation risk and investment return risk (Kiosse 
and Peasnell, 2009).6 A firm that offers a DB scheme usually funds the plan by 
contributing assets to a separate entity, usually a trust.7 The difference in the 
benefit obligation and the plan asset is known as the funded status of the plan. 
The latter is overfunded if the plan assets exceed the pension obligation and 
underfunded if the pension obligation exceeds the plan assets. In the case of 
funded schemes, companies set aside pension plan assets to finance future 
                                                          
5 In practice pension arrangements can combine elements of DB and DC plans (cash balance or 
hybrid pension plans) (Wesbroom and Reay, 2005). Technically, these plans are defined benefit 
plans since they have an unallocated account, but they have the visibility and portability 
characteristics of the defined contribution plan. This type of pension plans is particularly used in 
US.   
6 See Table 2.1 for a description of these risks. All tables are shown at the end of each chapter. 
7 The plan assets are managed to generate the income and principal growth necessary to pay 
the pension benefits as they come due. 
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pension payments. Under IAS 19, funding shortages of a defined benefit plan will 
be visible on the company’s balance sheet and income statement, since the 
company guarantees the benefits and hence funding shortages must be paid. In 
the case of unfunded schemes, companies must finance future pension 
payments from their cash flows when they are due (pay-as-you-go schemes). 
Regulatory requirements usually specify minimum funding levels for DB pension 
plans, but those requirements vary by country.8 Accounting for defined benefit 
plans is considered complex mainly because of the numerous assumptions 
required to measure the pension obligation and expense. Specifically, the 
estimation of the pension obligation requires assumptions about employee 
turnover, length of service and rate of increase of salary levels. The length of time 
pension payments will be made requires demographic assumptions about 
employee’s life expectancy. Moreover, the present value of these future 
payments requires assumptions about the appropriate discount rate. These 
assumptions can have a significant impact on the pensions provision and 
therefore, also on company’s financial position. Billings, O’Brien, Woods and 
Vencappa (2016) use a sample of UK firms during 2005 to 2009 to examine the 
actuarial assumptions used to measure the pension obligation under IAS 19. The 
authors find evidence of management discretion in the selection of those 
assumptions, in particular, for firms that pension plan funding is weak. The 
authors suggest that the use of discretion reduces the representational 
usefulness of the reported pension figures and thus companies should be 
required to better justify their assumptions. Moreover, Glaum (2009) notes that 
differences in assumptions reduce the comparability among companies.  
 
"Insert Table 2.1 here" 
2.2 Historical developments of UK legislation on private pensions 
 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries to formally establish 
private pension systems (late 17th century) and one of the first countries to 
promote the funded private pension and to gradually reduce the unfunded public 
pension provision (Dilnot, Disney, Johnson and Whitehouse, 1994; Blake, 2003). 
                                                          
8 Currently, in the UK are applied scheme specific funding requirements. Please refer to 
Pensions Act 2004 for more information. 
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Most of the private pensions are employee sponsored plans (Blake, 2003). The 
recent changes in the economy and the extended life expectancies had 
significantly increased the cost of public pensions and spurred UK governments 
in the 1980s to undertake steps towards promoting privately funded pension 
schemes to prevent a pension crisis. This led to a rapid growth of occupational 
pension schemes. Currently there are over 33.5 million members participating in 
occupational pension schemes in the UK.9  
During the 1980s, the UK government proposed a new pension reform 
legislation to encourage privately funded pensions (both occupational and 
personal), to reduce the public burden of unfunded social security pensions 
(World Bank, 1994). The Social Security Act 1986 reduced the pension benefits 
of the State Earnings - Related Pension Scheme ('SERPS') and encouraged 
individual employees to opt out of SERPS into a funded private pension system. 
As a result, a smaller, but growing number of individuals have been covered by 
individual private pension arrangements, typically known as personal pensions 
or stakeholder pensions since its introduction in April 1988 (Disney and 
Whitehouse, 1992a and 1992b). In addition, the Social Security Act 1980 linked 
the growth rate in pensions to the retail price index as opposed to the earnings 
growth that it was before to reduce the pension liability.  
In December 1991, there was a public scandal about Robert Maxwell's 
looting of the Mirror Group pension funds. More than 18,000 Maxwell pensioners 
lost their pension entitlement because of his fraudulent theft of over £160 million 
pension assets during 1990-1991 (Blake, 2000). After this scandal significant 
attention was given to the lack of legislative framework governing those 
responsible for managing private pension funds. As a result, the government 
established the Pension Law Review Committee (Goode Committee) to review 
how to improve existing pension laws.  The Goode Report, published in 1993, 
proposed to strengthen the legislative backing of regulations governing funded 
pensions and to protect pension members' rights. These proposals were codified 
in the Pension Act 1995. Designed to ensure the security of pension plan 
beneficiaries and protect their rights, the Pension Act 1995 established minimum 
standards for trustee fiduciary duties and pension fund reporting. The main 
features of the 1995 Pension Act were: i) the establishment of Occupational 
                                                          
9 Office of National Statistics: Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2015. 
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Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) (Ch. 26, Part 1, Sec. 1-15); (ii) 
introduction of Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) (Ch. 26, Part 1, Sec. 56–
61) ; iii) a compensation fund for pension schemes in the event of fraud (Ch. 26, 
Part 1, Sec. 78-86); iv) a requirement for every pension fund to appoint an auditor 
and an actuary (Ch. 26, Part 1, Sec. 47-48) v) protection of existing pension 
scheme benefits so that they could not be reduced without member consent (Ch. 
26, Part 1, Sec. 67). 
In particular, OPRA had extensive powers with respect to regulating the 
activities of employers and trustees in relation to the pension scheme. Before the 
Pension Act 1995 sponsoring firms were responsible for appointing the majority 
of trustees (Blake, 2003). However, the 1995 Act allowed for one-third of the total 
number of trustees to be member-nominated trustees (MNT), with a minimum two 
MNTs for large plans and one if the scheme has less than 100 members. (Ch. 
26, Part 1, Sec. 16-21). The Act required OPRA to monitor trustees’ activities, 
and to state their qualifications, and specified a procedure for appointing trustees 
(Chapter 26, paragraphs 5-8). Moreover, the 1995 Act gave trustees among 
other, the responsibility for deciding on pension fund investment strategy (with 
the option to delegate it to a professional fund manager) and the power to defer 
winding up (Chapter 26, paragraphs 32-39). The trustees must set out and follow 
a Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) to establish the strategic objectives of 
the pension fund and manage conflicts between pension plan managers and 
members. A potential conflict may arise if sponsoring firms encourage higher risk 
taking in pension fund investments to reduce the amount of contributions, 
whereas pension members are against or tolerate less risk taking on pension fund 
investments (Franzen, 2010). To ensure scheme’s funding adequacy the 1995 
Act, introduced MFR. The MFR specifies a minimum funding level for a DB 
pension scheme and a schedule of necessary contributions. The statutory MFR 
requirement states that ‘schemes must ensure that the value of the assets of the 
schemes is not less than the amount of the liabilities of the scheme'.10 11 The 
                                                          
10  The detailed workings of compliance to statutory MFR requirement were set out in the 
Occupational Pension Schemes (Minimum Funding Requirement and Actuarial Valuations) 
Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/1536) and Guidance Note 27 (GN 27) from the Institute and Faculty 
of Actuaries. 
11 A ‘serious underprovision' arises under the 1995 Act section 60(1) in the case where the 
scheme's assets are less than 90 percent of its liabilities. The sponsoring employers with funds 
falling below 90 percent of the MFR are required to increase their cash contributions to 
23 
 
introduction of MFR highlighted the need for trustees to consider the potential 
divergence between pension assets and liabilities. Until this time, the average 
proportion of pension assets invested in equity had increased significantly 
because individual fund managers were competing to beat the peer group (Blake, 
2003). This strategy was successful during the equity bull market in the early 
nineties creating surpluses in pension schemes and allowed for contribution 
holidays and other improvements.  
Whilst the rules on funding levels were well received, MFR was also 
criticized due to its failure to consider individual schemes’ specific circumstances 
and encourage an appropriate long-term investment strategy to meet employer-
specific pension commitments (Blake, 2003). In 2001, HM Treasury and 
Department for Work and Pensions issued the Myners Review of Institutional 
Investments to address the above criticism against MFR rules and its potential 
negative impact on pension investments. The Myners Review (2001) proposed 
to end the MFR and replace it with scheme-specific funding requirements. The 
Myners report encouraged an investment strategy that pension assets should be 
allocated with reference to the pension liabilities leading to a fundamental change 
in pension fund investment in the UK (Blake, 2003). The DB plan closures from 
UK firms received considerable public attention since the Myners Review report 
was published. In most cases, new employees were offered a defined 
contribution plan instead. This development, along with an ageing population and 
maturing workforce, imposed a strain on the occupational pension system in the 
UK. In December 2002, in the Green Paper, ‘Simplicity, Security and Choice: 
Working and Saving for Retirement’, it was observed that OPRA was mainly a 
reactive regulator, acting in response to reports of problems with pension 
schemes and failed to anticipate problems and intervene proactively. Therefore, 
it was proposed that a new, more proactive regulator be introduced. On 11th 
February 2004, the UK government implemented the Green paper proposals and 
enacted the 2004 Pensions Act (the 2004 Act). The main features of the 2004 Act 
involve the replacement of OPRA with the Pensions Regulator (Ch. 35, Part 1); 
the replacement of the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) with a new 
‘statutory funding objective’ (SFO) (Ch. 35, Part 3) and the establishment of 
Pension Protection Fund (PPF)(Ch. 35, Part 2). Specifically, the main objectives 
                                                          
eliminate the deficit within one year. A five-year period was set for those falling in the region of 
90 to 100 percent of the required MFR. 
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of the Pension Regulator are: i) to protect the benefits of members of company 
pension arrangements; ii) to keep claims on the PPF to a minimum and iii) to 
facilitate good pension scheme administration. The Statutory Funding Objective 
(SFO) requires that a defined benefit scheme must have sufficient assets to cover 
its future pension payments. If a scheme does not meet the SFO, its trustees 
must agree a recovery plan with the scheme's sponsor. Thus, the funding 
objective is specific to each individual scheme. The PPF is an insurance scheme 
to protect members of an insolvent employer's defined benefit scheme and all 
defined benefit schemes must pay a levy to the PPF. A scheme will only transfer 
funds to PPF if it does not have enough assets (or cash resources) to buy at least 
PPF levels of compensation from an insurance company.  
In fact, the main features of the present UK pension regulatory framework 
are established with the introduction of the Pension Act 2004. The Finance Act 
2004, introduced changes designed to simplify the tax regime for pensions by 
replacing the numerous tax regimes that were in place with a single universal 
regime. These changes came into effect on 6 April 2006, known as A-day.12 Since 
A-day, there have been no limits on the benefits that may be provided by 
registered pension schemes, although adverse tax consequences arise where 
'unauthorised payments' are made and where members’ annual or lifetime 
allowances are exceeded. The 'lifetime allowance' is the maximum value of 
benefits an individual can have across all their registered pension arrangements 
without tax penalties arising.13 The 'annual allowance' is the maximum amount 
by which the value of an individual’s pension savings across all the registered 
pension schemes of which they are a member may increase in any given period, 
known as the pension input period, without tax penalties arising.14 The Finance 
Act 2011 introduced further changes to the tax regime for pensions of which the 
most important were the reduction of the lifetime and annual allowances which 
were further reduced with the Finance Act 2016.15 Moreover, The Pension Act 
                                                          
12 See Chapter 4 of Finance Act 2004. 
13 The lifetime allowance for the tax-year 2006-07 was £1.5 million and went up to £1.8million 
for the tax year 2010-11 when the tax regulation changed. Any amounts in excess of the lifetime 
allowance are subject to a tax charge of 25% (on top of the income tax) if the benefits are paid 
as a pension and 55% if they are paid as lump sum.  
14 The annual allowance for the tax year 2006-07 was £250,000 and went up to £255,000 for 
the tax year 2010-11 when the tax regulation changed. 
15 Annual allowance was reduced from £255,000 in the tax year 2010-11 to £50,000 from 2011-
12 onwards and to £40,000 from April 2016; while lifetime allowance was reduced from £1.8 
million to £1.5 million from April 2012 and £1m from April 2016. 
25 
 
2014 gave more power to the PPF to request pension levies in respect of past 
periods and to restructure the compensation cap to better protect long service 
members. Furthermore, The Pension Act 2015 introduced the shared-risk 
schemes (or defined ambition schemes) (Ch. 8, part 1) and collective benefits 
(Ch. 8, Part 2). Shared- risk schemes offer a pension promise about some of the 
benefits of scheme, but not for all. Collective benefits are provided by allowing 
pension plans to be run in a way that shares risks among members by pooling 
their assets. This means that when a member retires, they can receive an income 
from the shared assets of the scheme.  The purpose of those measures is to 
enable better risk sharing among firms, plan members and third parties and as a 
result to reduce the burdens that final salary plans pose to employers. 
Amendments in pension legislation had a direct impact on how firms account for 
DB pensions during my sample period. Moreover, changes in annual and lifetime 
allowances are important factors in shaping executives’ incentives related to DB 
plans. Tables 2.216 and 2.3 present an overview of the changes in the pension 
legislation in the UK and the changes in the lifetime allowance and annual 
allowance.  
"Insert Table 2.2 here” 
“Insert Table 2.3 here” 
2.3 Accounting standards on pensions 
 
Until 1988 there was no real distinction was made between the accounting 
for DB and DC schemes in the UK (Blake, Cairns and Dowd, 2008). Both 
schemes were accounted for mainly on pay- as- you- go (PAYG)17 contribution 
basis.18 This changed with the introduction of Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice 24 (SSAP 24) by the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) (Kiosse 
and Peasnell, 2009). SSAP 24 provided the first attempt in the UK accounting to 
standardise the calculation of pension costs and the disclosure of information 
                                                          
16 Tables are shown at the end of each Chapter. 
17  PAYG schemes are unfunded pension schemes. The sponsor accepts the liability to provide 
retirement benefits to participants but does not set aside provisions to meet future obligations. 
The PAYG structure is based on a philosophy of “intergenerational solidarity” where today’s 
workers support older workers. 
18 This means that before 1988 DB and DC schemes were treated as public pension schemes 
for accounting purposes. 
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related to this calculation, particularly to DB pension schemes (Sweeting, 2010).19 
It went into effect from periods ending on or after 1 July 1988 and remained in 
force until the introduction of Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS 17) and IAS 
19 in 2005. Although, SSAP 24 introduced some level of standardisation, it still 
left considerable scope for discretion in the choice of assumptions, making 
comparisons difficult (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). In particular, SSAP 24 
permitted UK companies that sponsored DB schemes substantial flexibility in the 
choice of actuarial valuation methods, valuation frequency (minimum once every 
three years), and the discount rate used to calculate the pension liabilities 
(Sweeting, 2010). 
The UK adopted a system of fair value accounting with the introduction of 
FRS 17 in November 2000.20 FRS 17 introduced essential changes in accounting 
for DB pension schemes. UK firms had to recognise their pension plan surpluses 
or deficits as an asset or liability on their balance sheets measured annually to 
market values (FRS 17, paragraphs 37-74). Also, any actuarial gains and 
losses21 were recorded in the statement of total recognised gains and losses 
(STRGL) (FRS17, paragraphs 57-59). To assess the expected effect of the 
changes that the new standard brought on Kiosse and Peasnell (2009) analyse 
the relevant aspects of responses received by the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) to the proposals included in exposure draft FRED 20 on pension 
accounting. The authors conclude that many respondents were concerned that 
the proposals would lead to the termination of DB plans. This concern was shared 
across other groups such as the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, the National 
Association of Pension Funds, the Pension Management Institute and other 
accounting and actuarial consulting firms. The main reason underlying this 
concern was that FRS17 would increase the volatility of pension costs by 
requiring immediate recognition in the profit and loss statement with 
corresponding large fluctuations on the balance sheet because of the 
                                                          
19 Proposals had previously been set out in two Exposure Drafts (ED), ED 32 (1983) and ED 39 
(1986). Despite their limited scope the EDs raised issues around both disclosure and 
recognition of pension schemes in corporate accounts. 
20 FRS 17 was introduced in 2000 but it only had to be implemented in stages between June 
2001 and June 2003. However, full FRS 17 implementation was delayed until 2005 in order to 
reduce the costs associated with the implementation of two accounting standards during a short 
time period (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009).   
21 Actuarial gain or loss refers to an increase or decrease to a company’s estimate of the 
Present Value of Obligation (PBO) or the Fair Value of Plan Assets (FVPA) as a result of either 
change in assumption or experience adjustments / variance. (See IAS 19 (para. 7) for a full 
definition). 
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requirement to recognise pension surpluses and deficits of the sponsoring 
company. 
With Regulation EC 1606/2002 the European Parliament and Council 
decided that all publicly traded companies should apply the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the preparation and presentation of 
consolidated accounts for the periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. 
Under IFRS, the accounting standard concerning employee benefits is IAS 19. 
FRS 17 and IAS 19 are similar in their rules regarding measurement and 
disclosure of retirement benefits, but there are some differences in the recognition 
of actuarial gains and losses and the presentation of items in the financial 
statements. Both standards require that defined benefit scheme assets and 
liabilities are valued at each balance sheet date to produce an asset or liability 
for recognition on the balance sheet. All the items recognised in the profit and 
loss account under FRS17 are treated in a similar way under IAS 19. However, 
for actuarial gains and losses that are recognised immediately in the statement 
of total recognised gains and losses (STRGL)22 under FRS17, there are three 
options under IAS 19: i) full recognition through the Statement of Recognised 
Income and Expense (SORIE) (i.e. through shareholders’ equity; similar to the 
treatment under FRS 17); ii) full recognition through Profit & Loss (P&L), or iii) the 
‘standard’ corridor approach23 according to which firms can defer the recognition 
of actuarial gains and losses. Immediate recognition of these gains and losses, 
as opposed to smoothing their impact via the corridor approach, can yield 
significant volatility in equity and the STRGL (Fasshauer, Glaum and Street, 
2008). In addition, it has been shown that some European companies achieved 
material off-balance sheet financing by using the corridor method (Fasshauer, 
Glaum and Street, 2008). To address this issue the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) introduced in 2004, as an option, the equity method 
where actuarial gains and losses are immediately recognised in Other 
Comprehensive income (OCI). The equity method became mandatory in 2011, 
                                                          
22 STRGL is a primary financial statement that includes the profit or loss for the period together 
with all movements in reserves reflecting recognised gains and losses attributable to 
shareholders.  
23 Under the corridor rule if the gain or loss exceeds 10% of the greater of the Pension Benefit 
Obligation (PBO) or the fair value of plan assets actuarial gain or loss can be amortized 
gradually over time into the income statement. For financial reporting periods beginning on or 
after 1st January 2013 the ‘corridor method’ option is removed.  
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and firms had to apply it no later than 1 January 2013. Glaum, Keller and Street 
(2017) examine the determinants of the voluntary adoption of the equity method 
for a sample of firms from France, Germany and the UK during 2005 to 2013. The 
authors note that UK firms adopted the equity method since 2005 while only a 
small number of French and German firms selected this method. The authors find 
that the voluntarily adoption of the equity method is primarily driven by short-term 
effects on equity suggesting that the accounting choice was used 
opportunistically especially in 2005. 
The revised version of IAS 19, IAS 19(R), effective for fiscal years 
beginning on January 2013, recently replaced IAS 19. IAS 19(R) introduced 
significant changes to accounting for actuarial gains or losses and pension 
expenses. First, as mentioned earlier, firms can no longer defer the recognition 
of actuarial gains or losses by using the corridor approach; rather they have to 
recognise actuarial gains or losses immediately in other comprehensive income 
(OCI). Although, actual economic exposure is not affected this increases the 
volatility in the statement of financial position (KPMG, 2013). However, 
Fasshauer, Glaum and Street (2008) argue that this would enhance international 
comparability and assist the convergence with US GAAP.  Second, IAS 19(R) no 
longer allows the use of expected rates of return (ERR) when calculating the 
pension expense to be recognised in profit or loss and firms will have to apply the 
discount rate on the net pension asset or liability. Thus, companies will have to 
use the discount rate used to calculate the present value of the pension 
obligations when computing return on pension plan assets. This change is likely 
to increase the reported pension expense. It should be noted that SSAP 24, FRS 
17 and IAS 19 are the accounting standards followed by firms in my sample in 
chapters 3 and 4; While, IAS 19R only applies to the sample of firms in chapter 5 
where I extend the sample period beyond 2013. Table 2.4 summarises the main 
features of the pension accounting standards SSAP 24, FRS 17 and IAS 19. 
“Insert Table 2.4 here” 
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 Appendix I 
Table 2.1: Description of DB plan risks 
Risk type Definition 
 
Longevity risk 
 
 
The risk that employees will, on 
average, live longer than expected. 
 
 
Interest rate risk 
 
The risk that interest rates will fall and 
the burden of long-dated liabilities will 
increase accordingly. 
 
Inflation risk 
 
The risk that final salaries will 
increase at a rate greater than 
expected. 
 
Investment risk (equity or credit risk) 
 
The risk that the returns on the 
pension plan assets investments will 
under-perform or that a bond in the 
pension assets portfolio might default. 
 
Operational risk 
The risk that an unexpected need for 
higher contributions can divert cash 
from main business activities. 
Notes: Table 2.1 summarises the main risks faced by firms that sponsor DB plans. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of pension legislation changes (1995- 2016) 
Year Legislation Description 
1995 Pension Act 2005 
Introduced stronger regulatory 
framework. Established minimum 
standards for trustee fiduciary duties 
and pension fund reporting. 
1999 
Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 
Introduced stakeholder pensions. 
2000 
Child Support, Pensions 
and Social Security Act 
Replaced SERPS with State Second 
Pension (S2P). 
2002 State Pension Credit Act 
Guaranteed minimum income with 
tapered benefit for all over-60s. 
2004 Finance Act 
Simplified tax regime for pensions. 
Introduced Lifetime allowance and 
Annual allowance. 
2004 Pensions Act 
Reformed pensions’ regulatory 
system. Establishment of the 
Pension Regulator, Statutory 
Funding Requirement and Pension 
Protection Fund. 
2006 
The Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations 
Prohibited unjustified direct and 
indirect age discrimination. 
2007 Pensions Act 
Statutory Pension Age (SPA) for men 
and women to increase from 65 to 68 
from 2024. Reformed the Basic State 
Pension and S2P. 
2008 Pensions Act 
Workplace pension reform, including 
auto-enrolment and compulsory 
employer contributions for most 
employees. 
2011 Finance Act 
Changed rules on annual and lifetime 
allowances, annuities and income 
drawdown. 
2011 Pensions Bill 
Amendments to workplace pension 
reform (Pensions Act 2008). SPA for 
men and women to increase to 66 by 
2020. 
2014 Pension  Act  
Increased powers to PPF. 
Replacement of the basic state 
pension with the single-tier pension. 
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2015 Pension Act 2015 
Introduction of shared-risk schemes 
and collective benefits. 
2016 Finance Act 2016 
Changed rules on annual and lifetime 
allowances. 
Sources: Office for National Statistics (2011) and author’s own research. 
Notes: Table 2.2 summarises the most important pension legislation changes in the UK for the 
period 1995 until 2016. 
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Table 2.3: Changes in the lifetime and annual allowances (2006-2017) 
Financial Year 
Lifetime Allowance 
(in £ millions) 
Annual Allowance 
(in £ thousands) 
2006/07 1.5 215 
2007/08 1.6 225 
2008/09 1.65 235 
2009/10 1.75 245 
2010/11 1.8 255 
2011/12 1.8 40 
2012/13 and 2013/14 1.5 40 
2014/15 and 2015/16 1.25 40 
2016/17 and 2017/18 1 40 
Notes: Table 2.3 shows the changes in the lifetime allowance and annual allowance for pension 
benefits in the UK from 2006 when they were initially introduced until present. 
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Table 2.4: Comparison of accounting standards SSAP24, FRS17, IAS 19 
and IAS 19R 
 SSAP24 FRS17 IAS19 IAS 19R 
General 
approach 
 
Profit and 
Loss (P&L) 
driven 
 
 
Balance sheet 
driven 
 
Balance sheet 
driven 
Same 
Rights of 
assumptions 
Actuary 
Employer on 
actuary’s 
advice 
Employer 
(actuarial 
advice 
recommende
d) 
Same 
Measurement 
frequency 
At least 
triennial 
Annual 
update but 
without 
annual 
valuations 
Annual Same 
Actuarial 
method 
Not specified 
Projected unit 
method 
Projected unit 
method 
Same 
Asset 
valuation 
Actuarial 
value 
Market value 
(no 
smoothing) 
Market value 
(no 
smoothing) 
Same 
Discount rate 
assumption 
Actuary’s best 
estimation 
over the long-
term equity 
return 
High quality 
(AA or 
equivalent) 
corporate 
bond yield 
High quality 
corporate 
bonds yield 
Same 
Expected rate 
of return on 
assets 
NA 
Long term 
expected 
return for 
each asset 
class 
Long term 
expected 
return for all 
assets 
No distinction 
between the 
discount rate 
and expected 
rate of return 
on assets 
Recognition 
of actuarial 
gains and 
losses 
Spread over 
working 
lifetime in 
P&L 
Immediate 
recognition in 
balance sheet 
via statement 
of recognised 
gains and 
losses; no 
effect on P&L 
Immediate 
recognition in 
P&L or 
deferred via 
the corridor 
approach. An 
alternative 
treatment is 
immediate 
recognition in 
Other 
Comprehensi
ve Income 
(OCI) 
Immediate 
recognition in 
OCI 
Notes: Table 2.4 provides a comparison of the pension accounting standards in the UK, namely, 
SSAP24, FRS17 and IAS19. 
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Chapter 3: Defined Benefit Plan Retentions 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter examines the determinants of DB pension plan provision in 
the UK. Given that life expectancies have significantly risen and the related on-
going concern of the welfare of retirees, addressing the issue of retirement 
funding in the UK and elsewhere has never been so important. In the UK and 
elsewhere employer sponsored pension schemes are vital sources of retirement 
income (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009).  
Historically, most companies commonly offered final salary pension 
schemes that provided employees with income security after retirement (Yermo 
and Severinson, 2010). More recently, the costs of these schemes have risen 
significantly, owing primarily to new and increased levels of regulation coupled 
with changes in demographic and economic environments (Yermo and 
Severinson, 2010; Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). This has ultimately led to the 
reduction in the benefits provided to new and/or existing members and DB plans 
have even been closed during the last three decades (Munnell, 2006; Glaum, 
2009; Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). Evidently, a survey from the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) illustrates that, in the UK in 2012, only 13 
percent of DB plans were open to new entrants, which is a sharp fall compared 
to 2005, when 43 percent of pension plans were open. In addition, the number of 
firms that closed DB plans for existing members climbed to 31 percent in 2012 
compared to 23 percent in 2011 (NAPF, 2013). The prior literature examines the 
motives behind pension benefits reductions or terminations of DB pension plans. 
Hamdallah and Ruland (1986) examine the motives underlying the termination of 
overfunded pension plans by comparing a sample of firms that terminate their DB 
pension plans to a sample of firms which continue sponsoring overfunded 
pension plans. The results suggest that firms are more likely to terminate 
overfunded pension plans when union employees are not members of the plan; 
in addition, firms which terminate their plans are more likely to have managerial 
compensation plans tied to income-related numbers as well as high owner 
control. Hence, these findings emphasize the importance of management 
incentives underlying the decision to terminate overfunded pension plans. 
Further, Thomas (1989) finds that cash needs are the main reason of overfunded 
plan terminations as opposed to tax implications, accounting or wealth transfer, 
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while Petersen (1992) finds that avoidance of future obligations explains the 
termination decision.   
The economics of DB plans have changed significantly over the recent 
years. The strict regulation as well as recent developments in the financial 
markets has resulted in severely underfunded DB plans (Munnell and Soto, 
2007). More recent studies on DB plan terminations explore the potential effect 
of accounting reforms (e.g., Beaudoin, Chandar and Werner, 2010) along with 
firm and pension plan characteristics on the decision to terminate a DB plan (e.g., 
Munnell and Soto, 2007; Comprix and Muller, 2011), while others consider the 
role of changes in labour characteristics and preferences (e.g., Cowan and 
Power, 2003; Coronado and Copeland, 2004; Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; 
Kapinos, 2012; D’Souza, et al., 2013). 
Aside from the benefits arising from the cessation or conversion of DB 
pension plans,24 they still constitute an important component of the compensation 
package. This deferred component of compensation is used as a motivational 
tool and retention mechanism for employees. Despite the decline in DB pension 
provision, the Occupational Pension Scheme Survey from The Office of National 
Statistics (2011) notes that, in the UK, there are 12.1 million members of DB 
pension plans in the private sector compared to 2.4 million members of DC 
plans.25  
Firms that retain their DB plans can keep the plan open to all employees (i.e. 
existing and new employees) or reduce the accrual of future benefits either to all 
employees or to new employees only by offering for example, career average 
rather than final salary schemes.26 Even though prior studies have examined the 
factors influencing firms’ decisions to close a DB plan, there is little research on 
the motives underlying firms’ decisions to maintain DB plans. Such effect is not 
obvious or straightforward for several reasons. First, considering this issue from 
a research conceptualisation perspective, studies examining DB plan closures 
are motivated by the risks and subsequent costs associated with these plans. 
                                                          
24 It should be emphasized that termination or conversion of DB plans involve significant costs 
for the firm. In particular, the costs associated with pension provision do not decline immediately 
following closures of DB plans given that contribution to DC plans will increase at the same time 
(Rauh and Stefanescu, 2009). 
25 These numbers refer to total members (i.e. the sum of active, deferred and pensioners). 
Active members were 1.9 million and 0.9 million in DB and DC plans respectively.  
26 For the remainder of the paper I refer to plans that are closed only to new entrants as partly 
open/closed plans and to plans that are closed/open to both existing and new members as fully 
closed/open plans.  
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Focusing on costs does not explicitly consider benefits emanating from DB plan 
retention (for example attraction and retention of highly skilled employees). 
Second, identifying the determinants of DB plan closures does not necessarily 
mean that the opposite will be the case for DB plan retentions. For example, 
several studies suggest that plans with funding shortfalls are more likely to close 
(e.g. Munnell and Soto, 2007; Atanasova and Hrazdil, 2010). Therefore, it should 
be expected that plans with no shortfalls are more likely to remain open. However, 
this might not necessarily hold. For example, Comprix and Muller (2011) find a 
positive association between DB plan freezes and funding, which they define as 
the ratio of the pension plan assets to the projected benefit obligation. Moreover, 
existing literature examines CEO incentives in the context of DB plan freezes (e.g 
Comprix and Muller, 2006, 2011; Bergstresser et al., 2006). As a result, they 
mainly focus on how CEOs are motivated from their equity-linked incentives and 
fail to consider executives’ pension compensation incentives and subsequent DB 
plan retention decisions. In particular, previous literature shows that managers 
use their discretion in the choice of pension-plan related assumptions to show 
higher pension expense and pension liability to exaggerate the economic burden 
of pension plans and justify pension closures (e.g. Comprix and Muller, 2011) 
while other studies find that managers opportunistically select pension 
assumptions to boost income prior to undertaking acquisitions and CEO option 
exercises and to reduce income prior to CEO option grants (Bergstresser et al. 
2006). Similarly, Comprix and Muller (2006) show that managers opportunistically 
select pension related assumptions to boost income when pension income is 
reported, in periods prior to CEOs selling shares in the open market, and when 
leverage is high. The above studies show that executive’s pension compensation 
and associated retention incentives have been overlooked in the (pension) 
literature. Examining the factors that have an impact on DB pension retention is 
interesting given advantages and disadvantages associated with the sponsoring 
of DB pension plans from a corporate perspective as well as the importance of 
DB plans from a social welfare viewpoint. Hence a study that directly addresses 
the reasons why companies retain DB plans is topical and likely to provide new 
insights. 
Using hand-collected data for a sample of the FTSE All-Share UK firms 
sponsoring DB plans, this study provides a descriptive account of DB provision 
37 
 
over time from 1999 to 2013 by identifying plans that are fully open, partially open 
and closed. In addition, I examine the determinants of DB plan retentions. In 
particular, I initially examine the role of labour market incentives on the decision 
to retain DB pension plans. I expect that firms for which human capital is an 
important resource are more likely to retain their DB plans. In addition, building 
on the growing literature discussing the importance of key executives on 
corporate decisions, I examine the role that managerial incentives play on 
pension provision decisions. In this context, I examine the impact of CEO / CFO 
participation in the main DB plan on the same terms as the rest of the employees 
on the likelihood of retaining the DB plans. In this case, I would expect the CEO 
/ CFO to have incentives to retain the DB plan. However, executives are 
sometimes members of a preferential executive DB pension plan exclusive to 
executives only; in this case, I would not expect incentives to retain DB plans to 
be equally as strong. However, I do not have any predictions about the impact of 
managerial membership in an executive pension plan on the decision to retain 
the main DB plan. Finally, drawing on the literature examining the impact of 
accounting rule changes, I explore the potential role of FRS17 on the decision to 
retain DB plans by examining the voluntary adoption of FRS17 by firms included 
in our sample. Firms choosing to voluntarily adopt FRS17 may do so to signal 
their transparency to the market and to portray the financial position of pension 
plans in the accounts accurately. On the other hand, comment letters submitted 
by companies to the Exposure Draft leading to the introduction of FRS17 noted 
that FRS17 may contribute to the demise of DB plans. Hence, it is possible that 
some of the firms that voluntarily adopted FRS17 did so to legitimize the reduction 
in the accrual of benefits or even the closure of DB plans. The underlying 
incentives are not clear, and this is ultimately an empirical question to which I 
seek to shed more light. 
Using a duration hazard research design which models the cause-specific 
hazards of closure, for a sample of FTSE All-Share firms during 1999-2013, I find 
that firms where the CEO and CFO participate in the main DB pension plan as 
the rest of the employees as well as firms where human capital is important are 
more likely to retain their pension plans, despite whether the plan is underfunded 
or not. Moreover, I do not find any evidence that voluntary adoption of FRS17 
influences DB plan retention. However, when this is combined with CEO/CFO 
pension plan incentives, I that firms that voluntarily adopted FRS17 and their 
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CEOs/CFOs have executive pension plans then these firms are less likely to keep 
DB plans partly open. Overall, these results suggest that DB plans are an 
important retention tool consistent with the labour economics literature. In 
addition, CEO and CFO incentives play an important role in DB plan retention 
decisions. 
In the UK, DB plans are set up in trusts and trustees are responsible for 
decisions such as the closure of DB plans (The Pensions Regulator, 2014). The 
presence of company executives on the board of trustees possibly allows the firm 
to exert more control over decisions related to the plan than would be the case if 
the board of trustees consisted of independent trustees only (Cocco and Volpin, 
2007). Using a subsample for which trustee data are available, I examine the role 
of insider trustees, which I define as trustees that are also company executives, 
on the firm’s decision to keep DB plans open. In this context, the extent to which 
the incentives of insider trustees are aligned with plan members’ interests or 
shareholders’ incentives is examined. I find that controlling for the presence of 
insider trustees, CEOs who are members of the main DB plan are more likely to 
keep this plan open. On the contrary, I do not find such evidence for CFO trustees 
which suggests that CEOs have the overall responsibility in such decisions. 
The study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this 
study contributes to the limited empirical literature on pension provision by 
documenting the determinants of DB plan retention in the UK context. This is the 
first study, to the best of my knowledge that addresses this question explicitly. 
While previous studies have examined the motives underlying pension 
terminations (e.g.,Hamdallah and Ruland, 1986; Munnell and Soto, 2007; 
Comprix and Muller, 2011), no studies have examined the reasons why some 
firms decide to retain their DB plans and it is not straightforward to infer this from 
studies focusing on DB plan closures. Understanding why some firms continue 
to sponsor DB plans is of interest to regulators, shareholders, plan members, 
academics and other stakeholders given the importance of pensions for 
retirement security as well as the magnitude of pension obligations.27 Second, 
recent US studies (e.g., Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) find that managerial 
incentives influence the extent of risk shifting versus risk management of DB 
pension plans and that executives’ stake, in particular CFOs, in DB plans is the 
                                                          
27 In 2013, the DB plan deficit for the FTSE 100 companies was £43 billion; in particular, 
liabilities were equal to £490 billion and assets were equal to £447 billion (LCP, 2013). 
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main driver of DB plan funding. I build on this stream of research by documenting 
the impact of CEOs and CFOs on decisions to retain DB plans in the UK. In 
addition, I extend prior work on DB plan governance (e.g., Cocco and Volpin, 
2007) by examining the impact of insider trustees. In particular, I find that CEO-
trustees are more likely to positively influence the retention of DB plans, 
suggesting that insider-trustees have a significant impact on such decisions. 
Further, this chapter contributes to the emerging literature of CEO versus CFO 
role in corporate decisions (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2010; Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011) 
by documenting the key role that CEOs play in the decision to retain DB plans. 
Finally, I contribute to the literature (e.g., Beaudoin, Chandar and Werner, 2010) 
analysing the potential impact of new accounting standards on pension provision 
by examining the effect that the adoption of FRS17 has on DB plan retentions. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows; Section 3.2 provides 
a review of relevant literature and develops the hypotheses to be tested in this 
study. Section 3.3 discusses the research design and Section 3.4 discusses 
sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 discusses the findings 
and Section 3.6 provides additional analysis on the role of insider trustees. 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
There are four streams of literature relevant to this study. The first is the 
labour economics literature discussing the role of DB plans; the second refers to 
studies that examine the importance of executive pensions and their impact on 
management incentives; the third refers to studies that examine the effect of 
changes in accounting standards on pension provision decisions; finally, the 
fourth refers to studies that examine the closure of DB plans. The following 
subsections discuss each stream of the literature and develop the hypotheses to 
be tested in this chapter. 
3.2.1 Labour market incentives 
 
A significant body of literature on labour economics examines why 
companies offer pension plans and in particular DB plans. Occupational pensions 
generally represent a significant part of employee compensation and can be 
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viewed as deferred remuneration accepted by employees as an alternative to 
additional cash wages or fringe benefits such as health insurance (Stone, 1987). 
In addition, the existence of DB plans encourages the employee-firm bonding 
because if employees decide to leave the company voluntarily they will have to 
bear a high opportunity cost such as lost retirement benefits (Lazear, 1979, 
1981). Hence, turnover cost is predicted to decline and productivity to rise in the 
presence of a DB plan (Salop and Salop, 1976; Blinder, 1982; Lazear, 1981).28 
Further, DB plans enable employers to develop firm-specific human capital 
(Blinder, 1982). Assuming a rational labour market, this suggests that when firms 
provide a generous pension scheme, this will positively affect a firm’s ability to 
attract and retain high quality employees (Ippolito, 1985). This view is also 
supported by recent surveys in both the UK and the US on pension preferences, 
which document that DB plans have stronger employee attraction and retention 
effects (Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 2013; Towers Watson, 2014).  
The cost of providing DB plans has increased significantly, which 
influences the sustainability of DB plans (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009) and hence 
cost saving incentives may prevail for some firms when considering DB pension 
provision (Rauh, Stefanescu and Zeldes, 2013). However, human resource 
requirements differ across firms. In particular, for some firms it may be more 
important to employ high-calibre employees and reduce employee turnover 
compared to other firms. Companies that face large up-front costs when hiring 
and training employees or firms where productivity is enhanced by retaining a 
loyal employee base will be more likely to provide employees with a competitive 
deferred compensation package (Clark and Quinn, 1999; Coronado and 
Copeland, 2004). Given the above reasoning, I argue that firms for which human 
capital is relatively more important are more likely to design compensation 
policies with a view to attracting and retaining high calibre employees; I therefore 
expect that such firms are more likely to keep their DB plans open. The above 
discussion leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Firms for which human capital is important are more likely to retain 
their DB plans, all else equal. 
                                                          
28 See Ippolito (1997) for a thorough discussion on how DB plans can be used as natural 
mechanisms to increase productivity and reduce turnover. 
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3.2.2 Executive pensions 
 
DB pension plans are considered a form of inside debt29 and similarly to 
other forms of debt, inside debt obligations expose managers to default risk 
(Edmans and Liu, 2011). Inside debt compensation represents a potential way to 
reduce the agency costs of debt, which may arise when managers change the 
firm’s capital structure, investment policy or capital ratio in order to re-allocate 
wealth from debtholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They 
suggest that for an optimal incentive structure, management’s personal holdings 
in debt and equity should be in line with the firm’s overall external capital 
structure. If this is not the case then it is possible for excessive inside debt to 
prompt executives to make more conservative decisions, reduce the overall risk 
and restrain liquidity, thereby transferring wealth from shareholders to 
debtholders. This argument has gained more prominence in the current financial 
environment as many firms seek to reduce their managers’ risk-taking behaviour 
(Wei and Yermack, 2011). In line with these arguments, several studies find that 
DB pensions play a significant role in the compensation of US executives. For 
example, Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) calculate the pension values for 51 
existing and recently retired CEOs of S&P 500 companies and conclude that 
pensions represent a significant component of CEOs’ compensation; in 
particular, the sample of CEOs examined are entitled to pension benefits of over 
$800 million. In addition, the prior literature finds that firms make higher 
contributions when highly paid executives are members of the plan (Wilkie, 1988).  
I build on this literature and explore the impact of management 
participation in the company’s DB plan on the decision to retain DB plans. This 
decision may be influenced by managers’ participation in the same scheme as 
the rest of the employees or alternatively by whether they are members of a 
separate exclusive executive scheme. 30  If managers are rational utility 
                                                          
29 They basically represent fixed obligations to be paid to company insiders (employees). 
30 Following implementation of the regulations contained within the Finance Act 1989, UK 
companies had to adopt the Statutory Earnings Cap with regards to pensionable salaries; thus, 
Executive Directors will be eligible to receive the maximum pension that can be provided from 
the registered pension scheme and for the part of the pensionable salary above the cap any 
pension entitlement is delivered through an unapproved retirement benefits scheme (URBS), 
which may be funded or unfunded. In the present study, I do not refer to these unapproved 
schemes, but rather to separate qualified DB plans established specifically for the executives of 
the firm. Recently URBS are replaced by Employer- Financed Retirement Benefit Schemes 
(EFRBS or EFURB). 
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maximizing individuals, then it is in their own interest not to close the DB scheme 
if they are members of the firms’ main DB plan provided to the rest of the 
employees. The above discussion suggests that firms with management 
membership in the main DB plan, as the rest of the employees, are more likely to 
keep their DB plans open, all else equal. On the other hand, if executives have a 
separate DB scheme from the rest of the employees then their incentives may be 
different. In particular, they may not have a vested interest to fully fund and keep 
the main DB scheme open. However, some companies may believe that deferred 
compensation components such as pensions are important and may therefore be 
more inclined to retain DB plans for both existing and new employees irrespective 
of whether managers are members of the company’s DB plan. Even though it is 
not clear which effect will predominate, the above reasoning suggests that 
participation of executives in a separate DB plan will affect a firm’s decision to 
retain their DB plans, all else equal. 
Although, corporate decisions are often made in teams (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 2003), the previous literature has highlighted the important role of 
CEOs on corporate decisions and policies (e.g., Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 
1997; Schrand and Unal, 1998; Rogers, 2002; Dennis and Mihov, 2003; Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2010; Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007) find that debt incentives are a more important component of CEO 
compensation as CEOs get older and that in those cases CEOs pursue more 
conservative strategies to reduce the overall risk of the firm. In addition, their 
results suggest that at any given age, the CEO is more likely to retire voluntarily 
if their pension benefits have vested and are payable immediately. When CEOs 
continue working after the minimum retirement age, their cash compensation is 
higher. Moreover, Wei and Yermack (2011) examine investor reactions to CEO’s 
initial reports of inside debt positions required by SEC reforms in 2007. They find 
that firms whose CEOs have large DB plans or deferred compensation, stock 
prices fall, bond prices rise and the volatility of both bonds and equities drops 
when this information was reported after the SEC disclosure reform in 2007. Their 
results imply a reduction in overall firm risk and a transfer of value from equity 
holders to debtholders when executives’ holdings of inside debt are large. The 
study by Begley et al. (2015), which is the one more closely related to mine, 
examines whether the CEO’s compensation package influences the funding 
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levels of a firm’s tax-qualified DB plan and they find that CEOs with greater 
interests in supplemental pension plans are more likely to underfund the 
company’s DB plan. 
Furthermore, the role of chief financial officers (CFOs) on corporate 
decisions has only recently started to gain prominence and several studies 
document the effect of CFO incentives with regards to corporate and financial 
decisions (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). 
Building on this literature, I examine the influence of both CEO and CFO 
participation in the firms’ main pension plan, as opposed to a separate executive 
plan, on the survival rate of DB plans. In this context, I would expect the CEO and 
CFO incentives related to the decision to retain a firm’s DB plan to be more 
important compared to the executive directors in general. Anantharaman and Lee 
(2014) find that pension funding is stronger and that the positive relationship 
between firm risk and underfunding is lower when top managers, CEOs and 
CFOs in particular, have a significant vested interest in the pension plan and 
which may be jeopardized if the plan proves to be unsustainable. Based on the 
above discussion, I expect CEOs and CFOs who are members of the firms’ main 
DB plan to be more likely to retain the main DB plan. This leads to the second 
sub-hypothesis: 
H2A: Firms with CEO (CFO) membership in the firm’s DB plan on the same 
terms as the rest of the employees are more likely to keep their DB 
plans open, all else equal. 
On the other hand, if CEOs/CFOs have a separate DB scheme from the 
rest of the employees then their incentives may be different. However, I do not 
have any strong predictions about the impact of CEO/CFO membership in an 
exclusive executive pension plan on the decision to retain the main DB plan. This 
leads to the following non-directional sub-hypothesis:  
H2B: Participation of CEO (CFO) in a separate DB plan will affect a firm’s 
decision to retain DB plans, all else equal. 
At this point it is important to distinguish my expectations based on 
whether the hazard is a part or full closure of the plan. If the plan is fully closed, 
the expected effect on the executives’ pension are straightforward; they will 
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normally be worse off since they lose their vested interest. On the contrary, if the 
firm’s pension plan is partly closed the direct effects on the CEO (CFO) plan are 
not clear. If there are further curtailments followed by the partial plan closure then 
executives will be worse off; on the other hand, if the closure of the plan to new 
members does not have any subsequent effects on existing members, then an 
executive being a member of this plan will not make any difference to the decision 
to close/retain the DB plan. 
3.2.3 Accounting standards 
 
Historically, there was no accounting standard governing pension 
accounting in the UK until 1988 when SSAP 24 was introduced. SSAP 24, which 
was based on actuarial calculations, was superseded by FRS 17 in November 
2001, a standard that introduced fundamental changes to pension accounting. 
The adoption of FRS 17 was postponed until June 2003 and then again until 
January 2005 to coincide with the introduction of IAS 19, thereby reducing the 
cost for companies of having to implement two accounting standards. Up until 
this time, companies were required to disclose pension information under FRS17 
in the footnotes and were encouraged, but not required, to adopt or fully 
implement FRS17. Studies examining the impact of pension accounting 
standards on pension provision are few. Klumpes, Whittington and Li (2009) 
examine the characteristics of firms that exercised discretion over expected rate 
of return assumptions and which curtailed their DB plans. Using an industry 
matched sample of 40 UK companies that used mark-to-market expected rate of 
return (ERR) assumptions, consistent with the requirements under FRS 17, and 
40 non-switching industry-matched firms, Klumpes et al. (2009) find that firms 
that curtailed their DB plans and which frequently changed their ERR 
assumptions had significantly lower funding ratios, higher pension expenses and 
higher rates of undertaking new investments before the curtailment of the plan 
compared to those that kept the DB scheme open. Further results suggest that 
companies, which did not engage in active risk management of their DB plans in 
light of regulatory and economic changes, curtailed their DB plans and engaged 
in other corporate restructuring activities.  
Beaudoin et al. (2010) examine the potential impact of the anticipated 
adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 158 in the 
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US in September of 2006. They compare a sample of 147 firms which decided to 
freeze their DB plans with a matched sample of firms that did not freeze their DB 
plans. The results provide strong support for the hypothesized impact of SFAS 
No. 158 on firm decisions to freeze their DB plans. Amir, Guan and Oswald (2010) 
examine the impact of changes in pension disclosure and recognition 
requirements under FRS17 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US on pension asset 
allocation decisions. The new standards were expected to introduce volatility on 
reported numbers. By identifying a disclosure and a full recognition period, Amir 
et al. (2010) find that UK firms changed their pension asset allocation from 
equities to bonds during both periods. A shift from equities to bonds was also 
documented for US firms around the adoption of SFAS 158. The authors 
conclude that these results can be partly explained by the anticipated impact of 
the new accounting standards. 
Building on the prior literature, which documents the impact of accounting 
standards on pension freezes in the US and on asset allocation decisions for UK 
firms, I examine the impact of pension accounting standards on the decision to 
retain DB plans by focusing on the voluntary adoption of FRS 17 by firms included 
in my sample. The incentives driving the voluntary adoption of FRS 17 can be 
either characterized as altruistic or strategic. On the one hand, firms choosing to 
voluntarily adopt FRS 17 fully by recognizing the required amounts in the financial 
statements may do so to signal their transparency to the market and to portray 
the financial position of pension plans in the accounts accurately (i.e., altruistic 
FRS17 adopters). On the other hand, some firms which voluntarily adopted 
FRS17 may be motivated by strategic incentives. Comment letters submitted by 
companies to the Exposure Draft leading to the introduction of FRS17 alleged 
that FRS17 may contribute to the closure of DB plans. The above suggest that it 
is possible that some of the firms that adopted FRS17 voluntarily did so to ‘use’ 
the impact of the accounting rule changes on reported numbers as an excuse to 
legitimize the reduction in the accrual of benefits or even the closure of DB plans. 
The underlying incentives are not clear ex ante, and this is ultimately an empirical 
question to which I seek to shed more light. This leads to the last hypothesis: 
 
H3: Voluntary adoption of FRS17 is associated with DB pension provision 
decisions, all else equal. 
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3.2.4 DB plan terminations 
 
Another stream of literature relevant to the present study is the one that 
analyses DB plan closures. During the last three decades, the number of firms 
sponsoring DB plans has decreased significantly (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). 
Therefore, the existing literature focuses primarily on the reasons (determinants) 
for DB plan terminations and it provides in general mixed evidence.  
Early studies examine the termination of overfunded plans that became 
widespread during the 1980s. The majority of academic studies at that time 
indicate that plan terminations were attempts by financially distressed firms to 
access excess plan assets and thus several studies document wealth transfers 
from employees to shareholders (Alderson and Chen, 1986; Hamdallah and 
Ruland, 1986; Hsieh et al., 1990; Mittelstaedt, 1989; Thomas, 1989; Mittelstaedt 
and Regier, 1990; Petersen, 1992; Datta et al., 1995). Generally, these studies 
suggest that if a company is in financial distress, terminating a pension plan 
relieves the firm of future financial responsibility. Funds used for pension 
contributions would then be available for other uses by the firm such as to further 
reduce debt or fund projects that the firm was previously unable to undertake. 
Although prior research, mainly in the US setting, explains pension terminations 
prompted by the existence of excess pension assets as a form of financial slack, 
this explanation is not valid in the current economic environment where 
sponsoring firms are required to recognise any pension plan surplus or deficit on 
their balance sheets (Klumpes et al., 2007). In addition, historically in the UK the 
consensus view was that pension fund surpluses belong to plan members, 
depending on reasonable pension asset levels31 (Howe and Saunders, 1992). 
The economics of DB plans have changed significantly over the recent 
years. The strict regulations as well as recent developments in the financial 
markets have resulted in severely underfunded DB plans (Munnell and Soto, 
2007). More recent studies on DB plan terminations explore the potential effect 
that changes in accounting regulation (e.g. Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009; Beaudoin, 
Chandar and Werner, 2010) along with firm and pension plan characteristics have 
                                                          
31 ‘Historically, in the UK most trust or plan documents do not provide for surplus reversion to 
employer sponsors on plan termination. Rather, trust documentation often gives trustees 
discretion to improve member benefits, with some plans providing surplus ownership to plan 
members’ (Howe and Saunders, 1992).  
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in the decision to terminate a DB plan (e.g. Munnell and Soto, 2007; Comprix and 
Muller, 2011), while others consider the changes in the labour characteristics and 
preferences (e.g. Cowan and Power, 2003; Coronado and Copeland, 2004; 
Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; Kapinos, 2012; D’Souza et al., 2013). Kiosse and 
Peasnell, (2009) note that in the UK and the US the main reason behind DB 
freezes is the increased costs related with these plans and although accounting 
regulation has played a role this does not appear to be the main reason. However, 
the literature provides some evidence about the impact of accounting standards 
on pension provision decisions, mainly in the US setting. For example, Beaudoin 
et al. (2010) find that the effect of the adoption of Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 158 (SFAS 158) in the US is significantly related with 
firms’ decision to terminate their DB plans. Moreover, Munnell and Soto (2007) 
examine firm, plan and industry characteristics in a sample of US firms during 
2004 and 2005 and find that larger firms and companies that have low credit 
coverage relative to income, considerable legacy costs, low funding ratios and 
operate in R&D intensive industries are more likely to freeze their DB plans, while 
they do not find any significant effect of profitability on the decision to freeze DB 
plans. The authors conclude that the future earnings of companies that have such 
characteristics are more likely to be affected by expected reporting changes from 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Therefore, they are more 
likely to freeze DB plans. 
 Comprix and Muller (2011) nevertheless find that large firms are less likely 
to freeze, and that the funding ratio does not affect the probability of freezing. 
Moreover, Beaudoin et al. (2010) and Comprix and Muller (2011) find that the 
profitability of the sponsor firm plays an important role in the decision to freeze. 
Furthermore, Cowan and Power (2003), Coronado and Copeland, (2004) and 
Aaronson and Coronado, (2005), show that the conversion from DB to cash 
balance (CB)32 in the US is mainly done to appeal to a younger and more mobile 
workforce. On the contrary, D’Souza et al. (2013) do not find evidence that CB 
conversions are related with higher labour mobility. Rather, they suggest that 
firms for whom pension terminations are costly in terms of employee resistance, 
political visibility or explicit tax costs and those that are more likely to have 
                                                          
32 In the US the cash balance (CB) pension schemes have become popular as a way to limit the 
risk for the employer (Cowan and Power, 2003). Cash balance schemes are legally recognized 
as defined benefit schemes but with several characteristics of defined contribution plans. See 
Cahill and Soto (2003), for a detailed description of cash balance schemes. 
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financial accounting benefits from retaining DB plans are more likely to convert 
to CB plans than terminate their plans. 
The results of the prior literature which is mainly US- based do not point to 
a single factor driving DB plan terminations, but rather they suggest several 
factors combined. It should also be noted that the characteristics of companies 
that decide to close DB plans have changed historically. For example, in the past, 
most companies that closed their DB schemes were those facing bankruptcy or 
survival issues. However, it is worth noting that more recently, even healthy 
companies are making termination decisions with regards to their DB pension 
plans (Munnell and Soto, 2007). 
 
3.3 Research design 
 
To examine the determinants of a firm’s decision to retain their DB plans, 
I use a duration hazard model. To implement the hazard model, I define the 
duration of interest starting with the first year in my sample period, e.g., 1999, or 
the first year that the firm appears in the Index during my sample period 
(whichever is the earliest) ending with the year that the DB plan is closed or 2013, 
if the plan has not closed during the period examined in this study. The general 
form of a hazard model is: 
 
ln hi (t) = α(t) + BXi (t)        (3.1) 
where: 
hij (t)=the hazard, or instantaneous risk of closure, at time t for company i, 
conditional on survival to t; 
α(t) = the baseline hazard; 
B is a vector of coefficients; and 
Xi (t) is a matrix of observations on explanatory variables, some of which 
may vary with time. 
I estimate the model using the proportional likelihood estimation 
developed by Cox (1972).33 In the Cox model, no distributional assumptions are 
needed for α(t), the hazard function, or for the estimation of the coefficients. The 
estimated coefficient vector depends only on the rank order of the dependent 
                                                          
33 The Cox regression is a more appropriate model compared to logit and probit models, which 
assume an underlying distribution for the predictor variables (Henebry, 1996).  
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variable and is invariant with respect to monotonic transformations of the 
dependent variable. In this case, the dependent variable is t, time to failure. Cox 
proportional hazards model has been heavily used in bankruptcy prediction 
studies (Lane, Looney and Wansley, 1986; Crapp and Stevenson, 1987; 
Shumway, 2001; LeClere, 2000; Liu, 2004). LeClere (2000) notes that qualitative 
response models such as logistic regression or probit models employ data from 
the time period directly preceding the occurrence of the event of bankruptcy. 
Hence, the author considers those models static because they do not consider 
the entire time period preceding the event. Similarly, in this study the use of a 
survival model such as the Cox proportional model is more appropriate. 
Moreover, Liu (2004) observes that failure rates change with changes in the time-
series of economic data. Survival analysis is ideally suited to introducing a time 
dimension into DB plan survival since the objective is to estimate S(t) = P(T>t), 
the probability that DB plan closure will occur at a time T which lies beyond the 
time horizon t, for a range of values of t. Thus, a time dimension is embedded in 
the dependent variable of the model. The time dimension is also introduced to 
the independent variables by making them time-varying. For example, Chen, Lin 
and Zhou (2011) refer that a vector giving the asset turnover for a firm over a ten-
year period would be treated as a single variable, but the value of that variable 
would be updated as we follow the firm through time in estimating the survival 
model.  
The ‘failure event’ in this case is captured by the variables 
HAZARD_PART and HAZARD_FULL. These are indicator variables that take the 
value of 0 if the firm has an open DB plan and 1 if the plan is closed to new 
members and to all members, respectively. Thus, the failure value is 1. I examine 
both the hazard of a part and a full plan closure. I estimate separate models for 
each hypothesis (H1, H2A, H2B, and H3) discussed in Section 2. In addition, I 
interact each executive pension variable with the funding status of the plan to 
examine the incremental value of these variables for hypotheses H2A, H2B and 
interact each executive pension variable with FRS17 to examine the incremental 
value of those variables for hypothesis H3.  
To identify knowledge intensive firms and in particular firms for which 
human capital is important, I follow Barth et al. (2001) and measure INTANG as 
research and development and advertising expenses divided by operating 
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expenses.34 Based on H1, I predict the coefficients on INTANG and R&D to be 
negative, suggesting that if the firm is a knowledge intensive firm then the firm is 
more likely to retain the DB plan (or alternatively the hazard of closure is less 
likely). CEO_MAINDB (CFO_MAINDB) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO (CFO) is part of the company’s main DB plan and 0 otherwise. Based on 
hypothesis H2A, I predict a negative coefficient for CEO_MAINDB and 
CFO_MAINDB, which would suggest a higher likelihood of keeping DB plans 
open. CEO_EXCLDB (CFO_EXCLDB) is an indicator variable, which takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO (CFO) is a member of an exclusive executive DB plan and 
0 otherwise. I do not have any a priori expectations about the sign of this variable. 
FRS17 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm voluntarily adopted FRS 
17 in the years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 and 0 otherwise; I do not have any 
strong expectations about the sign of the FRS17 coefficient. 
Following Beaudoin et al. (2010), I also control for the CEO tenure and 
CFO tenure: CEO_TENURE (CFO_TENURE) captures the number of years that 
the CEO (CFO) holds the position. Following the extant literature, I include 
several control variables. To gauge how easy or difficult it is for a firm to keep DB 
plans open, I include three control variables: the ratio of active participants to total 
employees (ACTIVE), which measures the proportion of the firm’s employees that 
are currently offered a DB pension (Munnell and Soto, 2007). In addition, I include 
lagged plan size (PLAN_SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of the fair value 
of pension plan assets.35 Finally, I include the lagged salary cap (SALARY_CAP), 
which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has imposed a cap in the 
pensionable salary and 0 otherwise. Plans that are offered to a greater number 
of employees will face greater constraints if they proceed in DB pension closures 
compared to firms that are offered to a smaller part of the workforce (Munnell and 
Soto, 2007). In addition, larger firms and firms with larger DB pension plans will 
face more resistance and will potentially experience higher reputational costs due 
to greater potential negative media coverage (Comprix and Muller, 2011). Firms 
that have imposed a cap on pensionable salaries are partly controlling the 
inflation risk associated with DB plans. Thus, I expect a negative coefficient on 
ACTIVE, FIRM_SIZE, PLAN_SIZE and SALARY_CAP.  
                                                          
34 I also use R&D measured as research and development divided by total employees and 
results are similar for those two measures.  
35 The model also included firm size as a control variable but due to the high correlation 
coefficient between firm size and plan size I excluded this variable from the model. 
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To control for the health of the pension plan, I include the lagged funding 
status of the plan (FUNDED) which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the plan 
is overfunded and zero otherwise.36 Cowan and Power (2003), Comprix and 
Muller (2011), and D’Souza et al. (2013) suggest that employers are more likely 
to close DB plans that are more costly. In this case, the higher the deficit in the 
pension plan the higher the cost. In addition, Rauh (2006) finds that contributions 
to DB pension plans pose a real constraint on capital expenditures of the firm. To 
the extent that an overfunded plan is an indication of a healthier plan, I expect a 
negative coefficient on FUNDED.  
Moreover, the economics literature shows that DB pension plans provide 
management with negotiation leverage in discussions with employees or trade 
unions (Ippolito, 1985). In situations where management are negotiating costly 
wage increases, these can be limited by promising to make additional 
contributions to the pension plans (Ippolito, 1985). To control for the level of 
wages, I include average salaries (SALARY_AVG) measured as the ratio of 
wages and salaries to total employees. Plans that are subject to collective-
bargaining must negotiate with trade unions for any major decisions affecting the 
plan including closure decisions. Hence, plans that are covered by unions are 
arguably more difficult to freeze compared to plans that are not covered by unions 
(Munnell and Soto, 2007; Kapinos 2009 and 2012; Comprix and Muller, 2011). 
UNION is measured as the union density per industry based on the UK SIC 
industry classification. I use the lagged value of UNION and predict a negative 
coefficient on UNION. 
To control for the financial situation of the firm, I use leverage 
(LEVERAGE) measured as the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value 
of debt plus the market value of equity (Rauh, 2008) and the lagged value of the 
standard deviation of operating cash flows (STDEV_OCF) for the current and 
previous three years (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). In addition, I include the 
lagged operating profit margin (EBIT) measured as earnings before interest and 
taxes divided by total sales following Rauh and Stefanescu (2009). I expect that 
firms with lower leverage, lower variation of operating cash flows and higher 
operating profit margin to be more likely to retain their DB plans. Hence, I predict 
                                                          
36 According to the Pension Act 1995 (Sec 60 (1)) a ‘serious underprovision' arises in the case 
where the scheme's assets are less than 90 percent of its liabilities. The sponsoring employers 
with funds falling below 90 percent are required to increase their cash contributions so as to 
eliminate the deficit within one year.  
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a positive coefficient for LEVERAGE and STDEV_OCF and a negative coefficient 
for EBIT. I also include the sales growth (GROWTH) measured as the percentage 
change in sales and the market risk measured by lagged beta (BETA) to control 
for the market valuation of future growth opportunities and market risk. I expect a 
positive coefficient on GROWTH and a negative coefficient on BETA. 
In the models where the hazard is full DB plan closure I also include 
PARTLY_CLOSED an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the plan is 
closed to new entrants and 0 otherwise. 
All specifications include industry fixed effects (∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ) to control 
for cross-sectional differences within industries.37 All models use robust standard 
errors clustered by firm to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
(Rogers, 1993). Variable definitions are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
3.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
3.4.1 Sample selection 
 
Table 3.2 presents the sample selection process. The initial sample 
includes all firms that are constituents of the FTSE All-Share index from 199938 
until 2013. I subsequently remove firms not sponsoring a DB plan. Finally, I omit 
firms that sponsor a DB plan in another country given that plans in other countries 
may be affected by regulation and institutional setting in those countries. For 
those firms I collect data from 199939 to 2013. Given the research design, I 
subsequently omit firm-year observations after the plan part and full closure from 
the sample. The final sample used in the empirical analysis after taking into 
consideration missing observations includes 1,371 firm-year observations for the 
analysis of partly closed DB plans and 2,684 firm-year observations for the 
analysis of the full closure of the plans.40 Table 3.2 presents the sample selection 
                                                          
37 I use Fama and French 12 industry classification codes.  
38The sample period begins in 1999 because this is the first year for which firms provide 
information on the market value of the pension plan assets and liabilities in the notes to the 
financial statements, as required by FRS 17. Before year 1999, UK firms provided disclosures 
under SSAP 24, which was based on actuarial calculations. If the market value of plan assets 
and liabilities is not provided for 1999 I use the market valuation provided for 2000. 
39 The starting year is 1999 or the first year in which the firm appears in the FTSE All - Share 
index. 
40 The sample is also reduced because I use lagged values for control variables. 
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process. 41  Data on financial and pension variables are hand-collected from 
annual reports and extracted from Worldscope.42 Data on pension plan members 
are hand-collected from ‘Pension Funds and Their Advisers’ publication.43 Data 
sources for all variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
“Insert Table 3.1 here” 
“Insert Table 3.2 here” 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3.3 provides information about the number of firms that retain their 
DB plans by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B).44   Panel A, shows a 
monotone decrease of open plans over time. The number of firms with fully open 
plans has been declining with the largest decline being from 2006 onwards 
(Column 3), suggesting that the decision to retain DB plans is affected by the 
adverse conditions in the equity markets during this period. On the contrary, firms 
with partly open plans (i.e., typically open to existing employees only) (Column 4) 
shows a peak in the period 2001-2003 which coincides with the adoption of FRS 
17 for UK companies. Then the number of plans that are partly open declines 
gradually up until the end of the sample period in 2013. It is important to clarify 
that all sample firms that close DB plans, either to new or existing employees, set 
up some type of DC plan.45 Finally, there are a few full closures during 2002 and 
2003, but the number of fully closed DB plans has been increasing after 2006 
reaching a maximum in 2011 (19 plans) (Column 5).  Panel B shows that firms in 
mature industries such as Manufacturing and Utilities have higher retention of DB 
                                                          
41 All tables are presented at the end of the chapter in Appendix II. 
42 Variables were checked against Thomson Reuters database and against financial statements 
to ensure that all values are as reported and to add any missing variables. Pension data are 
hand-collected for 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
43 Pension Funds and Their Advisers is an annual edition that provides financial and contact 
information for the UK’s major pension funds and details on their advisory firms. 
44 The number of firms through the years is not consistent as many firms leave the market 
(either close or become private) while others enter the market. 
45 The main groups of DC plans that have been identified from hand-collected data from pension 
footnotes are money purchase plans or self-invested personal pension plans (SIPP) or 
stakeholder plans. 
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plans (Columns 3 and 4). An interesting fact is that firms in industries such as 
utilities and energy do not appear to have any full DB plan closures (Column 5).   
“Insert Table 3.3 here” 
Table 3.4 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical analyses and their associated tests of differences in means. Panel A of 
this Table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms in which I examine 
the hazard of partial closure while Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 
sample of firms in which I examine the hazard of full DB plan closures; Panel C 
shows tests of differences in means. Continuous variables have been winsorized 
at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. Panel A shows that intangibles are 
very low on average (1.4%). Approximately 61% of CEOs and 66% of CFOs 
participate in the firms’ main pension plan, while only 8.4% and 9.8% of CEOs 
and CFOs respectively are members of a separate executive plan. This suggests 
that most of the executives in this sample are members of the firm’s main DB 
plan. Moreover, only 5% of the firms in the sample have voluntarily adopted 
FRS17. In addition, 65% of the plans in this sample are overfunded. The CEO 
and CFO tenure are on average 4.8 years. The mean (median) proportion of 
active participants in the main DB plan is 31% (23%). 24.5% of firms in this 
sample are on average unionised and 5.9% of firms in the sample imposed a 
salary cap on pension benefits. The average (median) plan size is about 5.8 (5.8). 
The average (median) profitability is 13% (8.7%) and the average (median) 
leverage ratio is 46% (44.9%) while average (median) sales growth is 9.1% 
(5.9%). Moreover, the average (median) market beta is 0.94 (0.95), indicating 
that firms in the sample have low systematic risk.  
Panel B shows that in this sample intangibles are on average slightly 
higher (1.7%). 49.8% of CEOs and 56.4% of the CFOs participate in the firm’s 
main pension plan while only 8.3% and 8.8% of CEOs and CFOs respectively 
participate in an executive pension plan. The number of CEOs and CFOs that 
participate in the firms’ main DB plan is lower in this sample suggesting that firms 
that fully close DB plans have lower proportion of executives participating in the 
main DB plan. In addition, only 5.1% of the firms in the sample have voluntarily 
adopted FRS17. Moreover, approximately 52% of firms in this sample are 
overfunded suggesting that firms that fully close DB plans are less funded as 
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compared to firms that partly close them. The average CEO and CFO tenure are 
5 years. The mean (median) ratio of active plan participants to total employees is 
lower in this sample 28.2% (20.5%), suggesting that firms that close DB plans to 
all employees have less active participants as compared to the sample of firms 
that have only closed DB plans to new entrants. The number of firms that imposed 
a pensionable salary cap increases significantly to 16% while average union 
density increases to 28%. In addition, the average salary is higher for the sample 
of firms that fully close DB plans (0.028) compared to firms that partly close them 
suggesting that these firms are likely to compensate for the closure of DB plans 
with higher salaries. The average (median) plan size is 5.7 (5.8) the average 
(median) market beta is 0.97 (0.96). Average growth is lower (7.6%) compared 
to the sample of firms with partly closed plans. Overall, when comparing the two 
samples, it can be observed that firms that fully close their DB plans have more 
intangibles and less CEOs and CFOs that participate in the firm’s qualified DB 
plan relative to the sample of firms that partially close DB plans. Moreover, these 
firms have less funded pension plans. In addition, firms that close DB plans to all 
employees have less active participants in the DB plan and higher union density; 
have imposed more pensionable salary caps, offer higher salaries on average 
and have higher market risk compared to firms that have closed their DB plans 
only to new entrants. 
“Insert Table 3.4 here” 
Table 3.5 presents the correlation matrix for the sample of firms in which I 
examine the partial closures (upper diagonal) and for the sample of firms in which 
I examine full closures (lower diagonal). The table shows that HAZARD_PART is 
negatively correlated to FUNDED (-0.13), suggesting that better funded plans are 
more likely to remain open and there is also some evidence that plan size 
(PLAN_SIZE) (-0.05) and union density (UNION) (-0.06) are negatively correlated 
with HAZARD_PART. In addition, CEO_TENURE is positively correlated with 
HAZARD_PART (0.05) suggesting that the longer a CEO remains on the board 
the more likely the plan to close to new entrants. 
The lower diagonal in Table 3.5 shows that HAZARD_FULL is negatively 
correlated with both CEO (-0.11) and CFO (-0.11) being members of the 
company’s main DB plan (CEO_MAINDB and CFO_MAINDB). HAZARD_FULL 
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is also negatively correlated with CFO_EXCLDB (-0.04), suggesting that CEOs 
are more likely to keep DB plans fully open when they are members of the firm’s 
pension plan while CFOs are likely to retain DB plans despite of whether they are 
members of the company’s or of an exclusive executive plan. FRS17 is negatively 
correlated with HAZARD_FULL (-0.04) suggesting that firms that adopted FRS17 
are less likely to fully close their DB plans. HAZARD_FULL is negatively 
correlated with FUNDED (-0.07) suggesting that firms with funded plans are more 
likely to retain DB plans open. CFO_TENURE is also negatively correlated with 
HAZARD_FULL (-0.03) suggesting that the more the CFOs remain on the board 
the more likely they are to retain DB plans. Moreover, HAZARD_FULL is 
negatively correlated with the ratio of active members to total firm employees 
(ACTIVE) (-0.05) UNION (-0.07) and sales growth (GROWTH) (-0.04). On the 
contrary, the standard deviation of operating cash flows (STDEV_OCF) (0.03), 
LEVERAGE (0.04) and BETA (0.07) are positively correlated with 
HAZARD_FULL, implying that riskier firms are more likely to fully close DB plans. 
SALARY_CAP (0.07) and PARTLY_CLOSED (0.11) are positively correlated 
with HAZARD_FULL, implying that firms that have imposed a pensionable salary 
cap and have partly closed their DB plans are more likely to fully close them. 
The analysis discussed in this section provides descriptive information 
about the variables used in this study, without controlling for other factors that 
may influence the likelihood of keeping DB plans open. The next section reports 
the results of the Cox multivariate analysis, which examines variables that may 
have an impact on a firm’s decision to retain DB pension plans. 
“Insert Table 3.5 here” 
3.5 Findings  
 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results of the Cox regression which models 
the effects of covariates on the survival probability of DB plans.46 Table 3.6 shows 
the results for main DB plans (MAINDB) (Panel A) and exclusive DB plans 
(EXCLDB) (Panel B) when the hazard is a partial closure of the DB plan. Table 
3.7 shows the results for MAINDB plans (Panel A) and EXCLDB plans (Panel B) 
                                                          
46 Coefficients with a negative sign indicate a positive impact on the probability of DB plan 
retention, while coefficients with a positive coefficient indicate a negative impact on the 
probability of DB plan retention. 
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when the hazard is a full DB plan closure. Column (1) in both tables (Panel A) 
reports the results of the basic model which shows the effect that a firm with highly 
skilled human capital has on the survival of DB plans (H1), while controlling for 
other variables which may have an impact on DB plan retention. Column (1) in 
Table 3.6, shows that the coefficient on INTANG is not statistically significant 
when the hazard is a partial DB closure while is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 10% level of significance) when the hazard is a full closure of 
the plan (Table 3.7), suggesting that being a knowledge intensive firm increases 
the survival rate of a DB plan, consistent with the first hypothesis.47 However, 
since this appears to be the case only when the hazard is a full closure of the 
plan it suggests that DB plans are mainly seen as means of retaining existing 
employees rather than being used as a tool for attracting new employees. This is 
in line with the literature which suggests that a younger workforce prefers the 
portability of DC plans rather DB plans which in many cases cannot be transferred 
when switching jobs (e.g. Cowan and Power, 2003; Coronado and Copeland, 
2004; Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; Kapinos, 2012; D’Souza, Jacob and 
Lougee, 2013). Moreover, the coefficient on FUNDED is negative and statistically 
significant when the hazard is a full plan closure (Table 3.7) suggesting that 
overfunded plans are more likely to remain fully open.  
Next, I explore the influence of key executives such as the CEO and CFO 
on DB plan survival; Tables 3.6 and Table 3.748 report these findings. Table 3.6, 
Panel A, Column (2), shows that CEO_MAINDB has a negative and significant 
coefficient. These results suggest that controlling for INTANG and FUNDED, 
CEO membership in the firms’ main DB plan increases the likelihood of DB plan 
survival consistent with H2A. When I interact CEO_MAINDB with FUNDED 
(Column (3)), CEOs that are members of DB plan as the rest of the employees 
are more likely to retain these plans regardless of the funding status of the plan. 
This result holds for both hazards, part and full plan closure as it can be also 
observed in Table 3.7 (Columns (2) and (3)). In addition, the coefficient on 
CFO_MAINDB is statistically insignificant when the hazard is a part closure 
                                                          
 
 
48 Results for CFO_EXCLDB are not reported in Table 3.7, Panel B, because the CFO_EXCLDB 
variable is collinear (negative collinearity) with the hazard variable (HAZARD_FULL). 
Coefficients for the variables that have (any form of) collinearity cannot be estimated. 
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(Table 3.6, Column (4)) while it is negative and highly significant in the case of a 
full closure (Table 3.7, Column (4)), suggesting that after controlling for INTANG 
and FUNDED, the participation of CFOs in the firm’s main DB plan has a positive 
effect on DB plan survival, also supporting H2A. Column (5) in both Tables reports 
the results when I interact CFO_MAINDB with FUNDED. Similar to CEOs, the 
findings show that when CFOs are members of the firm’s main plan they are less 
likely to close DB plans to either new or existing members regardless of the 
funding status. 
Table 3.6, Panel B reports the results for exclusive DB plans. The 
coefficient on CEO_EXCLDB and CFO_EXCLDB is statistically insignificant 
(Columns (2) and (4)) suggesting that management participation in a separate 
executive plan does not have any impact on the hazard of closure of the main DB 
plan. However, when interacting CEO/CFO_EXCLDB with FUNDED (Columns 
(3) and (5)) I find some marginal evidence that, when executives are members of 
an exclusive DB plan they are more likely to close DB plans to new entrants when 
the plan is underfunded while I do not find such evidence when the hazard is a 
full closure (Columns (6) and (7) in Table 3.7). Overall, these findings support 
hypotheses H2A and H2B suggesting that CEO participation in particular in the 
main DB plan is likely to increase the likelihood of DB plan retention; I also find 
some evidence that CFO participation in the main DB plan is also likely to 
increase the likelihood of DB plan retention. 
Moreover, I examine the effect of the FRS17 adoption on DB plan 
retention. Columns (6) - (9) in Table 3.6, Panels A49 and B report the findings for 
H3.50 Panel A shows that FRS17 does not have any effect on the likelihood of DB 
plan survival (Column 6). However, when interacted with CFO_MAINDB I find 
that firms that adopted FRS17 and their CFOs are members of main plans are 
less likely to close DB plans to new entrants (Panel A, Column 10). On the 
contrary, when I interact FRS17 with CEO/CFO_EXCLDB (Panel B, Columns (8) 
and (10)), I find that firms that voluntarily adopted FRS17 and their CEOs/CFOs 
                                                          
49 Panel A, does not report the interaction between FRS17 and CEO_MAINDB (Column 8). 
Interacting those two variables was not possible because there are no observations where 
FRS17 and CEO_MAINDB overlap i.e. where FRS17 and CEO_MAINDB are simultaneously 1.  
50 It was not possible to examine the effect that FRS17 has on the hazard of a full DB plan 
closure (Table 3.7) because the FRS17 variable is collinear (negative collinearity) with the 
hazard variable (HAZARD_FULL). Coefficients for the variables that have (any form of) 
collinearity cannot be estimated. 
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are members of an exclusive DB plan are less likely to retain DB plans partly 
open (i.e. the hazard of part closure increases for those firms). However, these 
findings provide only weak evidence about the effect that the FRS17 adoption 
has on the retention of DB plans; rather, they suggest that it is the executive 
pension plan incentives that play an important role. 
With regards to the control variables, the coefficient on ACTIVE is positive 
and statistically significant while coefficients on UNION and PLAN_SIZE are 
negative and statistically significant in Table 3.6, suggesting that firms that have 
a higher proportion of active members, lower union density and smaller pension 
plans are more likely to close DB plans to new entrants. In Table 3.7 the 
coefficient on PLAN_SIZE is negative and statistically significant while 
coefficients on LEVERAGE and STDEV_OCF are positive and statistically 
significant suggesting that larger firms are more likely to retain DB plans fully 
open while firms with higher leverage and higher fluctuations of operating cash 
flows are less likely to retain DB plans fully open. The pseudo R-squared values 
suggest that the selected models are better as compared to the baseline model.51 
Taken together, these results suggest that the duration of DB plans is 
longer in firms that operate in industries which rely on high skilled human capital 
and for firms in which CEOs and CFOs participate in the same DB plan as the 
rest of the employees. I do not find evidence that the adoption of FRS 17 had any 
effect on DB plan retention. These findings provide some weak evidence that DB 
plans are still considered as an important tool to retain highly skilled employees 
in line with the labour economics literature. They also indicate that CEO and CFO 
incentives are important in determining the DB plan survival rate.  
 
"Insert Table 3.6 here" 
“Insert Table 3.7 here” 
                                                          
51 For non-linear regression models is not possible to compute a single R-squared that has all 
the characteristics of R-squared in the linear regression model, so these approximations are 
computed instead. The pseudo R-squared used in this case is the Cox and Snell (1989) R-
squared which is based on the likelihood for the model compared to the log likelihood for a 
baseline model. Note that Cox and Snell (1989) pseudo R-squared has a maximum value that is 
not 1. In other words, this ratio is indicative of the degree to which the model parameters 
improve upon the prediction of the null model.  The smaller this ratio, the greater the 
improvement and the higher the R-squared. 
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3.5.1 Do DB plan partial closures really matter? 
 
As discussed earlier there is a need to clarify whether executives are 
worse off after the closure of the plan to new entrants. This will help to adjust my 
expectations regarding the effect that CEO (CFO) membership in the firms main 
DB plan has in the decision to close DB plans to new entrants. For this reason, I 
initially test whether executives are worse off after a partial plan closure using a 
cox hazard model where the hazard is imposing a pensionable salary cap (SC).52 
Table 3.8 presents the results of the Cox regression which models the hazard of 
having a pensionable salary cap as a result of a DB plan closure to new 
entrants.53 Column (1) reports the results of a firm partly closing its DB plan 
(CLOSED_PART) on the hazard of imposing a salary cap while controlling for the 
funding status of the pension plan. The coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance suggesting that if a firm closes its DB plan 
to new entrants it is highly likely that this firm will also impose a pensionable salary 
cap to existing plan members. Columns (2-5) and (6–9) report how CEO and CFO 
pension plans (CEO_MAINDB, CEO_EXCLDB and CFO_MAINDB, CFO_ 
EXCLDB) respectively affect these results. More specifically, columns 2,3 and 6, 
7 show that CEOs and CFOs being members of the firms pension plan or an 
exclusive pension plan does not have any impact on the hazard of a salary cap. 
However, when interacting those variables with CLOSED_PART an interesting 
result that emerges is that if the plan is closed to new entrants and the CEO is a 
member of that plan (Column 4) it does not have any effect on the probability of 
a salary cap. In contrast, when the plan is partly closed, and the CEO is a member 
of an exclusive plan (Column 5), then it is more likely for the firm to introduce a 
pensionable salary cap for existing scheme members. The results in Columns 8 
and 9 show the CFO pension does not have any significant effect on the decision 
to impose a salary cap along with the DB plan being closed to new members. 
Overall, these results suggest that if a DB plan is closed to new entrants, the firm 
is also likely to adopt other forms of pension curtailments such as a pensionable 
                                                          
52 I have also tested this using a probit model which provides (untabulated) similar results.  
53 For ease of interpretation I present the coefficients (βi) and not hazard ratios (exp(βi)). 
Variables with positive coefficients (the βi values) are associated with increased hazard and 
decreased survival times, i.e. as the predictor increases the hazard of the event increases and 
the predicted survival duration decreases. Negative coefficients indicate decreased hazard and 
increased survival times. In other words, If βi > 0, the hazard of closure is higher because eβi > 
1. If βi < 0, the hazard of closure is lower because eβi >1. 
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salary cap which will adversely affect existing members, especially when the CEO 
is a member of a separate executive DB plan. Hence, these results also suggest 
that the personal incentives of the CEO play a key role on pension curtailment 
decisions following the closure of the company’s main DB plan to new members. 
3.6 Additional analysis 
In the UK, assets of DB pension plans are held in trusts and the trustees 
are responsible for the investment of pension plan assets as well as for producing 
and maintaining a schedule of contributions. In particular, the trustees need to 
decide about the level of contributions to the scheme, the pension plan 
investment strategy, amendment of scheme rules or the members’ benefits and 
the closure or winding up of the plan (The Pensions Regulator, 2014). This 
suggests that the actions of the trustees will have significant implications on the 
behaviour of the management of the firm (Cocco and Volpin, 2007). Trustees 
could be either individual or corporate trustees and can be elected plan members, 
company or independent trustees. Among these types of trustees, special 
consideration is given to trustees who are also executive directors of the 
sponsoring company due to their conflict of interest between their role as 
executives and their role as trustees (Cocco and Volpin, 2007). The law specifies 
that trustees should not act in the benefit of any particular group and that they 
should act in the best interest of the scheme members (The Pensions Regulator, 
2014). However, being a director of the sponsoring company as well as a trustee 
may potentially influence trustees’ independence. This has been recognised by 
both the previous and the current pension regulatory authorities, namely OPRA 
and The Pensions Regulator. In particular, The Pension Regulator (2008) refers:  
“Conflicts are likely to be of two main types:  
 conflicts between the personal interest of a trustee, director or staff 
member and his duty to the beneficiaries of the pension scheme (the 
possibility of personal financial gain, for example); and   
 conflicts between the duty owed by the trustee, director or staff member to 
the beneficiaries of the scheme and his fiduciary duty owed to other 
persons (for example, as a director of an employer company or as a 
trustee of another trust).” 
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In this study, I focus on the second type of conflict, specifically when the trustee 
is also the director of the sponsoring company. The Pension Regulator (2008) 
also provides some relevant situation specific examples in which other duties may 
influence decisions:  
 “funding decisions which are unduly or inappropriately influenced by a 
trustee who also holds a senior role within the employer – may become 
more relevant when the employer operates performance related bonuses 
or incentives.  
 trustee involvement in corporate transactions involving the sponsoring 
employer, where the interests of the scheme as a creditor may diverge 
from the benefits accruing to other parties to the transaction.  
  a trustee who also holds a role within the employer is privy to sensitive 
information relating to the employer, which could have an impact or 
potential impact on the scheme.   
 a decision to wind up/close the scheme to future accrual.   
 where conversion terms for member options are under discussion, 
particularly those for commutation of pension at retirement; while trustees 
are likely to be motivated to ensure broad cost neutrality within the 
scheme, the employer may prefer and encourage conversion terms that 
lead to lower expected costs.   
 trustees approaching retirement may be motivated by favourable options 
to improve benefits at a personal level as opposed to considering the wider 
implications.” 
Cocco and Volpin (2007) note that on the one hand insider-trustees may 
be a source of agency problems between shareholders and pension plan 
members. In this case, insider trustees act in line with shareholders’ incentives 
by shifting the risk from shareholders to plan participants; on the other hand, 
insider trustees may act to the benefit of both shareholders and scheme members 
by integrating their financial and pension policies. More specifically, if a company 
increases leverage, uses the proceeds to fund the pension plan, and invests 
these funds in bonds, this may generate tax savings without affecting financial 
risk (Black, 1980, Tepper, 1981). Using a sample of UK firms between 2002 and 
2003, Cocco and Volpin (2007) test these two alternative hypotheses and find 
63 
 
that insider trustees act in the interest of shareholders. More specifically, they find 
that companies with higher leverage and higher proportion of insider trustees 
invest in more risky assets, make fewer contributions, and have a higher dividend 
payout ratio. I extend those findings by examining how the presence of insider 
trustees affects a firm’s decision to retain DB plans. As explained above, trustees 
play an important role in decisions related to the DB pension plans including the 
decision to alter pension benefits for particular groups of employees and the 
decision to close a DB plan. In particular, trustees who are also company 
executives (i.e., insider trustees) may have different incentives with regards to 
the decision to retain DB plans. Based on the above discussion, I do not make 
any specific predictions about the influence of the insider trustees on the decision 
of the firm to keep DB plans open. CEOs have the overall responsibility for 
corporate decisions and they will typically bear the reputation and other costs of 
bad decisions. However, DB plans are generally considered a form of long-term 
debt (Edmans and Liu, 2011) and the management of debt is a key responsibility 
of CFOs (e.g. Graham and Harvey, 2001; Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2008; Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2010). Hence, corporate pension decisions are of great 
importance especially when pension assets and liabilities are economically 
significant. Anantharaman and Lee (2014) find that CFOs in particular engage in 
risk shifting through pension underfunding when their compensation packages 
provide greater risk-taking incentives. I build on this research by analysing the 
effect that CEO trustees and CFO trustees have on the decision to retain DB 
plans. This setting allows me to explore the interesting question whether CEO 
and CFO personal incentives i.e., being member of the DB plan has an impact 
on DB retention decisions. 
Using the sample employed in the main analysis, I hand-collect data on 
names of pension plan trustees from the Pension Funds and Their Advisers 
publication from 1999 to 2013. I manually check the names of trustees against 
information included in the BoardEx database and data collected manually from 
annual reports about the role(s) of each executive to establish whether trustees 
sit on the executive board. If they do so, I label these ‘insider trustees’. Due to 
availability of data, the subsample for this analysis drops significantly. More 
specifically, for the partial open plans sample there are 1,115 firm-year 
observations available (171 unique firms) which drops to 800 firm-year 
observations once we delete missing observations and use lags in all 
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independent variables. For the sample of fully opens schemes, there are 2067 
firm-year observations available (185 unique firms) which after removing missing 
observations and using lags for all independent variables reduces to 1,627 firm-
year observations.54 In this analysis I employ two new variables. CEO_TRUSTEE 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the trustee is also a firm’s CEO and 0 
otherwise; and CFO_TRUSTEE equals 1 if the trustee is also a firm’s CFO and 
0 otherwise. The rest of the variables are defined as above. 
Table 3.9 reports the descriptive statistics and associated tests of 
differences in means for this subsample. Panel A, shows that, on average, there 
are 15.9% and 29% trustees are CEOs and CFOs, respectively, for the 
subsample of partial closures. Panel B, shows that 11.9% of trustees are also 
CEOs and 26.5% are also CFOs. The proportion of CFOs that are also trustees 
is higher than the CEOs. I assume that their financial knowledge makes them 
more relevant for the role of trustee. Because the trustee information is only 
available for a subsample of the main sample there may be some concern for 
self-selection bias. I therefore carry out univariate analysis testing differences in 
means for the subsample used in the analysis reported in this section and the 
sample used in the main analysis. Panel C, reports these results. Overall, there 
are no significant differences in means between the subsample used in this 
analysis and the sample used in the main analysis; however, I find some marginal 
evidence for some of the variables used in the analysis as follows: Panel A, 
INTANG at the 10% level of significance, CEO_MAINDB at the 10% level, 
CFO_MAINDB at 5% level and a few of the control variables are statistically 
different between the two samples. Panel B, CFO_EXCLDB at 10% level and a 
few of the control variables are statistically different between the two samples. 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report the results of the Cox regression model for 
the additional analysis. Table 3.10 shows the results for MAIN_DB plans (Panel 
A) and EXCLDB (Panel B) when the hazard is a part closure of the DB plan. Table 
3.10 shows the results for MAIN_DB plans (Panel A) and EXCLDB (Panel B) 
when the hazard is a full DB plan closure. In Column (1) using the subsample 
available for the additional analysis I estimate the basic model as in Tables 3.7 
and 3.8. As it can be seen the results are similar to the ones obtained for the main 
                                                          
54 I delete observations after the first year of a part (full) closure. This information refers to these data. 
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sample. Table 3.10, Panel A, Columns (2) and (7) report the effect of 
CEO_TRUSTEES and CFO_TRUSTEES on DB plan retention. The coefficient 
on CEO_TRUSTEE is positive and statistically significant (at 10% level of 
significance) suggesting that the presence of CEOs as trustees can positively 
affect the decision to retain DB plans partly open. I do not find such evidence for 
CFO_TRUSTEES. I then interact CEO_TRUSTEE/ CFO_TRUSTEE with 
FUNDED (Columns (3) and (8)) respectively. I find some evidence that when the 
plan is overfunded, CEOs who are also trustees are more likely to retain DB plans 
(at 5% level of significance), while I do not find such evidence for a CFO trustees.  
To analyse CEOs/CFOs personal incentives I initially add into the model 
CEO/CFO_MAINDB (CEO/CFO_EXCLDB) and then I utilize two way and three 
way interactions to examine the effect of CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE and 
CEO/CFO_MAINDB (CEO/CFO_EXCLDB) and FUNDED simultaneously.55 The 
results reported in Columns (4) suggest that after controlling for CEO trustees, 
when CEOs are members of the main DB plan the survival rate of the DB plan is 
likely to increase which is consistent with my findings in the main analysis. 
Moreover, the results in Columns (5) show that CEO trustees that are also 
members of the firms’ DB plan are more likely to retain this plan partly open even 
if it is underfunded. I also find evidence that CEO trustees that are members of 
an exclusive executive plan are more likely to close the main DB plan to new 
entrants (Panel B, Column (6). I also examine the role of CFOs; I do not find any 
statistical significance for CFO_TRUSTEES but consistent with the findings for 
CEOs, I find that participation of CFOs in the main DB plan after controlling for 
CFO_TRUSTEES increases the likelihood of DB plan retention. In addition, 
participation of CFOs in an exclusive DB plan decreases the likelihood of DB plan 
retention.  
Taken together these results suggest that firms where CEOs and CFOs 
are also trustees are more likely to retain DB plans. In addition, when 
CEOs/CFOs, and also trustees then they are more likely to retain those plans; 
while when they are members of an exclusive executive DB plan then they are 
more likely to close these plans to new entrants. The results overall reflect the 
                                                          
55 Two way and three way interactions were not possible to be estimated in Table 3.11 where 
the hazard is a full plan closure, due to collinearity. Coefficients for the variables that have (any 
form of) collinearity cannot be estimated. 
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role of insider trustees on pension provision decisions and suggest that their 
decisions are motivated by their personal incentives. 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter examines the determinants of defined benefit plan retentions 
in the UK. I hypothesise that firms for which human capital is important, are more 
likely to retain their defined benefit pension plans. In addition, I expect that 
defined benefit plans are more likely to be retained when key executives such as 
the CEO and the CFO are members of the firm’s main DB plan; however, I do not 
have any strong predictions about the impact of CEO/CFO participation in 
separate executive DB plans on pension provision decisions. Using hand-
collected data on a sample of FTSE All-Share firms that sponsor DB plans, for 
which data were available from 1999 to 2013, the results suggest that firms where 
human capital is important are more likely to retain DB plans. This result implies 
that DB plans are important means to retain highly skilled employees consistent 
with economic theory. In addition, the participation of CEOs and CFOs in the 
firms’ main pension plan, as the rest of the employees, has a significantly positive 
effect on the survival of DB plans. I do not find any evidence that the adoption of 
FRS 17 from UK firms had any effect on the survival rate of DB plans. Moreover, 
using a subsample for which data on the names of the trustees are available and 
also information about whether they are members of the executive board, I 
examine the impact of insider trustees on the survival rate of DB schemes. I find 
that the presence of CEOs on the board of trustees is more likely to lead to 
defined benefit plan retentions, suggesting that the CEO plays a key role in 
corporate pension provision decisions. 
Overall, these results shed light on the factors influencing DB plan survival 
in the UK and document the key role of human capital and managerial incentives 
on such decisions. This study contributes to the existing body of literature 
examining the impact of managerial incentives on corporate decisions by 
showing the importance of CEO and CFO incentives on the decision to retain 
defined benefit plans. In addition, this study examines the determinants of defined 
benefit plan retentions and in this context, it contributes to the literature on 
pension provision as well as studies examining the economic consequences of 
accounting standards. Finally, this study contributes to the corporate governance 
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literature by examining the role of insider trustees who may also be members of 
the company’s defined benefit plan. 
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Appendix II 
 
Table 3.1: Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Source 
HAZARD_PART Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
has closed its plan to new employees only 
and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
HAZARD_FULL Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
has closed its plan to all) new and existing) 
employees only and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CEO_MAINDB Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
CEO is a member of the main DB plan as the 
rest of the employees, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CEO_EXCLDB Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
CEO is a member of a separate executive 
DB plan, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CFO_MAINDB Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
CFO is a member of the main DB plan as the 
rest of the employees, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CFO_EXCLDB Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
CFO is a member of a separate executive 
DB plan, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
FUNDED Funding status computed by dividing the fair 
value of plan assets by the projected benefit 
obligation. 
Worldscope and hand-
collected from Annual 
Reports 
INTANG Following Barth et al. (2001) this is 
calculated as: Research and development 
and advertising expenses divided by 
operating expenses. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CEO_TENURE The number of years the CEO holds the 
position. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CFO_TENURE The number of years the CFO holds the 
position. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CEO_TRUSTEE Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
CEO is also the trustee of the company, and 
0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
‘Pension Funds and Their 
Advisors’ 
CFO_TRUSTEE Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
CFO is also the trustee of the company, and 
0 otherwise.  
Hand-collected from 
‘Pension Funds and Their 
Advisors’ 
ACTIVE Number of active members of the plan 
divided by the total number of employees. 
Hand-collected from 
‘Pension Funds and Their 
Advisers’ 
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UNION The union density by industry based on UK 
SIC code. 
Office of National 
Statistics: Trade Union 
Statistics 
PLAN_SIZE Pension plan size is computed by the natural 
logarithm of the fair value of pension plan 
assets. 
Worldscope and hand-
collected 
SALARY_CAP Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
imposed a cap on pensionable salaries and 
0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
SALARY_AVG The average salary is computed by dividing 
salaries and wages by the total number of 
employees. 
Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Following Rauh (2008) this is calculated as 
follows:  
(Book Debt) / (Book Debt+ Market Value of 
Equity), where the book debt excludes the 
effect of pensions.  
Worldscope 
STDEV_OCF Standard deviation of operating cash flows 
for the current and previous four years. 
Worldscope 
EBIT Measure of profitability computed by dividing 
EBIT by Sales. 
Worldscope 
GROWTH Growth is computed as follows: (Salest – 
Salest-1)/Salest-1. 
Worldscope 
BETA Market beta  The London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) 
PARTLY_CLOSED Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has 
closed its DB plan to new entrants and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
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Table 3.2: Sample selection process 
  Firms  
Firm-year 
observations 
FTSE All-Share constituents 2000-
2013 
1340 
 
After deleting firms that do not sponsor 
a DB plan or firms sponsoring an 
overseas DB scheme 
322 
 
             
          3,625 
Whereof:  
 
Sample for partially open plans  
 
                   
                  306 
 
 
          1,371 
Sample for fully open plans 322† 2,684 
 
†16 firms fully closed their DB plans and as such not included in the sample of partially open plans. 
Notes: Table 3.2 presents the sample selection process. 
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Table 3.3: Defined benefit pension plan provision by year and industry 
 
Notes: Table 3.3 presents descriptive information on defined benefit pension provision by year (Panel A) 
and by industry (Panel B). 
  
Panel A: Defined Benefit Pension Provision by Year
Year
Total # of firms that 
sponsor a DB plan
# of firms with fully 
open plans (to new 
and existing 
members)
# of firms with partly 
open plans (open to 
existing members 
only)
# of firms with closed 
DB plans
1999 292 292 - -
2000 299 299 - -
2001 295 267 28 -
2002 291 233 57 1
2003 280 228 48 4
2004 264 251 13 -
2005 255 236 19 -
2006 238 218 19 1
2007 218 202 8 8
2008 197 185 4 8
2009 185 175 4 6
2010 171 150 5 16
2011 150 127 4 19
2012 129 121 2 6
2013 121 113 3 5
Total 322 92 214 74
Panel B: Defined Benefit Pension Provision by Industry
Industry
Total # of firms that 
sponsor a DB plan
# of firms with fully 
open plans (to new 
and existing 
members)
# of firms with partly 
open plans (open to 
existing members 
only)
# of firms with closed 
DB plans
Consumer Non-
Durables
30 9 21 7
Consumer 
Durables
4 0 4 0
Manufacturing 40 12 24 11
Energy 9 4 5 0
Chemicals 9 0 8 2
Business 
Equipment
21 8 10 6
Telecoms 8 2 6 1
Utilities 13 6 7 0
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
54 16 35 16
Healthcare 13 4 8 1
Money Finance 38 10 27 8
Others 83 21 59 22
Total 322 92 214 74
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics and tests of differences in means. 
 
Average Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
INTANG 0.014 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.293
CEO_MAINDB 0.608 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CEO_EXCLDB 0.084 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFO_MAINDB 0.655 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CFO_EXCLDB 0.098 0.297 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
FRS17 0.050 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
FUNDED 0.650 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CEO_TENURE 4.753 4.799 0.000 1.000 3.000 7.000 28.000
CFO_TENURE 4.762 4.547 0.000 1.000 3.000 7.000 22.000
ACTIVE 0.306 0.252 0.001 0.108 0.230 0.469 1.000
UNION 0.245 0.122 0.000 0.124 0.255 0.287 0.601
PLAN_SIZE 5.767 1.904 0.993 4.391 5.883 7.169 9.996
SALARY_CAP 0.059 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SALARY_AVG 0.025 0.016 0.004 0.017 0.022 0.029 0.128
LEVERAGE 0.457 0.210 0.047 0.302 0.449 0.582 0.970
STDEV_OCF 0.032 0.033 0.001 0.012 0.024 0.040 0.207
EBIT 0.129 0.246 -0.981 0.045 0.087 0.154 1.189
GROWTH 0.091 0.289 -0.714 -0.031 0.059 0.166 1.446
BETA 0.939 0.274 0.039 0.760 0.950 1.110 1.960
Average Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
INTANG 0.017 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.293
CEO_MAINDB 0.498 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
CEO_EXCLDB 0.083 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFO_MAINDB 0.564 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CFO_EXCLDB 0.088 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
FRS17 0.051 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
FUNDED 0.517 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CEO_TENURE 5.063 5.253 0.000 1.000 4.000 7.000 28.000
CFO_TENURE 4.928 4.691 0.000 1.000 4.000 7.000 22.000
ACTIVE 0.282 0.245 0.000 0.091 0.205 0.419 1.000
UNION 0.220 0.113 0.000 0.119 0.215 0.271 0.601
PLAN_SIZE 5.714 1.859 0.993 4.300 5.770 7.020 9.996
SALARY_CAP 0.160 0.367 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SALARY_AVG 0.028 0.018 0.004 0.018 0.024 0.032 0.128
LEVERAGE 0.444 0.213 0.047 0.292 0.429 0.574 0.970
STDEV_OCF 0.032 0.032 0.001 0.012 0.023 0.040 0.207
EBIT 0.127 0.213 -0.673 0.045 0.090 0.160 1.189
GROWTH 0.076 0.257 -0.714 -0.025 0.056 0.148 1.446
BETA 0.967 0.284 0.039 0.780 0.960 1.140 1.960
PARTLY_CLOSED 0.444 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Panel A: Partial Closures Analysis (N=1,371)
Panel B: Full Closures Analysis (N=2,684)
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Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics and their associated test of differences in means for the 
variables used in the empirical analyses. Panel A, refers to the sample of firms in which I analyse the hazard 
of a partial DB plan closure; Panel B, refers to the sample of firms in which I analyse the hazard of a full DB 
plan closure; PANEL C refers to the associated tests of differences in means between the two samples.  ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. All variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
Panel C: TESTS OF DIFFERENCES MEANS
Partial Closures Full Closures
Difference t-stat
INTANG 0.014 0.017 -0.003 -1.687*
CEO_MAINDB 0.608 0.498 0.110  5.889***
CEO_EXCLDB 0.084 0.083 0.001  0.252
CFO_MAINDB 0.655 0.564 0.091  5.327***
CFO_EXCLDB 0.098 0.088 0.010  0.904
FRS17 0.050 0.051 -0.001 -0.502
FUNDED 0.650 0.517 0.133  8.380***
CEO_TENURE 4.753 5.063 -0.310 -1.583
CFO_TENURE 4.762 4.928 -0.166 -1.067
ACTIVE 0.306 0.282 0.024  3.228***
UNION 0.245 0.282 -0.037 -6.294***
PLAN_SIZE 5.767 5.714 0.053  0.538
SALARY_CAP 0.059 0.160 -0.101 -10.13***
SALARY_AVG 0.025 0.028 -0.003 -4.663***
LEVERAGE 0.457 0.444 0.013  1.249
STDEV_OCF 0.032 0.032 0.000  0.932
EBIT 0.129 0.127 0.002  0.345
GROWTH 0.091 0.076 0.015  1.785*
BETA 0.939 0.967 -0.028 -2.941***
Means
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Table 3.5: Correlations among the hazard of closure (partial and full) and test and control variables. 
 
Notes: Table 3.5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical analyses. The upper diagonal refers to the sample of firms with 
partly closed DB plans; the lower diagonal refers to the sample of firms with fully closed plans. All variables are defined in Table 3.1.
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)
HAZARD FULL/PART (1) -0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13*** 0.05* -0.02 0.02 -0.06** -0.05* -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.02
INTANG (2) -0.02 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0 -0.05** -0.01 0.08*** 0.01 0.04 0.06** 0.14*** -0.19*** 0.12*** -0.22*** 0.01 0.05**
CEO_MAINDB (3) -0.11*** -0.03* -0.37*** 0.49*** -0.37*** -0.04* 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.04 0.05* 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05* 0.04 0.10*** -0.02 -0.13***
CEO_EXCLUSIVE (4) -0.03 0.02* -0.30*** -0.35*** 0.64*** -0.05* -0.02*** -0.04 0.04 0.05* 0.03 0.05* 0.00 -0.07*** 0.06** 0.00 -0.04* -0.03 0.06***
CFO_MAINDB (5) -0.11*** -0.09*** 0.46** -0.30*** -0.42*** 0.03 0.07*** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.07*** -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.09***
CFO_EXCLUSIVE (6) -0.04** 0.09*** -0.29* 0.64*** -0.34*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09*** 0.04* -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.06** 0.02 0.04
FRS17 (7) -0.04* 0.00 -0.05*** 0.04** -0.04** 0.10*** -0.11*** 0.00 -0.05** -0.04 0.01 0.09*** -0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
FUNDED (8) -0.07*** -0.03* 0.06* -0.02 0.06** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.04 -0.01 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.02 -0.09*** -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07*** 0.02
CEO_TENURE (9)  0.01 0.02 0.08*** -0.05*** -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* -0.05*** 0.21*** 0.00 -0.02 -0.18*** 0.00 0.02 -0.06** 0.01 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.06***
CFO_TENURE (10) -0.03* 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.09* 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.25* -0.02 -0.03 -0.11*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.07*** -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
ACTIVE (11) -0.05** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.08*** 0.00 -0.04* 0.32*** 0.01 -0.01 0.29*** 0.07*** 0.023 0.14*** -0.04 -0.10***
UNION (12) -0.07** 0.02 0.07*** 0.04 0.08*** 0.04 0.04 0.11*** -0.02 -0.02 0.32*** 0.22*** -0.07*** 0.12*** 0.19*** -0.04 0.10*** -0.01 -0.14***
PLAN_SIZE (13) -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.05*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.22*** -0.16*** 0.04* 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.07*** 0.22*** -0.20*** -0.13*** -0.09*** 0.02
SALARY_CAP (14) 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.08*** -0.03* -0.16*** -0.03* -0.03* -0.06*** -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.12*** 0.08*** 0.15*** -0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.03 0.07***
SALARY_AVG (15) 0.02 0.17*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.04** -0.04** -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.26*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.12*** -0.04* 0.03 0.21*** 0.00 0.12***
LEVERAGE (16) 0.04** -0.28*** -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.06*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.23*** -0.03* -0.02 -0.16*** -0.06** -0.11*** 0.09***
STDEV_OCF (17) 0.03* 0.11*** 0.05*** -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.07*** -0.02 -0.19*** 0.03 0.06*** -0.14*** -0.18*** 0.09*** 0.00
EBIT (18) -0.03 -0.09* 0.05* -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.06* 0.02 0.10* 0.10* -0.13* -0.05* 0.26* -0.13* -0.10* -0.08*** -0.11***
GROWTH (19) -0.04** 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07* 0.06* 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.08* -0.03 0.01 -0.07* 0.07* -0.05* -0.05**
BETA (20) 0.07*** -0.04 -0.08* -0.02 -0.02 -0.05* -0.05* 0.00 -0.07* -0.04* -0.08* -0.12* 0.03 0.07* 0.12* 0.17* -0.02 -0.13* -0.05*
PARTLY_CLOSED (21) 0.11*** 0.04 -0.18* -0.02 -0.10* -0.05* -0.05* -0.27* -0.03 -0.01 -0.07* -0.20* 0.05* 0.33* 0.20* -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.06* 0.10*
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Table 3.6: Cox regression results (Hazard: Partial DB plan closure) 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: MAIN DB PLAN
H1
BASIC BASIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)† (9) (10)
INTANG 1.315 1.089 1.021 1.402 1.341 1.208 0.975 1.299 1.373
(0.69) (0.55) (0.51) (0.72) (0.69) (0.63) (0.49) (0.67) (0.73)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB -0.284** -0.455** -0.030 -0.318* -0.286** -0.026 0.076
(-2.08) (-2.49) (-0.21) (-1.69) (-2.09) (-0.18) (0.50)
FRS17 -0.236 -0.237 -0.245 0.780***
(-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.83) (2.65)
FUNDED -0.125 -0.122 -0.297 -0.126 -0.485** -0.120 -0.116 -0.121 -0.131
(-0.86) (-0.84) (-1.51) (-0.86) (-2.13) (-0.82) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.89)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB * FUNDED -0.423** -0.235
(-2.17) (-1.27)
FRS17*CEO/CFO_MAINDB -1.276**
(-2.00)
CEO/CFO_TENURE 0.025* 0.026** -0.012 -0.011 0.025* -0.012 -0.014
(1.95) (1.96) (-0.65) (-0.63) (1.94)    (-0.68) (-0.77)
ACTIVE 0.592 0.570** 0.603** 0.595** 0.568** 0.588** 0.565** 0.591** 0.610**
(2.17) (2.11) (2.23) (2.18) (2.09) (2.16) (2.09) (2.17) (2.24)
UNION -1.574** -1.755** -1.838** -1.504* -1.619** -1.537* -1.716** -1.461* -1.603**
(-1.94) (-2.16) (-2.28) (-1.86) (-2.04) (-1.87) (-2.08) (-1.78) (-1.97)
PLAN_SIZE -0.089* -0.071 -0.071 -0.089** -0.094** -0.087* -0.069 -0.087** -0.083*
(-1.97) (-1.54) (-1.53) (-2.00) (-2.11) (-1.93) (-1.49) (-1.97) (-1.90)
SALARY_CAP -0.285 -0.284 -0.265 -0.308 -0.274 -0.291 -0.289 -0.315 -0.350
(-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.73) (-0.86) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.80) (-0.88) (-0.98)
SALARY_AVG 0.374 0.471 0.832 0.481 -0.0938 0.314 0.390 0.431 1.135
(0.08) (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (-0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.24)
LEVERAGE -0.344 -0.380 -0.387 -0.366 -0.331 -0.322 -0.359 -0.343 -0.322
(-0.89) (-0.97) (-0.99) (-0.94) (-0.86) (-0.84) (-0.92) (-0.88) (-0.83)
STDEV_OCF -0.413 0.202 0.199 -0.498 -0.198 -0.354 0.285 -0.444 -0.529
(-0.21) (0.10) (0.10) (-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.18) (0.15) (-0.22) (-0.27)
EBIT -0.393 -0.339 -0.354 -0.401 -0.396 -0.387 -0.332 -0.395 -0.410
(-1.45) (-1.19) (-1.22) (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.44) (-1.17) (-1.48) (-1.55)
GROWTH 0.028 -0.020 -0.006 0.026 0.026 0.028 -0.019 0.027 -0.010
(0.12) (-0.09) (-0.03) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (-0.08) (0.12) (-0.04)
BETA 0.201 0.161 0.141 0.195 0.214 0.205 0.165 0.199 0.169
(0.71) (0.57) (0.50) (0.69) (0.77) (0.73) (0.58) (0.71) (0.62)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371
Pseudo R2  0.014 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.016   0.015   0.018   0.015   0.019
H3H2A
CEO CFO CEO CFO
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†Model cannot be estimated because there are no observations where FRS17 and CEO_MAINDB are 
equal to 1 simultaneously.  
‡ Model is the same as in Panel A. 
Notes: Table 3.6 presents the Cox regression results modeling the hazard of defined benefit pension plan 
part closure for the main DB plan (Panel A) and executive DB plan (Panel B). ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed).  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. All variables 
are defined in Table 3.1. 
Panel B: EXCLUSIVE DB PLAN
(1)‡ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)‡ (7) (8) (9) (10)
INTANG 1.066 0.941 1.396 1.009 0.970 1.033 1.285 1.563
(0.55) (0.48) (0.72) (0.49) (0.50) (0.53) (0.66) (0.83)
CEO/CFO_EXCLDB 0.138 0.570** 0.022 0.531* 0.131 0.073 0.025 -0.148
(0.71) (2.40) (0.11) (1.90) (0.67) (0.37) (0.12) (-0.63)
FRS17 -0.215 -0.350 -0.248 -0.650*
(-0.74) (-1.16) (-0.84) (-1.80)
FUNDED -0.118 -0.038 -0.126 -0.029 -0.113 -0.100 -0.121 -0.129
(-0.81) (-0.25) (-0.86) (-0.19) (-0.77) (-0.68) (-0.82) (-0.88)
CEO/CFO_EXCLDB * FUNDED -0.521 -0.788*
(-1.14) (-1.66)
FRS17 * CEO/CFO_EXCLDB 2.053*** 1.191***
(4.79) (3.84)
CEO/CFO_TENURE 0.024* 0.027** -0.012 -0.014 0.024* 0.025* -0.012 -0.014
(1.87) (2.01) (-0.66) (-0.78) (1.86) (1.92) (-0.68) (-0.77)
ACTIVE 0.586** 0.618** 0.595** 0.633** 0.583** 0.592** 0.591** 0.608**
(2.15) (2.26) (2.18) (2.28) (2.13) (2.17) (2.17) (2.24)
UNION -1.741** -1.825** -1.500* -1.471* -1.709** -1.713** -1.458* -1.420*
(-2.15) (-2.26) (-1.85) (-1.84) (-2.08) (-2.07) (-1.77) (-1.72)
PLAN_SIZE -0.077* -0.076 -0.091** -0.098** -0.075 -0.077* -0.089** -0.091**
(-1.66) (-1.64) (-2.01) (-2.15) (-1.62) (-1.65) (-1.97) (-1.99)
SALARY_CAP -0.291 -0.278 -0.306 -0.308 -0.297 -0.295 -0.314 -0.288
(-0.81) (-0.77) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.88) (-0.81)
SALARY_AVG 0.653 0.424 0.527 0.0682 0.581 0.492 0.472 0.597
(0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
LEVERAGE -0.318 -0.287 -0.361 -0.343 -0.298 -0.305 -0.339 -0.269
(-0.82) (-0.75) (-0.94) (-0.90) (-0.77) (-0.78) (-0.88) (-0.70)
STDEV_OCF -0.346 -0.223 -0.517 -0.423 -0.289 -1.110 -0.463 -0.639
(-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.15) (-0.54) (-0.23) (-0.33)
EBIT -0.355 -0.315 -0.401 -0.413 -0.349 -0.355 -0.395 -0.380
(-1.25) (-1.13) (-1.49) (-1.52) (-1.24) (-1.25) (-1.48) (-1.45)
GROWTH 0.003 -0.023 0.025 0.016 0.003 -0.018 0.025 -0.013
(0.01) (-0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.01) (-0.08) (0.12) (-0.06)
BETA 0.216 0.186 0.196 0.158 0.220 0.261 0.200 0.236
(0.76) (0.64) (0.69) (0.56) (0.77) (0.92) (0.71) (0.84)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Pseudo R2  0.016 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018
CEO CFO CFO
H2B
CEO
H3
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The tables report the coefficients (β) not hazard ratios (exp(β))). Variables with positive coefficients (the β 
values) are associated with increased hazard and decreased survival times, i.e. as the predictor increases 
the hazard of the event increases and the predicted survival duration decreases. Negative coefficients 
indicate decreased hazard and increased survival times. 
Research hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Firms for which human capital is important are more likely to retain their DB plans, all else equal. 
H2A: Firms with CEO (CFO) membership in the firm’s DB plan on the same terms as the rest of the 
employees are more likely to keep their DB plans open, all else equal. 
H2B: Participation of CEO (CFO) in a separate DB plan will affect a firm’s decision to retain DB plans, all 
else equal. 
H3: Voluntary adoption of FRS 17 is associated with DB pension provision decisions, all else equal. 
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Table 3.7: Cox regression results (Hazard: Full DB plan closure) 
 
Notes: Table 3.7 presents the Cox regression results modeling the hazard of defined benefit pension plan 
full closure for the main and executive DB plan. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
The table shows the coefficients (β) not hazard ratios (exp(β)). Variables with positive coefficients (the β 
values) are associated with increased hazard and decreased survival times, i.e. as the predictor increases 
H1
BASIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
INTANG -6.497* -6.780* -6.912* -5.869 -5.784 -6.134 -6.065
(-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.58) (-1.58)
CEO_MAINDB/CFO_MAINDB -1.029*** -1.269*** -0.805*** -0.951**
(-3.30) (-3.30) (-2.75) (-2.50)
FUNDED -0.421* -0.418* -0.544* -0.500* -0.606** -0.433* -0.477*
(-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.92) (-1.86) (-1.97) (-1.68) (-1.83)
CEO_MAINDB/CFO_MAINDB * FUNDED -1.120** -1.128***
(-2.40) (-2.65)
CEO_EXCLDB -0.806 -1.292
(-1.40) (-1.50)
CEO_EXCLDB * FUNDED -0.359
(-0.38)
CEO_TENURE 0.027 0.028 -0.053 -0.053 0.020 0.020
(1.01) (1.01) (-1.57) (-1.58) (0.77) (0.78)
ACTIVE -0.334 -0.389 -0.454 -0.521 -0.528 -0.384 -0.409
(-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.73) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.65) (-0.69)
UNION -0.526 -0.84 -0.833 -0.14 -0.171 -0.744 -0.702
(-0.33) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.45) (-0.43)
PLAN_SIZE -0.253*** -0.258*** -0.257*** -0.274*** -0.272*** -0.223** -0.219**
(-2.85) (-2.81) (-2.78) (-3.19) (-3.16) (-2.42) (-2.38)
SALARY_CAP -0.188 -0.019 -0.007 -0.22 -0.215 -0.143 -0.152
(-0.65) (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.49) (-0.52)
SALARY_AVG 10.18 11.79 11.79 7.982 7.578 10.71 11.22
(1.23) (1.34) (1.36) (1.07) (1.03) (1.33) (1.39)
LEVERAGE 1.918** 1.916** 1.934** 2.015*** 1.985*** 1.870** 1.871**
(2.44) (2.44) (2.41) (2.66) (2.63) (2.33) (2.33)
STDEV_OCF 9.544** 9.964** 9.955** 10.96*** 11.23*** 9.052* 9.004*
(2.17) (2.12) (2.13) (2.81) (2.83) (1.95) (1.92)
EBIT -0.686 -0.76 -0.766 -0.810* -0.813* -0.72 -0.737
(-1.45) (-1.19) (-1.24) (-1.76) (-1.76) (-1.44) (-1.49)
GROWTH -0.170 -0.239 -0.186 -0.155 -0.141 -0.204 -0.221
(-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.22) (-0.23)
BETA 0.035 -0.146 -0.149 -0.009 -0.001 0.082 0.077
(0.09) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.02) (-0.00) (0.20) -0.18
PARTLY_CLOSED 0.392 0.284 0.279 0.308 0.309 0.449 0.464
(1.24) (0.89) (0.86) (0.94) (0.94) (1.50) (1.55)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684
Pseudo R2  0.080 0.097 0.098 0.103 0.103 0.083 0.085
CEO
H2A H2B
CEO
MAINDB
 CFO
MAINDB EXCLDB
79 
 
the hazard of the event increases and the predicted survival duration decreases. Negative coefficients 
indicate decreased hazard and increased survival times. 
Research hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Firms for which human capital is important are more likely to retain their DB plans, all else equal. 
H2A: Firms with CEO (CFO) membership in the firm’s DB plan on the same terms as the rest of the 
employees are more likely to keep their DB plans open, all else equal. 
H2B: Participation of CEO (CFO) in a separate DB plan will affect a firm’s decision to retain DB plans, all 
else equal. 
H3: Voluntary adoption of FRS 17 is associated with DB pension provision decisions, all else equal. 
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Table 3.8: Cox regression results (Hazard: Pensionable salary cap) 
 
 
BASIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PARTLY_CLOSED 0.691*** 0.685*** 0.690*** 0.574* 0.638** 0.688*** 0.694*** 0.554 0.714***
(2.66) (2.63) (2.67) (1.65) (2.38) (2.64) (2.68) (1.57) (2.70)
FUNDED -0.487* -0.484* -0.485* -0.482* -0.488* -0.490* -0.493* -0.488* -0.494*
(-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.79) (-1.81) (-1.80) (-1.84) (-1.85) (-1.84) (-1.85)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB -0.188 -0.36 -0.188 -0.381
(-0.88) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-0.98)
CEO/CFO_EXCLDB 0.0407 -0.651 -0.221 0.008
(0.12) (-0.69) (-0.51) (0.01)
PARTLY_CLOSED * CEO/CFO_MAINDB 0.451 0.431
(1.37) (1.29)
PARTLY_CLOSED * CEO/CFO_EXCLDB 0.814* 0.416
(1.96) (0.73)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404
Pseudo R2  0.025 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025
CEO CFO 
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Notes: Table 3.8 presents the Cox regression results modeling the hazard of a pensionable salary cap. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two tailed). t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
The table reports the coefficients (β) (not hazard ratios (exp(β)). Variables with positive coefficients (the β 
values) are associated with increased hazard and decreased survival times, i.e. as the predictor increases 
the hazard of the event increases and the predicted survival duration decreases. Negative coefficients 
indicate decreased hazard and increased survival time.
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Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics and tests of means for the sub-sample 
analysis 
 
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS:  INSIDERS SUBSAMPLE (PART CLOSURE) (N= 800) 
Average Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
INTANG   0.019   0.094   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.007   2.012
FUNDING   0.615   0.487   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_INSIDERS   0.159   0.366   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
CFO_INSIDERS   0.290   0.454   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_MAINDB   0.627   0.484   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_EXCLUSIVE   0.081   0.273   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
CFO_MAINDB   0.662   0.473   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
CFO_EXCLUSIVE   0.104   0.305   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
CEO_TENURE   4.616   4.409   0.000   1.000   4.000   7.000  28.000
CFO_TENURE   5.160   4.737   0.000   2.000   4.000   7.000  22.000
ACTIVE   0.331   0.261   0.000   0.125   0.259   0.518   1.000
UNION   0.240   0.118   0.042   0.118   0.251   0.281   0.601
PLAN_SIZE   5.873   2.003   0.993   4.338   5.934   7.404   9.996
SALARY_CAP   0.060   0.238   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
SALARY_AVG   0.028   0.017   0.005   0.018   0.024   0.032   0.128
LEVERAGE   0.440   0.208   0.047   0.279   0.426   0.565   0.970
STDEV_OCF   0.031   0.031   0.001   0.011   0.023   0.038   0.207
EBIT   0.141   0.229  -0.547   0.048   0.094   0.160   1.279
GROWTH   0.106   0.284  -0.714  -0.010   0.073   0.165   1.446
BETA   0.927   0.270   0.039   0.750   0.940   1.090   1.960
PANEL B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS:  INSIDERS SUBSAMPLE (FULL CLOSURE) (N= 1627) 
Average Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
INTANG   0.020   0.077   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.010   2.012
FUNDING   0.503   0.500   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_INSIDERS   0.119   0.323   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
CFO_INSIDERS   0.265   0.441   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_MAINDB   0.489   0.500   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_EXCLUSIVE   0.090   0.287   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
CFO_MAINDB   0.550   0.498   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
CFO_EXCLUSIVE   0.097   0.296   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
CEO_TENURE   5.046   5.040   0.000   2.000   4.000   7.000  28.000
CFO_TENURE   5.230   4.914   0.000   1.000   4.000   8.000  22.000
ACTIVE   0.292   0.253   0.000   0.098   0.209   0.438   1.000
UNION   0.212   0.108   0.000   0.117   0.207   0.260   0.601
PLAN_SIZE   5.802   1.932   0.993   4.289   5.817   7.152   9.996
SALARY_CAP   0.156   0.362   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
SALARY_AVG   0.030   0.019   0.004   0.019   0.025   0.035   0.128
LEVERAGE   0.430   0.213   0.047   0.274   0.411   0.559   0.970
STDEV_OCF   0.030   0.029   0.001   0.012   0.022   0.038   0.207
EBIT   0.136   0.215  -0.522   0.048   0.101   0.161   1.355
GROWTH   0.086   0.252  -0.714  -0.015   0.062   0.147   1.446
BETA   0.966   0.288   0.039   0.780   0.960   1.140   1.960
PARTLY_CLOSED   0.451   0.498   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
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Notes: Table 3.9 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis for the subsample 
of firms. Panel A, refers to the sample of firms with partly closed DB plans; Panel B, refers to the sample of firms 
with fully closed plans; Panel C presents univariate tests of differences in means between the sample used in 
the main analysis and the subsample used in the additional analysis examining the impact of insider trustees on 
the decision to retain defined benefit pension plans.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels (two-tailed Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of any outliers.  
All variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
PANEL C: TESTS OF DIFFERENCES IN MEANS
INTANG 0.014 0.019 -0.005 -1.733* 0.017 0.020 -0.003     -1.253
FUNDED 0.650 0.615 0.035 1.011 0.517 0.503 0.014 0.572
CEO_MAINDB 0.608 0.627 -0.019 -1.858* 0.498 0.489 0.009 0.033
CEO_EXCLDB 0.084 0.081 0.003 0.015 0.083 0.090 -0.007 -0.890
CFO_MAINDB 0.655 0.662 -0.007  -2.114** 0.564 0.550 0.014 0.923
CFO_EXCLDB 0.098 0.104 -0.006 -0.830 0.088 0.097 -0.009 -1.727*
CEO_TENURE 4.753 4.616 0.137 1.386 5.063 5.046 0.017  0.340
CFO_TENURE 4.762 5.160 -0.398 -1.071 4.928 5.230 -0.302 -1.437
ACTIVE 0.306 0.331 -0.025 -1.738* 0.282 0.292 -0.010      -0.980
UNION 0.245 0.240  0.005 0.026 0.219 0.212 0.007 1.697*
PLAN_SIZE 5.767 5.873 -0.106   -4.751*** 5.714 5.802 -0.088   -4.982***
SALARY_CAP 0.059 0.060 -0.001 -0.204 0.156 0.146 0.010 1.168
SALARY_AVG 0.025 0.028 -0.003 -1.693* 0.028 0.030 -0.002 -2.241**
LEVERAGE 0.457 0.440 0.017 0.492 0.444 0.430 0.014 1.269
STDEV_OCF 0.032 0.031 0.001     2.729*** 0.032 0.030 0.002     4.001***
EBIT 0.129 0.141     -0.012 -1.827* 0.127 0.136 -0.009 -1.845*
GROWTH 0.091 0.106     -0.015 -0.817 0.076 0.086 -0.010 -0.765
BETA 0.939 0.927 0.012 0.256 0.967 0.966 0.001 1.562
PARTLY_CLOSED 0.444 0.451 -0.007 -0.381
Partly closed sample Fully closed sample
Full sample Difference t-stat Full sample Difference t-stat
Insiders 
Subsample
Insiders 
Subsample
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Table 3.10: The role of insider trustees (Hazard: Part DB plan closure) 
 
PANEL A: MAIN DB PLAN
BASIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE -0.458* -0.202 -0.467** -0.482** 0.026 0.255 -0.049 0.317* 0.294 0.191
(-1.91) (-0.61) (-2.08) (-2.15) (0.07) (1.38) (-0.21) (1.74) (1.64) (0.52)
FUNDED -0.004 -0.001 0.069 -0.025 -0.241 -0.125 -0.018 -0.256 -0.013 -0.597* -0.684*
(-0.02) (-0.00) (0.32) (-0.12) (-0.88) (-0.45) (-0.09) (-0.99) (-0.06) (-1.95) (-1.88)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE * FUNDED -0.701* -1.000 0.352 -0.091
(-1.75) (-1.62) (1.22) (-0.17)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB -0.605*** -0.816*** -0.723*** -0.288 -0.724*** -0.611**
(-3.35) (-3.23) (-2.60) (-1.52) (-3.03) (-1.98)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB * FUNDED -0.642** -0.531* -0.382 -0.515
(-2.35) (-1.79) (-1.52) (-1.48)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO/CFO_MAINDB -1.312** -0.649**
(-2.34) (-1.99)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO/CFO_MAINDB*FUNDED -1.232** 0.041
(-2.47) (0.12)
CEO/CFO_TENURE 0.022 0.021 0.027 0.029* 0.027* -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(1.27) (1.26) (1.63) (1.74) (1.67) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.84)
INTANG 1.337 1.096 1.071 0.823 0.669 0.627 1.283 1.336 1.146 0.866 0.948
(0.73) (0.58) (0.57) (0.38) (0.31) (0.29) (0.69) (0.72) (0.57) (0.42) (0.46)
ACTIVE 0.034 0.064 0.047 -0.057 0.013 0.027 -0.027 -0.133 -0.063 -0.167 -0.232
(0.09) (0.18) (0.13) (-0.16) (0.04) (0.07) (-0.07) (-0.33) (-0.16) (-0.44) (-0.57)
UNION -2.515* -2.427* -2.471* -2.029* -2.146* -2.185* -2.386* -2.447** -2.239* -2.294* -2.346**
(-1.95) (-1.90) (-1.95) (-1.68) (-1.79) (-1.86) (-1.89) (-2.02) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-2.00)
PLAN_SIZE -0.089 -0.095 -0.095 -0.091 -0.091 -0.090 -0.072 -0.068 -0.060 -0.073 -0.068
(-1.54) (-1.61) (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.58) (-1.22) (-1.14) (-1.01) (-1.22) (-1.15)
SALARY_CAP -0.248 -0.215 -0.185 -0.191 -0.173 -0.139 -0.211 -0.206 -0.235 -0.172 -0.179
(-0.50) (-0.43) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.27) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.39)
SALARY_AVG -6.370 -3.868 -3.790 -3.940 -3.101 -2.958 -5.620 -5.447 -5.448 -5.903 -5.524
(-0.92) (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.75) (-0.85) (-0.81)
LEVERAGE 0.179 0.249 0.219 0.165 0.103 0.0651 0.155 0.214 0.154 0.252 0.300
(0.31) (0.43) (0.38) (0.28) (0.17) (0.11) (0.28) (0.38) (0.27) (0.44) (0.53)
STDEV_OCF -1.205 -1.520 -1.596 -0.834 -0.748 -0.687 -1.211 -1.187 -1.080 -0.785 -0.787
(-0.43) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.27) (-0.27)
EBIT 0.314 0.375 0.353 0.418 0.393 0.386 0.324 0.398 0.314 0.328 0.382
(0.75) (0.92) (0.87) (0.99) (0.92) (0.90) (0.78) (0.96) (0.74) (0.77) (0.88)
GROWTH 0.015 -0.020 -0.020 -0.015 0.010 -0.006 0.006 -0.056 0.016 0.036 -0.009
(0.05) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.05) (0.04) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.18) (0.06) (0.12) (-0.03)
BETA 0.193 0.177 0.183 0.043 -0.009 0.001 0.172 0.172 0.198 0.231 0.228
(0.55) (0.49) (0.50) (0.12) (-0.02) (0.00) (0.48) (0.49) (0.56) (0.65) (0.65)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Pseudo R2  0.023 0.027 0.028 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.032 0.034
CEO CFO
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PANEL B: EXCLUSIVE DB PLAN
BASIC
(1)‡ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE -0.458* -0.202 -0.505** -0.537** -0.460 0.255 -0.049 0.285 0.274 0.083
(-1.91) (-0.61) (-2.20) (-2.34) (-1.09) (1.38) (-0.21) (1.54) (1.54) (0.33)
FUNDED -0.001 0.069 0.029 0.144 0.197 -0.018 -0.256 -0.023 0.097 -0.092
(-0.00) (0.32) (0.13) (0.64) (0.87) (-0.09) (-0.99) (-0.11) (0.44) (-0.32)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE * FUNDED -0.701* -0.715 0.352 0.481
(-1.75) (-1.58) (1.22) (1.60)
CEO/CFO_EXCLDB 0.679*** 1.189*** 1.095*** 0.391* 0.933*** 0.992***
(2.92) (4.61) (3.88) (1.93) (3.77) (3.60)
CEO/CFO_EXCLDB * FUNDED 0.075 -0.056 -0.315 -0.520
(0.14) (-0.09) (-0.62) (-0.81)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO/CFO_EXCLDB 0.953*** 0.358
(2.63) (0.52)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO/CFO_EXCLDB*FUNDED 0.152 0.277
(0.28) (0.35)
CEO/CFO_TENURE 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.032* 0.033* -0.019 -0.019 -0.023 -0.025 -0.026
(1.27) (1.26) (1.31) (1.89) (1.92) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.90) (-1.01) (-1.07)
INTANG 1.096 1.071 0.736 0.524 0.369 1.283 1.336 0.922 0.548 0.718
(0.58) (0.57) (0.37) (0.26) (0.18) (0.69) (0.72) (0.47) (0.26) (0.34)
ACTIVE 0.064 0.047 -0.034 0.003 0.009 -0.027 -0.133 -0.023 -0.006 -0.147
(0.18) (0.13) (-0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.07) (-0.33) (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.36)
UNION -2.427* -2.471* -2.186* -2.288* -2.204* -2.386* -2.447** -2.302* -2.193* -2.334*
(-1.90) (-1.95) (-1.75) (-1.85) (-1.81) (-1.89) (-2.02) (-1.83) (-1.80) (-1.95)
PLAN_SIZE -0.095 -0.095 -0.105* -0.105* -0.107* -0.072 -0.068 -0.079 -0.091 -0.081
(-1.61) (-1.63) (-1.79) (-1.78) (-1.81) (-1.22) (-1.14) (-1.35) (-1.53) (-1.37)
SALARY_CAP -0.215 -0.185 -0.137 -0.108 -0.070 -0.211 -0.206 -0.185 -0.226 -0.208
(-0.43) (-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.42)
SALARY_AVG -3.868 -3.790 -3.111 -2.607 -1.624 -5.620 -5.447 -6.386 -6.855 -6.290
(-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.24) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.91) (-0.98) (-0.92)
LEVERAGE 0.249 0.219 0.297 0.365 0.435 0.155 0.214 0.125 0.143 0.225
(0.43) (0.38) (0.52) (0.64) (0.75) (0.28) (0.38) (0.22) (0.26) (0.40)
STDEV_OCF -1.520 -1.596 -2.155 -2.051 -1.601 -1.211 -1.187 -1.875 -1.558 -1.124
(-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.79) (-0.76) (-0.58) (-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-0.54) (-0.39)
EBIT 0.375 0.353 0.403 0.464 0.469 0.324 0.398 0.326 0.329 0.388
(0.92) (0.87) (0.99) (1.15) (1.19) (0.78) (0.96) (0.78) (0.79) (0.95)
GROWTH -0.020 -0.020 0.009 -0.028 -0.046 0.006 -0.056 -0.004 -0.001 -0.054
(-0.07) (-0.07) (0.03) (-0.09) (-0.15) (0.02) (-0.18) (-0.01) (-0.00) (-0.18)
BETA 0.177 0.183 0.249 0.245 0.222 0.172 0.172 0.209 0.185 0.200
(0.49) (0.50) (0.68) (0.64) (0.57) (0.48) (0.49) (0.58) (0.51) (0.56)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Pseudo R2  0.027 0.028 0.032 0.036 0.037 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.031 0.033
CEO CFO
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‡ Model is the same as in Panel A. 
Notes: Table 3.10 presents the Cox regressions results modelling the hazard of defined benefit plan part closure 
for the subsample of companies for which the names of pension plan trustees are available. Panel A shows the 
results for the main DB plan and panel B for the exclusive DB plan. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO/CFO is also a trustee of the pension plan and 0 otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
The tables report the coefficients (β) not hazard ratios (exp(β)). Variables with positive coefficients (the β values) 
are associated with increased hazard and decreased survival times, i.e. as the predictor increases the hazard of 
the event increases and the predicted survival duration decreases. Negative coefficients indicate decreased 
hazard and increased survival times. 
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Table 3.11: The role of insider trustees (Hazard: Full DB plan closure) 
 
PANEL A: MAIN DB PLAN
BASIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE -0.620 -0.699 -0.722 0.414 0.267
(-0.59) (-0.71) (-0.71) (0.96) (0.51)
FUNDED -0.306 -0.296 -0.253 -0.509 -0.608* -0.694
(-0.94) (-0.90) (-0.78) (-1.39) (-1.75) (-1.55)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE * FUNDED 0.0180
(0.03)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB -1.018** -1.786**
(-2.20) (-2.35)
CEO/CFO_MAINDB * FUNDED -0.711
(-1.33)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO_MAINDB
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED
CEO/CFO_TENURE 0.021 0.024 0.024 -0.137*** -0.137***
(0.49) (0.58) (0.57) (-2.87) (-2.85)
INTANG -3.211 -3.460 -4.017 -4.163 -4.142 -4.006
(-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.84) (-0.82)
ACTIVE -0.274 -0.307 -0.233 -0.306 -0.414 -0.542
(-0.31) (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.45) (-0.51)
UNION -4.537** -4.243** -3.596* -3.651* -4.146* -4.086*
(-2.10) (-1.97) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-1.81) (-1.76)
PLAN_SIZE -0.210* -0.191* -0.227* -0.220* -0.265** -0.259**
(-1.87) (-1.66) (-1.90) (-1.86) (-2.40) (-2.33)
SALARY_CAP -0.288 -0.246 -0.121 -0.0961 -0.357 -0.364
(-0.76) (-0.63) (-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.93) (-0.94)
SALARY_AVG 14.34* 14.97* 13.66 13.62 8.915 9.380
(1.73) (1.85) (1.52) (1.55) (1.16) (1.21)
LEVERAGE 2.275** 2.236** 2.223** 2.138** 2.203* 2.181*
(2.00) (1.98) (2.04) (1.97) (1.94) (1.89)
STDEV_OCF 10.74** 10.26** 9.169** 9.208** 12.66*** 12.69***
(2.44) (2.23) (2.06) (2.06) (2.93) (2.89)
EBIT -0.728 -0.684 -0.532 -0.540 -0.865* -0.841
(-1.36) (-1.14) (-0.82) (-0.86) (-1.67) (-1.60)
GROWTH 0.591 0.551 0.598 0.762 0.536 0.538
(0.62) (0.55) (0.60) (0.76) (0.62) (0.61)
BETA -0.169 -0.167 -0.601 -0.078 -0.315 -0.288
(-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.59) (-0.14) (-0.61) (-0.57)
PARTLY CLOSED -0.127 -0.085 -0.230 -0.287 -0.416 -0.429
(-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.54) (-0.65) (-1.00) (-1.02)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1627 1627 1627 1627 1627 1627
Pseudo R2  0.096 0.098 0.113 0.120 0.125 0.126
CFOCEO
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PANEL B: EXCLUSIVE DB PLAN
BASIC
(1)‡ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE -0.620 -0.562 -0.555 0.414 0.267
(-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.52) (0.96) (0.51)
FUNDED -0.296 -0.349 -0.432 -0.608* -0.694
(-0.90) (-1.03) (-1.27) (-1.75) (-1.55)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE * FUNDED 0.018
(0.03)
CEO/CFO_EXCLDB -0.723 -1.258
(-1.31) (-1.43)
CEO/CFO_EXCL * FUNDED -0.082
(-0.09)
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO_EXCLDB
CEO/CFO_TRUSTEE*CEO_EXCLDB*FUNDED
CEO/CFO_TENURE 0.021 0.022 0.022 -0.137*** -0.137***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.52) (-2.87) (-2.85)
INTANG -3.460 -3.276 -3.175 -4.142 -4.006
(-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.77) (-0.84) (-0.82)
ACTIVE -0.307 -0.333 -0.348 -0.414 -0.542
(-0.34) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.51)
UNION -4.243** -4.464* -4.255* -4.146* -4.086*
(-1.97) (-1.94) (-1.88) (-1.81) (-1.76)
PLAN_SIZE -0.191* -0.167 -0.161 -0.265** -0.259**
(-1.66) (-1.42) (-1.39) (-2.40) (-2.33)
SALARY_CAP -0.246 -0.238 -0.264 -0.357 -0.364
(-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.93) (-0.94)
SALARY_AVG 14.97* 15.73** 16.53** 8.915 9.380
(1.85) (1.97) (2.06) (1.16) (1.21)
LEVERAGE 2.236** 2.172* 2.191* 2.203* 2.181*
(1.98) (1.91) (1.91) (1.94) (1.89)
STDEV_OCF 10.26** 10.38** 10.39** 12.66*** 12.69***
(2.23) (2.24) (2.18) (2.93) (2.89)
EBIT -0.684 -0.686 -0.722 -0.865* -0.841
(-1.14) (-1.14) (-1.24) (-1.67) (-1.60)
GROWTH 0.551 0.518 0.501 0.536 0.538
(0.55) (0.53) (0.49) (0.62) (0.61)
BETA -0.167 -0.123 -0.148 -0.315 -0.288
(-0.31) (-0.22) (-0.27) (-0.61) (-0.57)
PARTLY_CLOSED -0.086 -0.029 -0.011 -0.416 -0.429
(-0.21) (-0.07) (-0.03) (-1.00) (-1.02)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1627 1627 1627 1627 1627
Pseudo R2  0.098 0.101 0.104 0.125 0.126
                  CEO  CFO
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‡ Model is the same as in Panel A. 
 
Notes: Table 3.11 presents the Cox regressions results modelling the hazard of defined benefit plan full 
closure for the subsample of companies for which the names of pension plan trustees are available. Panel A 
shows the results for the main DB plan and Panel B for the exclusive DB plan. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in parentheses. All variables are 
defined in Table 3.1.  
The tables report the coefficients (β) not hazard ratios (exp(β)). Variables with positive coefficients (the β 
values) are associated with increased hazard and decreased survival times, i.e. as the predictor increases the 
hazard of the event increases and the predicted survival duration decreases. Negative coefficients indicate 
decreased hazard and increased survival times. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Effects of DB Plan Retentions 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the potential impact of DB plan retentions 
and of chief executive officers’ (CEOs) participation, on credit ratings as well as firms’ 
dividend policy and investment decisions. In particular, I examine the potential 
consequences of DB plan retentions and CEO membership on firms’ credit ratings. 
Moreover, I investigate whether CEOs’ participation in the firm’s main DB plan can 
influence the dividend policy and investment decisions given that CEOs can affect 
the riskiness of corporate decisions (Core, Guay & Larcker, 2003). Specifically, in 
chapter 3, I find that if CEOs participate in a firm’s main DB plan as the rest of the 
employees then these firms are more likely to retain DB plans, either partially or fully 
open irrespective of whether these plans are underfunded or overfunded. In this 
chapter, I explore the impact of the decision to retain DB plans on credit ratings and 
also how this affects dividend policies and capital investment decisions. In particular, 
if a firm retains its DB plan then the associated risk will continue to increase (e.g. 
inflation risk, longevity risk, investment risk etc.) and as a result the cost to the firm 
will be higher. Moreover, the costs will be even higher for a firm that retains its DB 
plan for existing and new employees rather than retaining the DB plan for existing 
employees only. On the other hand, if a firm closes its DB plan, it is expected to save 
on costs related with these schemes. For example, Rauh, Stefanescu and Zeldes 
(2013) show that after freezing DB plans, US firms save 3.1% of total firm assets 
over a 10-year horizon. However, for a firm that is performing well, pensions and 
especially DB plans constitute a significant part of deferred compensation and as 
such positive effects of those plans might offset the associated costs of retaining 
them. Existing literature examines the effects that DB plan freezes have on stock 
markets and finds that that firms that terminate their DB plans exhibit positive 
abnormal returns (e.g. Rubin, 2007; Milevsky and Song, 2010). However, this 
literature does not directly address DB retention. In addition, although these studies 
provide evidence on the effect that pension disclosure has on stock markets, 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that the information that is value relevant for 
equity holders is not necessarily relevant for debt holders. Corporate credit ratings 
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are vital aspects of a firm’s financial reputation and its capital structure (e.g., Sufi, 
2007; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). Adverse changes in these ratings can increase 
the cost of borrowing and can yield direct negative effects on the firms’ cash flows 
not only through public markets but also through the use of performance-pricing 
provisions in private loan contracts (e.g., Beatty and Weber, 2003; Kraft, 2014). 
Moreover, prior research has focused extensively on the effect of quantitative factors 
such as firm characteristics and accounting information in the credit rating process 
(Kaplan and Urwitz 1979, Blume, Lim and Mackinlay, 1998). However, Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) stresses that although quantitative models are used to evaluate some 
of these criteria, qualitative adjustments are also made where necessary (S&P, 
2011). In particular, among other things, they focus on entity specific characteristics 
such as operational effectiveness, financial policies, risk management practices, and 
risk tolerance (S&P, 2011). Despite this fact, the role of management incentives has 
been largely unexplored. For example, managers’ potential opportunities to develop 
firms’ strategies, operational effectiveness as well as financial policies and risk 
management strategies make them an important factor to examine in debt markets. 
One study examining the effect of managerial incentives on credit ratings is Kuang 
and Qin (2013), which tests whether managerial risk-taking incentives impact credit 
ratings. In particular, Kuang and Qin (2013) find that increases in management risk-
taking incentives (i.e., vega and delta) are associated with lower ratings (i.e., higher 
default risk). 
In this context, I examine the effect of DB plan retentions on firms’ credit 
ratings. I find that firms which continue to sponsor DB plans are more likely to be 
awarded lower credit ratings. This result holds for both fully and partially open DB 
plans and it is exacerbated when these plans are underfunded. Moreover, I find that 
if the CEO is a member of the DB plan, this effect is offset and can positively affect 
credit ratings. These results suggest that open DB plans are considered to increase 
firms’ default rate which seems plausible due to risks associated with them. 
However, when CEOs are members of these plans the expected probability of 
default decreases and this might be because credit rating agencies take into 
consideration the fact that these CEOs remain members of these plans; this might 
itself signal that these are relatively healthy plans. In addition, prior literature shows 
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that CEOs that are members of DB plans are relatively more likely to be risk averse 
with regards to corporate financial decisions (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart, 2012).  
Existing literature shows that funds required for pension plans might restrict 
funds that could be allocated for other uses within the firm (e.g. Rauh, 2006; Liu and 
Tonks, 2013). Another stream of literature documents the importance of DB plans 
as part of CEOs compensation and how this can affect their incentives (e.g. Bebchuk 
and Jackson, 2005; Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Cadman and Vincent, 2015). Building on this literature, I analyse the effect that CEO 
participation in the main DB plan has on dividend and investment decisions when 
firms continue to sponsor these plans while controlling for the funding status of the 
plan. I find that participation of CEOs in the main DB plans combined with the 
pension plans being overfunded negatively affect investment decisions if these 
schemes remain open. I do not find any evidence of dividend cuts which may be 
explained by the market signalling implications of dividends. Dividend signalling 
models typically predict that unexpected changes in dividends convey information 
regarding the level of current and future cash flows (Lintner, 1956). As such the 
board of directors seeks to establish dividend policies that are unlikely to require 
year by year changes. Lintner (1956) concludes that no other decision made by the 
board of directors was considered as consistently important (i.e. year-by-year) as 
the dividend policy.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first 
study, to the best of my knowledge, to directly examine the economic effects of DB 
plan retentions and CEO participation on credit ratings. Given the magnitude of DB 
plans and the significant effect of credit ratings in firms’ financial reputation, it is 
essential to understand the impact that decisions related to DB plans have not only 
on the stock market but on credit ratings as well. Moreover, I contribute to the 
emerging literature on the sophistication of credit rating agencies in incorporating 
complex entity qualitative characteristics into their credit rating evaluation (e.g. Lee, 
2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bradley and Chen, 2011; Kuang and Qiu, 2013). 
Prior research investigates the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating 
complex accounting information on credit risk assessments. For example, 
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disclosures of employee stock options (Lee, 2008), corporate governance quality on 
credit rating evaluation (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bradley and Chen, 2011); and 
managerial risk-taking incentives (Kuang and Qiu, 2013). My study advances our 
understanding of the rating process from the perspective of managerial 
compensation incentives and DB pension plans in particular. My findings may also 
have implications on the role of accounting in restraining (or encouraging) 
managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation. 
Second, the present study extends findings of the literature on the impact of 
executives’ compensation on firms’ decisions (e.g. Core and Guay, 1999; Rogers, 
2002; Coles et al., 2006) and it contributes to the growing literature on the agency 
effects of inside-debt compensation. Contrary to existing, mainly US based studies, 
I examine the importance of tax qualified DB plans and find that CEOs who are 
members of the main DB plan are more likely to adjust corporate investments rather 
than to dividends in order to protect the pension plans.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the 
literature review and the hypotheses development; Section 4.3 presents the 
research design; Section 4.4 describes the sample selection process and descriptive 
statistics; Section 4.5 discusses the empirical findings and section 4.6 provides 
additional analysis; finally, section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature review and research objectives 
 
There are three streams of literature relevant to this study. The first is the 
literature analysing the value relevance of pension plan information to equity markets 
and to credit rating agencies; the second refers to studies that examine the effect 
that decisions related to pension funding have on other corporate decisions such as 
investment and dividends; finally, the third refers to studies that examine the 
importance of CEO pension incentives. The following subsections discuss each 
stream of the literature and develop the research questions to be addressed in this 
study. 
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4.2.1 Effects of DB plan retention on credit ratings 
 
Value-relevance studies investigate whether financial statement information 
is decision-useful to capital market participants as intended by standard-setters 
(Glaum, 2009). Usually these studies attempt to measure whether financial 
statement data are reflected systematically in stock market valuations. Existing 
literature, mainly US based, provides mixed results regarding the relevance of 
pension information to the stock markets (Barth et al., 1993; Coronado and Sharpe, 
2003; Coronado et al., 2008; Franzoni and Marin, 2006; Picconi, 2006; Hann, Heflin 
and Subramanyam, 2007; Fasshauer and Glaum, 2012). Similar to this line of 
research a few studies also analyse the stock market effects of DB pension plan 
freezes. In particular, those studies use event studies and measure the abnormal 
returns after the announcement date of the termination. For example, Rubin (2007) 
examines DB freeze announcements in the US for the period 2003-2006 (14 
announcements) and finds that freezes enhance firm value but that market valuation 
lags in responding to this increase, which according to the author suggests that 
markets are not semi-strong efficient with respect to pension freezes. In a related 
study, Milevsky and Song (2010) examine 75 freeze announcements in the US and 
find that firms that terminate their DB plans exhibit a positive abnormal return. 
Moreover, the abnormal return is greater for firms with higher beta and/or lower 
return on equity prior to the freeze. The authors suggest that the positive impact is 
more pronounced for firms that are likely to face financial distress if they maintain 
their traditional pension plan and the associated long-term promises. More recently, 
Choy, Lin and Officer (2014) examine the impact of DB plan hard freezes on the 
firm’s risk and risk-taking activities. The authors use a sample of US firms during the 
period 2002-2007 and find that firms that declare a hard freeze experience an 
increase in total risk, measured as the standard deviation of returns. Moreover, the 
study finds that yields on bonds issued by firms that that hard freeze their DB plans 
also increase, consistent with the increase in risk. The authors also note an increase 
in risk taking activities. In particular, they observe a shift from capital expenditures 
to riskier R&D projects after the freeze. Taken together their findings suggest that 
DB plans are a form of internal debt that aligns manager’s and bondholder’s 
interests.   
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Another stream of literature examines the value relevance of pension 
information to credit ratings. Early studies (late 1970s and early 1980s) on credit 
relevance of pension information in the US provide only weak results (Martin and 
Henderson, 1983 and Maher, 1987). Martin and Henderson (1983) use a US sample 
during 1979-1980 period, to examine traditional ratios and Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) - modified measures to see if the inclusion of the 
ERISA data helps predict bond ratings. The authors use rank discriminant analysis 
(RDA) methodology and along with traditional bond predicting ratios they include five 
ERISA measures suggested by Moody’s. They find that including ERISA measures 
seems to improve credit rating prediction and the prediction improvement is greater 
at the low end of the credit ratings. The authors argue that this suggests that if a firm 
has ERISA problems along with other financial problems, they both help forecast a 
low bond rating and the traditional ratios alone are less discriminating. However, the 
authors emphasize that given data availability issues, these results are unreliable 
and further research is required when additional data become available. Likewise, 
Maher (1987) uses a sample of US firms during 1980-1982 to examine whether net 
pension variables have predictive power in credit ratings. The study uses the SFAS 
No. 36 pension footnote disclosures to develop several measures of the net pension 
obligation (asset) such as the pension liability actually reported in the firm’s annual 
report as well as recalculated obligations based on cross-sectionally standardised 
interest discount rates. The author finds that the pension disclosures as required by 
SFAS 36 were not significant in predicting credit ratings in any of the years. In 
addition, pension specific measures calculated using standardised interest rates are 
predictive of credit ratings in 1981 and 1982 but not in 1980. These findings suggest 
that credit rating analysts could see through the use of high interest rates to decrease 
the reported pension obligation by some companies. Later studies however 
document a stronger association between pension information and credit ratings. 
For example, Carroll and Niehaus (1998) using US data for the period 1987–1994, 
find that accounting information on pension assets and liabilities significantly 
influence bond ratings. More specifically they find that unfunded pension liabilities 
decrease debt ratings more than an equivalent amount of excess pension assets 
increase debt ratings. Hann et al., (2007) using a sample of US firms for the period 
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1991 to 2002 also examine the relative credit-relevance of smoothed SFAS 87 
accounting measures and fair-value pension measures. They find no statistical 
difference in the explanatory power of smoothed SFAS 87 pension provisions and 
fair-value pension provisions. Cardinale (2007), rather than using credit ratings as 
previous studies, uses credit spreads for US corporate bonds to examine whether 
unfunded pension liabilities are associated with credit spreads. Based on data for 
more than 12,000 ‘bond-years’, he finds that the size of the unfunded pension 
liability, scaled by company value, is significantly associated with bond spreads.  
In summary, existing literature provides empirical evidence that credit rating 
agencies consider pension liabilities. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
US credit rating agencies revised their expectations about pension obligations during 
the adverse market conditions in 2001-2002. The two biggest credit rating agencies, 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's, issued reports in 2003 suggesting that traditional 
leverage ratios should be adjusted to take into consideration unfunded retirement 
obligations (Cardinale, 2007). In addition, there are companies’ examples during that 
period that support an association between downgrades and unfunded pension 
liabilities (e.g. General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, in the United 
States, Rolls-Royce in the United Kingdom, and ThyssenKrupp, Deutsche Poste, 
and Linde in Germany) (Cardinale, 2007). 
I build on this literature and analyse the effect of DB plan retention on 
corporate bond ratings. In particular, if a firm retains its DB plan it is plausible to 
assume that the risks associated with this plan will increase due to the obligation to 
provide a guaranteed payout of a specific amount of benefits for the life of employees 
upon their retirement. Moreover, these risks will tend to be higher for fully open plans 
as compared to schemes that are open only to existing members. Under these 
terms, I expect the retention of DB plans to have a negative impact on credit ratings. 
On the other hand, it is not always possible to assume a negative impact. For a firm 
that is performing well, especially a firm that operates in a knowledge intensive 
industry, offering a high calibre pension plan might constitute an important 
compensation component. Pensions in general and especially DB plans are a 
significant part of deferred employee compensation. As such, companies use them 
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as a means to attract and retain high quality employees. Given these two contrasting 
perspectives, it is of interest to analyse the effect that DB plan retention has on firm 
credit rating. Furthermore, given the executives’ personal incentives related to 
pension plans, this effect may also be influenced by the fact that the firm’s CEO is a 
member of the firm’s tax qualified DB plan. Existing literature has shown that 
pensions are an important part of CEO compensation and evidence suggests that 
CEOs with high pension holdings are more risk averse (e.g. Bebchuk and Jackson, 
2005, Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2009). In 
particular, the manner by which CEOs do so may involve some combination of 
reducing investment spending, selecting less risky projects, unlevering the firm’s 
capital structure, or lengthening the maturity of the firm’s debt (Sundaram and 
Yermack, 2007). Moreover, Kuang and Qin (2013) examine whether credit rating 
agencies incorporate managerial risk-taking incentives into their credit risk 
assessment. They use two proxies to measure risk-taking incentives: the sensitivity 
of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial 
wealth to stock price (delta). Using a sample of US firms from 1992 to 2006 the 
authors find that credit rating agencies incorporate managerial risk-taking incentives 
in their credit risk assessments. However, existing literature does not provide any 
evidence so far on how the participation of CEOs in the firms’ main DB pension plan 
might affect credit ratings. The most closely related study is the one by Moody’s 
(2005) which analyses the relation between credit ratings and CEO compensation 
for a sample of US firms between 1993 and 2003. They find that that large, positive, 
unexplained bonus and option awards can predict default and substantial rating 
downgrades while variations in salaries do not predict credit risk. Although these 
results do not provide a direct explanation on why CEO compensation might predict 
credit ratings, the authors suggest that high levels of unexplained compensation may 
indicate a weaker board which as a result, does not put any pressure on executives 
to provide good financial performance. Another study that is indirectly related to this 
one is a paper by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006). The study analyses the effect of 
corporate governance quality on credit ratings. The authors find that corporate 
governance affects credit ratings. They subsequently examine the reasons why all 
firms do not have strong governance. Their findings suggest that CEOs of weak 
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governance firms garner overcompensation in excess of their share of additional 
debt costs. Moreover, Bonsall, Holzman and Miller (2016) examine the effect of 
managerial ability on credit rating valuation. Using a sample of US firms from 1985 
to 2011 they find that higher managerial ability is associated with more favourable 
credit ratings. Nevertheless, these studies do not provide any direct evidence related 
to CEO pension compensation and its effect on credit ratings. This remains an 
empirical research question to which I seek to shed more light.  
4.2.2 Financial constraints and pension underfunding 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorise that in a world without frictions there are 
no differences between the cost of internal and external financing. Further research 
suggests that external funding might be more expensive because of information 
asymmetry, moral hazard problems, incomplete contracting agency costs and the 
tax systems. These ideas have often been synthesized into the trade-off theory and 
the pecking order theory of leverage (Donaldson, 1961; Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
The trade-off theory of capital structure refers to the idea that a company 
chooses how much debt finance and how much equity finance to use by balancing 
the costs and benefits. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) provide a classic statement 
of the theory that optimal leverage reflects a trade-off between the tax benefits of 
debt and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. According to Myers (1984), a firm that 
follows the trade-off theory sets a target debt-to-value ratio and then gradually moves 
towards the target. The target is determined by balancing debt tax shields against 
costs of bankruptcy.  
The pecking order theory initially proposed by Donaldson (1961) and modified 
later by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that due to adverse selection, companies 
prioritise their sources of funding based on their risk level. More specifically, internal 
financing is prioritised followed by the issue of debt and finally by issuing new equity. 
This pecking order is important because it signals to the market how the company is 
performing. If a company uses internal finance, this will generally mean that the firm 
is financially strong. If a firm issues new debt, it is a signal that management is 
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confident the company can meet its debt obligations. If a company issues new 
equity, it is normally a negative signal, as the company thinks its stock is overvalued 
and it seeks to profit before a fall in the share price. Moreover, Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) using a sample of 157 publicly traded US firms over the period 1971 
to 1989 find strong support for this prediction. 
A firm that sponsors a DB plan promises employees future pension benefits. 
This liability is generally measured based on the years of service of the employees 
and on their salary levels (Glaum, 2009). Thus, the firm has a financial liability toward 
retirees equal to the present value of the estimated benefits. In the UK, the Pensions 
Regulator requires firms to fund the liability in a pension fund with dedicated assets. 
If the market value of pension plan assets is greater than the present value of 
liabilities, the plan is considered “overfunded”. If the market value of pension assets 
is less than the present discounted value of the pension liability, the scheme is 
considered “underfunded”. Firms with overfunded plans do not have to make 
contributions to their pension funds. They may choose to make contributions but only 
up to certain full funding limits, beyond which contributions lose their favourable tax 
treatment. If the plan is underfunded, the firm is required to make contributions in 
order to meet a statutory funding objective (The Pension Regulator). Thus, 
contributions to underfunded plans can pose a significant financial pressure (Rauh, 
2006). The existence of budget constraints within firms implies that such 
contributions to the pension scheme can divert cash from alternative uses such as 
dividend payments or investments (Bunn and Trivedi, 2005; Rauh, 2006; Liu and 
Tonks, 2013). The implication of the trade-off theory is that an increase in pension 
contributions should not affect the optimal level of debt; therefore one might expect 
adjustment to higher pension contributions to take place through lower dividends 
and possibly lower investment (or higher equity issuance). The implication of the 
‘pecking order’ theory is that if pension contributions increase, unless they are fully 
offset by lower dividends or investments, a firm will have less internal finance 
available to finance investment and they will increase their demand for external 
finance. This may mean that firms take on more debt, although if external financing 
is costly and thereby leads to an increase in the cost of capital, investment will be 
lower than it would otherwise have been (Bunn and Trivedi, 2005). 
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Existing literature, mainly US based, shows that funds required to finance 
pension plans might restrict how much could be allocated for other uses within the 
firm. For example, Rauh (2006) using a sample of US firms that sponsor DB plans 
over the period 1991-2004, finds that mandatory pension contributions have a 
negative effect on firms’ capital expenditures. This effect is more evident when firms 
are more financially constrained. The author also finds a negative relation between 
pension plan contributions and acquisitions, dividends and stock repurchases.  
Another stream of literature examines the capital market effects of pension 
contributions. Franzoni and Marin (2006) use a US sample from 1981 to 2002 and 
show that firms with overfunded plans tend to be under-priced, while firms with 
underfunded plans are significantly overpriced. The authors suggest that this pricing 
anomaly does not have a risk-based explanation. As an alternative, they suggest an 
interpretation based on investors’ under-reaction to pension plan information. 
Franzoni (2009) finds a negative association between mandatory pension 
contributions and stock returns over the subsequent twelve months for a sample of 
US firms from July of 1991 and June of 2001. This association is stronger for firms 
that are more financially constrained. Likewise, Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz 
(2010) examine the relationship between capital expenditures and abnormal returns 
surrounding key dates in the legislative process that led to the adoption of the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006). Using the PPA 2006 as an exogenous 
shock to examine the market reaction to increased mandatory pension contributions, 
they find that firms with greater investment requirements (i.e., firms with higher levels 
of capital expenditures prior to the PPA 2006) are associated with added negative 
abnormal returns than are firms with relatively smaller investment requirements. 
Campbell, Dhaliwal and Schwartz (2012) examine the relation between firms' 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and internal financial resources, using 
mandatory pension contributions as a proxy for internal financial resources for a 
sample of US firms over the period 1991–2007. They find a positive association 
between firms’ WACC and mandatory pension contributions for firms that issue non-
investment grade debt but no such relationship for firms that issue investment-grade 
debt suggesting that mandatory pension contributions increase the cost of capital, 
but only for firms that face greater external financing constraints. In addition, the 
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study shows that Moody’s credit ratings are not significantly related with mandatory 
pension contributions. 
There are only two studies that use a UK setting to examine these issues. 
Bunn and Trivedi (2005), using a sample of publicly traded UK firms for the period 
over 1983-2002 find significant evidence that increased pension contributions are 
associated to lower dividend payments while they find only weak evidence that this 
relation holds for investments. In other words, companies that are required to divert 
funds to their underfunded pension plans tend to pay lower dividends than they 
would otherwise. In a similar study, Liu and Tonks (2013) using a sample of UK-
listed firms with at least one DB pension scheme from 2001 to 2005, find a strong 
and negative relation between pension contributions and capital expenditures and 
dividend payments.  
In general, these studies suggest that firms with underfunded pension plans 
tend to pay fewer dividends and undertake fewer investments than they would 
otherwise. In addition, these results are consistent with the notion that capital 
markets react as if increases in mandatory pension contributions require firms to 
forego valuable capital investments. 
 
4.2.3 CEO incentives  
 
The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulates that non-owner 
managers (agents) may adopt corporate decisions serving their own interests to the 
detriment of shareholders’ interests. Based on these concepts subsequent literature 
has identified several reasons for managers to deviate from decisions that optimise 
shareholders value. More specifically, several studies show that undiversified wealth 
and human capital invested in the firm may lead risk-averse managers to make sub-
optimal decisions to reduce firm risk (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Treynor and 
Black, 1976; Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach, 2005; etc.). The empire-building 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) suggests that managers might undertake unprofitable 
investments to increase the size of the company. The motivation to construct an 
‘empire’ reflects the executives’ desire to achieve higher status, more power and 
prestige in society. This can lead to over-investment that, in turn, reduces 
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shareholder value (Marris 1964; Williamson 1974; Jensen 1986). Reputation issues 
might be another explanation why managers act in their own interest (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989, Schleifer and Vishny, 
1988). Compensation is an additional important incentive that might lead managers 
to act against shareholders’ interests. Existing literature examining the effects of 
various compensation components emphasizes primarily the role of equity-based 
compensation. For example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) show that 
executives prefer highly risky investments if the value of their compensation 
package, particularly stock-option holdings, is positively related to firm risk.  
In the context of pensions, DB pension plans are considered a form of inside 
debt56 and like other types of debt, inside debt obligations expose managers to 
default risks (Edmans and Liu, 2010). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
possible excessive inside debt holdings, may prompt executives to make more 
conservative decisions by reducing the overall risk and restraining liquidity and 
thereby transferring wealth from stockholders to debtholders. Although inside debt 
holdings constitute a significant part of executives’ compensation (e.g. Bebchuk and 
Jackson, 2005), pensions do not receive the necessary attention in the empirical 
compensation literature as it is highlighted by Jenter and Frydman (2010) in their 
review of recent compensation research. In addition, a few US based studies on this 
matter mainly refer to Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs). These 
plans were established for the pension payments which exceeded the maximum 
federally-insured amounts available to most employees under ordinary tax-qualified 
pension plans. SERP pension liabilities represent unsecured, unfunded debt held by 
executives against the firm, and should the firm become insolvent, SERP pension 
beneficiaries would stand in line with other creditors. This type of pension plan is 
similar to Employer-Financed Retirement Benefits Scheme (EFRBS) (or EFURB) 
established in the UK for pension payments which exceeded the maximum lifetime 
allowance. 57  In either case, there is no corporation tax deduction for employer 
contributions to an EFRBS scheme on the basis that it involves no 'qualifying benefit'. 
                                                          
56 They represent fixed obligations to be paid to company insiders. 
57 Employer Financed Retirement Benefit Schemes (EFRBS) replaced Funded Unapproved 
Retirement Benefit Schemes (FURBS) or Unfunded Unapproved Retirement Benefit Schemes 
(UURBS) after A-day (6 April 2006). 
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In addition, executives do not face an income tax liability until payments are received. 
However, while in the US the majority of executives’ pension benefits are accrued 
through SERPS in the UK, the proportion of benefits accrued under non-
supplemental schemes (i.e. EFRBS) does not typically comprise the majority of 
executive pension benefits (Goh et al., 2015). As such, most of the existing US 
studies in general fail to consider the importance of qualified DB plans.  
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) use a sample of 237 Fortune 500 firms over 
the period 1996 to 2002 and find that SERPS are a significant part of executives’ 
compensation and that debt-based compensation prompts managers to be more 
conservative in managing pension plans. Similarly, Cassell, et al. (2012) examine a 
sample of US firms over the period 2006 to 2008, to see whether CEOs with large 
inside debt holdings protect the value of their holdings by implementing less risky 
investment decisions and financial policies. They find a negative association 
between CEO inside debt holdings and R&D expenditures and financial leverage 
and a positive relation between executive inside debt holdings and diversification 
and asset liquidity. They interpret their results as evidence that large inside debt 
holdings induce a decrease of risk-seeking behaviour. Likewise, Eisdorfer, et al. 
(2015) use a sample of US firms for the period 2000 to 2009 and investigate the 
effect that executive SERPs have on dividend policy. They find a negative 
association between SERPs and dividends. Particularly, they show that firms 
maintain a relatively low dividend yield and dividend payout ratio when the proportion 
of pension value in the executives' compensation package is high, and when the 
pension value represents a high fraction of the firm assets. In a similar line of 
research, Wei and Yermack (2011) examine investor reactions to CEOs’ initial 
reports of inside debt positions required by SEC’s reforms in 2007. They find that for 
firms whose CEOs have large DB plans or other deferred compensation, bond prices 
rise, and equity prices fall in response to the disclosure in 2007. They interpret their 
results as evidence that inside debt is used to align managerial incentives with those 
of outside creditors.  
Overall, the evidence strengthens the theoretical argument that inside debt 
alleviates agency costs of debt and supports the fact that excessive amounts of 
inside debt holdings lead to CEOs making more conservative decisions. Above, I 
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discussed studies which suggest that firms with underfunded pension plans tend to 
pay less dividends and undertake fewer investments than they would otherwise. In 
addition, in chapter 3, I find that CEOs that participate in the firms’ main DB plan are 
more likely to retain these plans. In this chapter, I combine these two streams of 
literature and findings in chapter 3 and examine the effect of CEO participation in 
the firm’s qualified DB plan on decisions related to dividend and investment outlays 
while controlling for the funding status of the pension plan. From earlier analysis, I 
infer that if CEOs are members of the firms’ main DB plans then these CEOs are 
more likely to retain the DB plans open even if these plans are underfunded. Existing 
literature shows that there is a negative association between the funds required for 
pension plans and funds required for other activities such as dividends and 
investments. An interesting research question that then arises is: how does the 
presence of a CEO affect/alters this relationship? If CEOs are only interested in 
serving their own interests, then one would expect that they would adjust dividends 
and investments in order to fund their own pension plan. However, the decision to 
cut dividends is not easy because of the signalling implications to the market 
(Lintner, 1956). More specifically, Lintner (1956) shows that dividend policy exhibits 
inertia and conservatism because of a deep belief by board directors that 
shareholders prefer stability, with equity markets placing a premium on stability and 
gradual growth. As such, the board of directors seeks to establish dividend policies 
that are unlikely to require year by year changes. Avoiding inconsistent changes to 
dividend policy can be achieved by changing dividends in line with changes in 
earnings forecasts. In addition, Lintner (1956) concludes that no other decision made 
by the board of directors was considered as consistently important (i.e. year-by-year) 
as dividend policy.  
In a summary of Lintner’s findings, Marsh and Merton (1987) conclude that 
managers tend not to make dividend decisions that might have to be reversed in the 
near future and they mainly focus on the change in existing dividend payout level 
rather than absolute level. Furthermore, agency theory posits that dividends 
encourage managers to more efficiently use available resources (Jensen, 1986). As 
such, dividends serve as a disciplining and monitoring mechanism intended to 
reduce the agency costs of equity. Given the role of dividends, there may be a need 
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for adjustment through other channels as well as dividends. Another channel in 
which adjustments may take place is through corporate investments. That is, in order 
to retain necessary funds for their DB plans, managers may decide to cut 
investments and thereby potentially underinvest. Therefore, examining the effect of 
CEO participation in the firm’s main DB plan on dividend payments and investments 
represents an interesting research question. 
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
In this section, I present the research design for the analysis of the effects of 
DB plan retention and CEO participation in them on credit ratings and the effects on 
dividends and capital investments, respectively. 
4.3.1 Effects on credit ratings 
 
To examine the effect that the retention of DB plans has on credit ratings, I 
use ordered probit models. I use ordered probit models because the eight categories 
of credit ratings convey ordinal risk assessment. The models are as follows: 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘  
(Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                         (4.1)                                              
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 
(𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡* 𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡* 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘  
(Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                    (4.2)                                                                 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡)+𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 
𝛽4 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  
                                                                                                                    (4.3) 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3  (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 
( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽5   ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡 * 𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽6  
( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡 * 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + 
YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                         (4.4)                
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To proxy for firm credit ratings (RATING), I use the long-term issuer credit 
rating compiled by Standard and Poor’s and reported in either Thomson One or S&P 
Capital IQ. Following, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) the ratings range from ‘AAA’ 
(highest rating) to ‘D’ (lowest rating) and are collapsed into eight categories as shown 
in Table 4.1. These ratings reflect the S&P’s assessment of the creditworthiness of 
the obligor with respect to its senior debt obligations. Model 4.1 examines the relation 
between a fully and partly open DB plan and an overfunded plan with the credit 
rating. Similarly, Model 4.2 includes interactions of those variables in order to 
examine their incremental effect. Equations 4.3 and 4.4 examine the effect of the 
participation of CEOs in the main DB plan along with whether this plan is fully or 
partially open on credit ratings. Equation 4.4 involves interactions of CEO_MAINDB 
with FULLY_OPEN and PARTLY_ OPEN to analyse their incremental value. 
FULLY_OPEN is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a fully open plan and 
0 otherwise. PARTLY_OPEN is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a partly 
open plan and 0 otherwise. FUNDED is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
has an overfunded plan and 0 otherwise. I predict a positive association between 
FUNDED and RATING since an overfunded plan is associated with a healthier plan. 
FULLY_OPEN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the plan is fully open and 0 
otherwise. A fully open plan might be considered a significant financial burden to the 
firm and therefore might have a negative impact on the firm’s credit rating. On the 
other hand, a ‘healthy’ open DB plan might not necessarily be considered a problem 
for the firm and as such, does not negatively affect the firm’s debt rating as discussed 
earlier. As such, I do not make any predictions with regards to the sign of the 
coefficient on OPEN. PARTLY_OPEN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
has a partially open plan and 0 otherwise. I predict that this variable is similar to 
OPEN and thus, again, I do not have any a priori expectations with regards to 
PARTLY_OPEN. CEO_MAINDB is an indicator variable that equals 1 the CEO is a 
member of the firm’s main DB plan and 0 otherwise. Based on the same rationale 
as above I do not make any predictions about the sign of the coefficient on this 
variable.  
Controls, is a vector of k additional factors expected to influence the credit 
rating. The set of control variables is based on existing literature and includes firm 
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size, capital intensity, leverage, interest coverage ratio, return on assets, 
subordinate debt and loss (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The size of the firm 
(FIRM_SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. I 
predict a positive association between FIRM_SIZE and RATING given that larger 
firms are expected to have a lower default risk. Capital intensity (CAP_INTENSITY) 
is measured as the gross PPE divided by total assets and it controls for differences 
in firms asset structure. Higher capital intensity is associated with lower risk and 
therefore, I expect a positive association between CAP_INTENSITY and RATING. 
Ratios such as LEVERAGE (total debt to total equity), interest coverage (ICR) and 
return on assets (ROA) are used to proxy for firms’ default risk. In particular, a higher 
ROA and ICR and lower LEVERAGE are associated with lower default risk and as 
a result is associated with a higher debt rating. SUBORD is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm has issued subordinate debt and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
used to control for differences in firms’ debt structures. A firm that has issued 
subordinated debt is considered riskier and I therefore expect a negative association 
between SUBORD and RATING. LOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
firm has experienced a loss during the current year and 0 otherwise. The probability 
of default is higher for firms that have negative income. Thus, I posit a negative 
relation between LOSS and RATING. 
Moreover, I control for the FUNDING_RATIO measured as the fair value of 
plan assets divided by present benefit obligation. I expect a positive association 
between RATING and FUNDING_RATIO. In addition, in models 4.3 and 4.4 where 
the role of CEO_MAINDB is examined I also control for the CEO tenure 
(CEO_TENURE) measured as the number of years that the CEO is in the current 
position. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid extreme 
values. All models include industry (INDUSTRY_FE) and year (YEAR_FE) fixed 
effects to control for cross-sectional differences within industries and time series 
differences within years. All models use robust standard errors clustered by firm to 
correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Rogers, 1993). Variables are 
defined in Table 4.2, Panel A. 
“Inserts Table 4.1 here” 
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4.3.2 Effects on dividends and capital investments 
 
To estimate the effects that the CEO participation in the main DB plan has on 
dividend payments and capital investments I use pooled regressions for dividend 
and investment proxies, respectively. I use the following models: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) +𝛽2  (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) 
𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        (4.5)               
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 
𝛽3  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 *  𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + 
YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                           (4.6)           
Also, I examine these effects using changes of the dependent variables.  
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) +  𝛽2 
(𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (4.7)            
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2 
(𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽3  (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 *  𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                 (4.8)             
I measure DIVIDENDS as follows: dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT) measured 
as the dividend paid divided by net income; dividend yield (YIELD) measured as the 
annual dividend per share divided by the stock price per share at the end of the year; 
Net dividends (NET DIVIDEND) are dividends paid in a given year less the difference 
between stock issuance and stock repurchase scaled by the book value of total 
assets. Investments (INVESTMENTS) are measured using capital expenditures 
divided by net sales. CHG_PAYOUT, CHG_YIELD, CHG_NET_DIVIDEND and 
CHG_INVESTMENTS are the respective changes in those variables measured as 
the difference between year t and t-1.  
CEO_MAINDB is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a CEO is a member of 
the firm’s main DB plan and 0 otherwise. As discussed earlier, I do not make any 
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predictions with regards to the sign of the coefficient on this variable.  FUNDED is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the plan is overfunded and 0 otherwise. Prior 
research indicates that the coefficient on FUNDED is expected to be negative as the 
more funded a plan is, the less funds available for other activities such as dividend 
distribution and/or investments. CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED is the interaction of those 
two variables. I use this interaction in order to examine the incremental effect of 
these two variables. I do not have any a priori expectations about the sign of the 
interaction coefficient. 
Moreover, I use several control variables based on existing literature (Rauh, 
2006; Liu and Tonks, 2013; Eisdorfer et al., 2015). The controls have a few 
differences between models based on existing literature. I include the funding ratio 
(FUNDING_RATIO) measured as the fair value of plan assets divided by the 
projected benefit obligation. I also control for other CEO payment incentives such as 
salary and bonuses (CEO_SALARY) calculated as CEO’s salary and bonuses for 
the current year scaled by firms’ total assets in that year; and CEO equity incentives 
(CEO_EQUITY) measured as the market value of CEO’s common shares plus the 
value of unexercised stock options. CEO_TENURE is the number of years for which 
the CEO has been in the current position. Firm size (FIRM_SIZE) measured as the 
natural logarithm of firms’ market value of equity; the book to market value of equity 
BM; ROA, return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets; CFOP 
is cash from operations scaled by total assets. LOSS is an indicator equal to 1 if a 
firm has made a loss and 0 otherwise. LEVERAGE is measured as long-term debt 
to book value of equity; CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets; 
CURRENT_RATIO is measured as current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Following Rauh (2006), I also control for unobserved investment opportunities 
(UNOB_INV) calculated as market-to-book ratio of firms’ assets. Z_SCORE is 
Taffler’s z-score used to measure firms’ bankruptcy risk; BETA is the market beta; 
FIRM_AGE is years since incorporation; SALARY_CAP is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm has imposed a pensionable salary cap and 0 otherwise. 
DIV_PAYABLE are dividends payable; RETURN is the cumulative return during the 
last 12 months. All independent variables are lagged by one year to capture 
conditions that prevail before dividend or investment decisions are made. 
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Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid extreme values. All 
models include industry- and year- fixed effects to control for cross-sectional 
differences within industries and time series differences within years. All models use 
robust standard errors clustered by firm to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation (Rogers, 1993). Variables are defined in Table 4.2, Panel B. 
“Insert Table 4.2 here” 
4.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
4.4.1 Sample selection 
 
The sample for the analysis of the effects on credit ratings includes FTSE All-
Share firms which sponsor a DB plan58 during the period 1999 – 2013 and which 
have an available long-term issuer credit rating provided by S&P. From the initial 
sample of 322 companies (3,625 firm year observations), only 101 firms have an 
available credit rating from S&P. The final sample yielded 945 firm year observations 
after excluding missing data. The sample for the analysis on the effects on dividends 
and investments includes all FTSE All-Share firms which sponsor a DB plan (322 
firms).  
Data on credit ratings are collected from Thomson One and S&P Capital IQ. 
Data on financial and pension variables are either collected from Worldscope or 
hand collected from annual reports. Data on executive compensation are obtained 
from BoardEx. Data sources are shown in Table 4.2, Panels A and B. 
 
  
                                                          
58 As explained in Chapter 1 for a firm to be included in the final sample it has to sponsor a DB plan 
in 1999 or the first year when the company was established. The sample selection process for 
these is shown in Table 4.2. 
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.3 provides information on the descriptive statistics and correlations 
for the main and control variables used in the credit ratings analysis59. Panel A shows 
descriptive statistics while Panel B shows pairwise correlations. In particular, Panel 
A shows that the average long-term S&P credit rating is about 4 which corresponds 
to a credit rating of ‘BBB+’ to ‘BBB-’ range. According to S&P, this rating means that 
‘on average the obligor has adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely 
to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitments’. 
About 54% of firms have an overfunded plan while the mean (median) funding ratio 
is 93% (91%) suggesting that on average firms in this sample have an underfunded 
pension plan which makes them financially more vulnerable. Furthermore, 52% of 
the DB plans in the sample are fully open while about 43% are partially open. 
Approximately 46% of the CEOs are members of the firms’ main DB plan while the 
average CEO tenure is around 4 years. Average (median) interest coverage ratio 
and financial leverage are 14.93 (6.68) and 93% (61%) respectively, suggesting that 
on average the firms in the sample are generating sufficient revenues to satisfy its 
interest expenses and have relatively low bankruptcy risk. In addition, only 10% of 
the firms have issued subordinate debt. Panel B presents pairwise correlations 
between the RATING variable and main and control variables. Panel B shows that 
the majority of the variables have the expected correlation with the RATING variable. 
Specifically, RATING is negatively and significantly correlated with FULLY_OPEN (-
0.13) and PARTLY_OPEN (-0.07), suggesting that a fully or partially open plan has 
a negative impact on debt ratings. Moreover, CEO_MAINDB (0.08) and FUNDED 
(0.02) are positively and significantly correlated with RATING suggesting that an 
overfunded plan and the participation of the CEO in the firm’s main DB plan have a 
positive correlation with the firms’ credit rating. In terms of control variables RATING 
is positively correlated with SIZE (0.59), ICR (0.09), ROA (0.16) and 
FUNDING_RATIO (0.15) while it is negatively correlated with LOSS (-0.15) and 
                                                          
59 All variables have been winsorized at 1 and 99% levels to avoid the effect of outliers. 
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SUBORD (-0.12). These findings are similar to findings reported in the previous 
literature (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).  
“Insert Table 4.3 here” 
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for the main and control variables used 
to analyse the effect of DB retention and CEO participation on dividends and capital 
expenditures. Specifically, this Table shows that the average dividend payout ratio 
is 0.48 while the mean change in this is again negative (approximately -0.03). The 
negative changes could be explained by the effect of the financial recession. The 
average dividend yield is 0.03 while the average change in dividend yield is 0; the 
mean dividend after deducting stock issuance and repurchases is 0.002 while the 
mean change in this is 0.02. Average changes are very small for dividend measures 
suggesting that changes in dividends are not preferred from firms due to the market 
signalling effects of dividends. Average investments are 0.1 while the average 
change in investments is negative -0.004. Approximately 61% of the CEOs in this 
sample are members of the firms’ main DB plan. The high percentage in this sample 
is explained by the fact that it includes only firms with fully open DB plans. 34% of 
the firms have a funded DB plan while the average funding ratio is 98% suggesting 
that on average these firms have funded pension plans.  
“Insert Table 4.4 here” 
Table 4.5 shows pairwise correlations between the various dividend 
measures and investments and the corresponding test and control variables. As it 
can be seen CEO_MAINDB is positively and significantly correlated to PAYOUT 
(0.09), YIELD (0.11), and NET_DIVIDENDS (0.11), suggesting that the presence of 
the CEO in the firm’s main DB plan can positively affect the dividend yield and net 
dividends. FUNDED is negatively and significantly correlated to YIELD (-0.10), 
CHG_YIELD (-0.09) and NET_DIVIDENDS (-0.04) suggesting that for firms that 
retain DB plans, a funded plan comes to the expense of investors through payment 
of less dividends.  
“Insert Table 4.5 here” 
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4.5 Findings 
4.5.1 Effects on credit ratings 
 
Table 4.6 presents the findings for the first part of the analysis which refers to 
the effects DB plan retention and CEO participation in these on credit ratings. Model 
4.1 estimates the effects of a DB plan being fully open (FULLY_OPEN) and partly 
open (PARTLY_OPEN) along with whether the plan is overfunded (FUNDED) on 
credit ratings. The coefficients on FULLY_OPEN and PARTLY_OPEN are negative 
and statistically significant (on the 10% and 5% level of significance, respectively), 
suggesting that a fully or partially open DB plan has an adverse effect on credit 
rating. The coefficient on FUNDED is not statistically significant.  
Model 4.2 extends Model 4.1 by including interactions of FULLY_OPEN and 
PARTLY_OPEN with FUNDED60. While the coefficient on FULLY_OPEN remains 
negative and statistically significant (on the 5% level), the coefficient on 
PARTLY_OPEN is not statistically significant. In terms of interactions, the interaction 
of FUNDED with FULLY_OPEN has a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
(on the 10% level) while the coefficient on FUNDED*PARTLY_OPEN is not 
statistically significant. These findings suggest that a fully open plan regardless of 
funding status has a negative impact on firm’s debt rating. However, an underfunded 
and fully open plan (coefficient on FULLY_OPEN) seems to exacerbate the negative 
effect as compared to an overfunded and fully open (coefficient on FUNDED * 
FULLY_OPEN) plan given the higher coefficient. In terms of controls in both models 
4.1 and 4.2, FIRM_SIZE, ICR and FUNDING_RATIO have a positive effect on credit 
rating while SUBORD has a negative effect. These results concur with prior literature 
and suggest that larger firms with higher interest coverage ratio and higher pension 
                                                          
60 Ai and Norton (2003) show that the magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models is not 
equal to the marginal effect of the interaction term, can be of opposite sign, and its statistical 
significance cannot be calculated by standard non-linear estimation methods. In the present 
analysis I am interested in the sign rather than the magnitude of the interaction coefficients. 
Therefore, to address this concern and given that the variables of interest are both indicator 
variables I have estimated the models 4.2 and 4.4 splitting the sample conditional on FUNDED (for 
equation 4.3) and by FULLY_OPEN and PARTLY_OPEN (for equation 4.4). Untabulated results 
confirm that the sign of the coefficients and their statistical significance are consistent to those 
presented in Table 4.6. 
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plan funding ratio are considered less likely to default while firms that have issued 
subordinate debt have higher probability to default. 
Models 4.3 and 4.4 estimate the effect CEO_MAINDB has on credit ratings. 
The results for Model 4.3 show that CEO_MAINDB does not have any statistically 
significant effect on credit rating. Model 4.4 involves interactions of CEO_MAINDB 
with FULLY_OPEN and PARTLY_OPEN. The results show that the coefficient on 
CEO_MAINDB*FULLY_OPEN is positive and statistically significant (on the 5% 
level), suggesting that a fully open plan that has a CEO who is a member of this plan 
positively affects credit ratings. As discussed earlier, this might demonstrate the fact 
that credit rating agencies are aware of the fact that CEOs who are members of 
firms’ main DB plans are more conservative and risk averse. In addition, this could 
also indicate that the fact that the CEO being a member of this plan signals to debt 
rating agencies that this plan is sustainable. Therefore, when a plan is fully open but 
the CEO is not a member of this plan, is perceived as a negative sign resulting in an 
adverse credit rating for these firms. The negative effect is partially mitigated by the 
fact that CEO is a member of this plan. In this case, firms are awarded a higher credit 
rating. Findings for control variables remain the same as in models 4.1 and 4.2 
except for FUNDING_RATIO which is no longer statistically significant.  
 
4.5.2 Effects on dividends and investments 
 
Table 4.7 presents the results of panel regressions with fixed industry and 
year effects for the models based on Equations (4.5) - (4.8) above. Panels A, B, C 
and D refer to effects on dividend payout ratio, dividend yield, net dividends and 
investments, respectively. Panel A, Models 4.5 and 4.6, show that CEO_MAINDB  
has a positive effect on PAYOUT (at the 10% level), suggesting that a CEO being a 
member of the firm’s main DB plan positively affects the dividend payout ratio. This 
result does not hold in Models 4.7 and 4.8 where the dependent variable is 
CHG_YIELD. FUNDED and the interaction between CEO_MAINDB and FUNDED 
is not statistically significant in any model. The latter suggests that there is no 
evidence to support any incremental effects of CEO_MAINDB and FUNDED. In 
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terms of control variables, cash from operations (CFOP) in all four models and 
dividends payable (DIV_PAYABLE) in models 4.5 and 4.6 have a positive effect on 
the dividend payout ratio and its changes.  
The findings in Panel B, where the dependent variables are YIELD (models 
4.5 and 4.6) and CHG_YIELD (models 4.7 and 4.8) are similar to those in Panel A. 
In particular, CEO_MAINDB has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (on 
the 1% level) in models 4.5 and 4.6. The rest of the variables of interest are not 
statistically significant. With respect to controls, CEO_SALARY (in models 4.7 and 
4.8), CEO_EQUITY (in models 4.7 and 4.8), FIRM_SIZE (in models 4.7 and 4.8), 
BM (in models 4.5 and 4.6) and CFOP (in models 4.5 and 4.6) are positively 
associated with YIELD and CHG_YIELD. On the other hand, BM (in models 4.7 and 
4.8) and LOSS and UNOB_INV (in models 4.5 and 4.6) have a negative effect on 
YIELD and CHG_YIELD. These results are in general in line with my expectations 
and previous literature (e.g. Liu and Tonks, 2013; Eisdorfer et al., 2015) 
Panel C shows the results when the dependent variables are 
NET_DIVIDENDS (Models 4.5 and 4.6) and CHG_NET_DIVIDENDS (Models 4.7 
and 4.8). Again, the results with regards to the main variables are similar to those in 
panels A and B of table 4.7. More specifically, CEO_MAINDB has a positive effect 
(on the 1% level) on NET_DIVIDENDS. Model 4.5 shows that FUNDED also has a 
negative and statistically significant (on the 10% level) coefficient. In terms of control 
variables ROA and CFOP (in models 4.5 and 4.6) have a positive effect on 
NET_DIVIDENS which is in line with my expectations and previous literature (Liu 
and Tonks, 2013; Eisdorfer et al., 2015). UNOB_INV and Z_SCORE (in models 4.7 
and 4.8) have a positive association with CHG_NET_DIVIDENDS which is not in line 
with my expectations and previous literature findings. On the contrary, ROA, CFOP 
and LOSS (in models 4.7 and 4.8) have a negative relation with 
CHG_NET_DIVIDENDS. While the sign on LOSS is in line with my expectations the 
signs on ROA and LOSS are not.  
Finally, Panel D presents the results when the dependent variables are 
INVESTMENTS (in models 4.5 and 4.6) and CHG_INVESTMENTS (in models 4.7 
and 4.8). The findings in this case are different from what is seen in Panels A, B and 
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C. In particular, test variables seem to be significant only in Model 4.8. 
CEO_MAINDB (on the 10% level) and FUNDED (on the 10 % level) are positively 
associated with CHG_INVESTMENTS while the interaction of those two is 
negatively associated (on the 5% level) to CHG_INVESTMENTS. In terms of control 
variables, BM (in models 4.5 and 4.6) has a positive effect on INVESTMENTS while 
CURRENT_RATIO and BETA (in models 4.5 and 4.6) are negatively related to 
INVESTMENTS which is in line with my expectations and previous literature (Rauh, 
2006; Liu and Tonks, 2013; Eisdorfer et al., 2015). 
Overall, these results show some evidence that the participation of CEO in a 
firm’s main DB plan has a positive effect on either dividend payments or changes in 
dividend payments suggesting that executives are less likely to curtail dividends in 
order to have more available funds for their DB plans. This finding is in line with the 
argument that dividends are a corporate policy which provides market signals about 
the financial health of the firm. Therefore, adjusting dividends might not be a good 
choice for a firm. Whereas, I find some empirical evidence that adjustments through 
corporate investments are more likely to happen. 
 
4.6 Additional analysis 
 
4.6.1 Irregular payouts 
 
Given the argument that dividends are not easy to adjust due to being a 
corporate policy which conveys information to the market about the firm, one might 
consider that adjustments might take place through other irregular payments such 
as stock repurchases and special dividends. Therefore, I examine the effect that 
CEO participation in the firm’s main DB plan has along with whether the plan is 
overfunded has on aggregate irregular payouts. These results are presented in 
Table 4.8. The dependent variable AGGR_IRREGULAR_PAYOUTS is measured as 
the sum of stock repurchases and special dividends scaled by total assets and 
models are in both levels (models 4.5 and 4.6) and changes (models 4.7 and 4.8). 
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The findings do not support the hypothesis that adjustments can take place through 
irregular payouts given that none of the test variables is statistically significant. 
 
4.6.2 Other investment measures 
 
In addition to investments in capital expenditures, I also consider investments 
in research and development (R&D)61 and the rate of undertaking new investments 
(RUNI)62 as developed by Ghicas (1990). The results are shown in Table 4.9 Panels 
A and B respectively. As it can be seen, neither CEO_MAINDB nor the interaction 
of CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED seem to have any statistically significant effect on any 
of those measures. From those models we can only observe the positive effect that 
an overfunded DB plan has on the decision to undertake R&D investments or the 
rate of undertaking new investments. 
 
4.6.3 Tobit models 
 
Following Rauh (2006) and Eisendorfer et al. (2015) I use Tobit regressions63 
for the dividend payout ratio, aggregate irregular payouts and R&D investments64 
because it provides a better specification for truncated distributions. The results are 
presented in Table 4.10. As it can be seen the results are similar with the ones 
obtained from the panel regressions above. 
                                                          
61 It should be noted that these results cannot be directly compared to relevant US studies because 
of different accounting standards related to R&D expense between US GAAP and IFRS. 
62 RUNI is measured as: (Capital Expenditures + Acquisitions + Advertising +R&D)/Total Assets 
63 The Tobit regression, also called a censored regression model, is designed to estimate linear 
relationships between variables when there is either left- or right-censoring in the dependent 
variable (also known as censoring from below and above, respectively). Censoring from above 
takes place when cases with a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of that 
threshold, so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it might also be higher. In the 
case of censoring from below, values those that fall at or below some threshold are censored. 
64 R&D is scaled by sales. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter analyses the effect retention of DB plans, either partially or fully 
open, has on credit ratings using samples of FTSE All-Share firms during the period 
1999-2013. Also, I examine the effect that the participation of CEOs in firms’ main 
DB plan under the same terms as the rest of the employees has on credit ratings, 
dividend payments and investments. The results show that fully and partly open DB 
plans have a negative impact on firms’ credit ratings. This suggests that credit rating 
agencies consider open DB plans to increase the default risk for a company. 
However, CEO participation in main DB schemes assures rating agencies about the 
riskiness of the plan and the positive effect of this offsets the negative impact of open 
DB plans. Specifically, this suggests that credit rating agencies do take into 
consideration the fact that executives that participate in firms’ DB plans make more 
conservative decisions and are more risk averse as such reducing the risk-taking 
initiatives which would increase the default risk for a firm. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that when DB plans remain open, CEO 
participation in the firm’s main DB plan seems to have a positive effect on dividend 
payments although the evidence is not very strong. In addition, there is also some 
evidence that CEO membership in the company’s DB plan might have a positive 
effect on investments. However, if these plans are overfunded then the effect on 
investments is negative, suggesting that to save funds for their pensions, CEOs 
make adjustments through investments. Overall, these results suggest that when DB 
plans remain open, dividend policies are less likely to change for the purpose of 
adjusting pension plan funding. On the contrary, investments seem to be a more 
common adjustment method used. In other words, it is less likely that CEOs cut 
dividends to ensure the necessary funds for their DB plans. They will more likely 
curtail investments for this purpose.  
Additional analysis shows that other types of irregular payouts such as share 
repurchases and special dividends are not affected by the fact that the DB plan 
remains open and/or the CEO participates in it. Moreover, I do not find empirical 
evidence that CEO participation in the firms’ main DB plan has any effect in other 
types of investments such as R&D and the rate of undertaking new investments.  
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Taken together, my results suggest that open DB plans are considered risky 
resulting in a reduction of firms’ credit ratings. The participation of CEOs in those 
plans alleviates this effect suggesting that credit rating agencies might take this into 
consideration. In addition, the findings suggest that there is cost from the agency 
behaviour related to pension funds. More specifically, these costs are related to the 
fact that the CEOs that are members of the firms’ open DB plans might direct funds 
to less than optimal investments in order to protect their own interests. On the 
contrary, I do not find such evidence related to dividend policy. These findings 
suggest that the retention of DB plans and CEOs participation in them play a role in 
corporate debt rating as well as in the manager- owner agency theory. In particular, 
they can be a cause for less than optimal corporate decisions.  
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Appendix III 
 
Table 4.1: Credit rating classifications  
S&P Long- 
Term Issuer 
Credit Rating 
 
RATING 
score 
 
Description 
AAA 7 An obligor rated 'AAA' has extremely strong capacity to meet 
its financial commitments. 'AAA' is the highest issuer credit 
rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings. 
AA+ 6 An obligor rated 'AA' has very strong capacity to meet its 
financial commitments. It differs from the highest-rated obligors 
only to a small degree. 
AA 6 
AA- 6 
A+ 5 An obligor rated 'A' has strong capacity to meet its financial 
commitments but is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse 
effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions 
than obligors in higher-rated categories. 
A 5 
A- 5 
BBB+ 4 An obligor rated 'BBB' has adequate capacity to meet its 
financial commitments. However, adverse economic 
conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead 
to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial 
commitments. 
BBB 4 
BBB- 4 
BB+ 3 An obligor rated 'BB' is less vulnerable in the near term than 
other lower-rated obligors. However, it faces major ongoing 
uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial, or 
economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's 
inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
BB 3 
BB- 3 
B+ 2 An obligor rated 'B' is more vulnerable than the obligors rated 
'BB', but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its 
financial commitments. Adverse business, financial, or 
economic conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or 
willingness to meet its financial commitments. 
B 2 
B- 2 
CCC 1 An obligor rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable, and is 
dependent upon favourable business, financial, and economic 
conditions to meet its financial commitments. 
CC 1 An obligor rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable. The 'CC' 
rating is used when a default has not yet occurred, but S&P 
Global Ratings expects default to be a virtual certainty, 
regardless of the anticipated time to default. 
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R 1 An obligor rated 'R' is under regulatory supervision owing to its 
financial condition. During the pendency of the regulatory 
supervision the regulators may have the power to favor one 
class of obligations over others or pay some obligations and 
not others. 
SD and D 1 An obligor rated 'SD' (selective default) or 'D' is in default on 
one or more of its financial obligations including rated and 
unrated financial obligations but excluding hybrid instruments 
classified as regulatory capital or in non-payment according to 
terms. An obligor is considered in default unless S&P Global 
Ratings believes that such payments will be made within five 
business days of the due date in the absence of a stated grace 
period, or within the earlier of the stated grace period or 30 
calendar days. A 'D' rating is assigned when S&P Global 
Ratings believes that the default will be a general default and 
that the obligor will fail to pay all or substantially all of its 
obligations as they come due. An 'SD' rating is assigned when 
S&P Global Ratings believes that the obligor has selectively 
defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations but it will 
continue to meet its payment obligations on other issues or 
classes of obligations in a timely manner. An obligor's rating is 
lowered to 'D' or 'SD' if it is conducting a distressed exchange 
offer. 
NR  0 An issuer designated 'NR' is not rated. This indicates that no 
rating has been requested, or that there is insufficient 
information on which to base a rating. 
Notes: Firm credit rating are the long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard and Poor’s and reported 
on Thomson One and Capital IQ. The ratings range from AAA (highest rating) to D (lowest rating) and NR (when 
no rating is issued). These ratings reflect the assessment of the creditworthiness of the obligor with respect to 
its senior debt obligations. For the purposes of the present analysis ratings are collapsed into eight categories 
as provided in the Table above.  
 
The rating 'CCC' may also be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing 
within the major rating categories. 
 
Source: S & P Global Ratings (https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-
/view/sourceId/504352)  
  
122 
 
Table 4.2: Variable definitions and sources 
PANEL A: CREDIT RATINGS ANALYSIS 
Variable Description Source 
RATING S&P long term issuer credit rating 
collapsed in eight categories as 
shown in Table 4.1. 
Thomson One and S&P 
Capital IQ. 
FUNDED Indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
plan is overfunded and 0 otherwise. 
 
FULLY_OPEN Indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
plan is fully open and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
PARTLY_OPEN Indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
plan is partially open and 0 
otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
CEO_MAINDB Indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
CEO is member of the firms’ main 
DB plan and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
FIRM_SIZE The firm size measured as the 
natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity. 
Worldscope 
CAP_INTENSITY Capital intensity is measured as the 
gross PPE divided by total assets 
and it controls for differences in 
firms asset structure. 
Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Measured as total debt to total 
equity. 
Worldscope 
ICR Interest coverage ratio measured as 
operating income divided by interest 
expense. 
Worldscope 
ROA Return on Assets measured as Net 
Income divided by Total Assets 
Worldscope 
SUBORD Indicator variable equal to1 if the 
firm has issued subordinated debt. 
S&P Capital IQ 
LOSS Loss is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm has experienced 
a loss during the current year and 0 
otherwise 
 
FUNDING RATIO Funding ratio is measured as the fair 
value of plan assets divided by 
present benefit obligation. 
Worldscope 
CEO_TENURE CEO tenure measured as the 
number of years that the CEO is in 
the current position. 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
 
 
 
123 
 
PANEL B: DIVIDEND AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
Variable Description Source 
PAYOUT Dividend payout is measured as the 
dividend paid during a year divided 
by the net income during that year 
Worldscope 
CHG_PAYOUT The change in dividend pay-out 
calculated as PAYOUTt – 
PAYOUTt-1 
 
YIELD Dividend yield is measured as the 
annual dividend per share divided 
by the stock price per share at the 
end of the years 
Worldscope 
CHG_YIELD The change in dividend pay-out 
calculated as YIELDt – YIELDt-1 
 
NET DIVIDENDS Net dividends are measure as 
dividends paid in a given year less 
the difference between stock 
issuance and stock repurchase 
during that year scaled by the book 
value of total assets 
Worldscope 
CHG_NET_DIVIDENDS The change in net dividends 
calculated as NET_DIVIDENDSt – 
NET_DIVIDENDSt-1 
 
INVESTMENTS Investments are measured using 
capital expenditures during a given 
year divided by net sales during that 
year 
Worldscope 
CHG_INVESTMENTS The change in INVESTMENTS 
calculated as INVESTMENTSt – 
INVESTMENTSt-1 
 
CEO_MAINDB An indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the plan is overfunded and 0 
otherwise 
Hand-collected from 
Annual Reports 
FUNDED FUNDED is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the plan is 
overfunded and 0 otherwise 
Worldscope and hand-
collected from Annual 
Reports 
FUNDING_RATIO Funding ratio is measured as the fair 
value of plan assets divided by 
present benefit obligation 
Worldscope and hand-
collected from Annual 
Reports 
CEO_SALARY Measured as salary and bonuses 
scaled by total assets 
BoardEx 
CEO_EQUITY CEO equity incentives is measured 
as the market value of CEO’s 
common equity plus the value of 
unexercised stock options scaled by 
the firm’s total assets 
BoardEx 
CEO_TENURE CEO_TENURE is the number of 
years for which the CEO has been 
in the current position 
Hand - collected 
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FIRM_SIZE The firm size (FIRM_SIZE) 
measured as the natural logarithm 
of firms’ market value of equity 
Worldscope 
BM The book to market value of equity 
BM 
Worldscope 
ROA Return on assets measured as net 
income divided by total assets 
Worldscope 
CFO CFO is cash from operations scaled 
by total assets. 
Worldscope 
LOSS Loss is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if a firm has made a loss 
and 0 otherwise 
 
LEVERAGE Leverage is measured as long-term 
debt divided by the book value of 
equity 
Worldscope 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets 
Worldscope 
CURRENT_RATIO Current ratio is measured as current 
assets divided by current liabilities 
Worldscope 
UNOB_INV Unobserved investment 
opportunities measured as the 
market- to- book ratio of firms’ 
assets following Rauh (2006) 
Calculated as: (Market 
Capitalization + Assets -Common 
Equity - Deferred Tax)/ Assets 
Worldscope 
Z_SCORE Z_SCORE is the Altman z-score 
used to measure the firms 
bankruptcy risk 
Worldscope 
BETA BETA is the market beta The London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) 
FIRM_AGE Firm age is the age of the firm in 
years 
The London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) 
SALARY_CAP An indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the firm has imposed a pensionable 
salary cap and 0 otherwise 
Hand – collected from 
Annual Reports 
DIV_PAYABLE Dividends payable Worldscope 
RETURN The cumulative return during the last 
12 months 
The London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) 
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Table 4.3: Credit ratings analysis - Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample 
used for the credit ratings analysis (Panel B). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels (two-tailed).  Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. All 
variables are defined in Table 4.2, Panel A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (N=945)
 Average Std. Dev.     Min    P25 Median    P75    Max
RATING   4.011   1.535   0.000   4.000   4.000   5.000   7.000
FULLY_OPEN   0.524   0.500   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
PARTLY_OPEN   0.425   0.495   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
FUNDED   0.543   0.498   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_MAINDB   0.456   0.498   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
CEO_TENURE   3.968   3.815   0.000   1.000   3.000   5.000  27.000
FIRM_SIZE   8.504   1.442   2.996   7.616   8.429   9.499  11.215
CAP_INTENSITY   0.577   0.408   0.003   0.228   0.552   0.880   1.570
ICR  14.927  49.146  -8.807   3.969   6.678  11.403 847.852
ROA   0.047   0.077  -0.320   0.011   0.044   0.081   0.263
LOSS   0.087   0.282   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
LEVERAGE   0.930   2.412  -7.243   0.265   0.605   1.216  12.289
SUBORD   0.102   0.302   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
FUNDING_RATIO   0.926   0.159   0.528   0.825   0.911   1.010   1.450
Panel B: Correlation analysis 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)
RATING (1)  1.00
FULLY_OPEN (2) -0.13***  1.00
PARTLY_OPEN (3) -0.07** -0.84***  1.00
FUNDED (4)  0.02  0.23*** -0.22***  1.00
CEO_MAINDB (5)  0.08***  0.28*** -0.129***  0.04**  1.00
CEO_TENURE (6) -0.05  0.01 -0.04** -0.04**  0.07***  1.00
FIRM_SIZE (7)  0.59*** -0.02  0.09***  0.05*** -0.01 -0.06***  1.00
CAP_INTENSITY (8)  0.01  0.1*** -0.06*** -0.01  0.01  0.01 -0.02  1.00
ICR (9)  0.09*** -0.08***  0.08*** -0.05***  0.01  0.18*** -0.08*** -0.02  1.00
ROA (10)  0.16*** -0.05***  0.07***  0.05***  0.03*  0.12***  0.22***  0.04**  0.19***  1.00
LOSS (11) -0.15***  0.00*** -0.03* -0.01 -0.04** -0.1*** -0.18*** -0.02 -0.08*** -0.58***  1.00
LEVERAGE (12)  0.04 -0.03*  0.06*** -0.05*** -0.02  0.00  0.07*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.02  1.00
SUBORD (13) -0.12*** -0.04***  0.07***  0.04**  0.04** -0.02  0.11*** -0.15*** -0.05** -0.09***  0.04**  0.16*** 1.00
FUNDING_RATIO (14)  0.15***  0.31*** -0.28***  0.78***  0.08*** -0.06***  0.06***  0.03* -0.06***  0.06*** -0.03* -0.06*** 0.01 1.00
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Table 4.4: Dividends and investments analysis - Descriptive statistics  
 
Notes: Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample used for the dividends and investments 
analysis. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. All variables are 
defined in Table 4.2, Panel B.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  N Average Std. Dev.     Min    P25  Median    P75    Max
PAYOUT  1837   0.480   0.590  -0.886   0.229   0.426   0.649   2.421
CHG_PAYOUT  1515  -0.025   1.058  -6.286  -0.120   0.000   0.144   5.521
YIELD  1803   0.034   0.021   0.000   0.021   0.031   0.045   0.102
CHG_YIELD  1482   0.000   0.017  -0.102  -0.005   0.000   0.006   0.087
NET_DIVIDENDS  1841   0.022   0.066  -0.303   0.010   0.021   0.036   0.322
CHG_NET_DIVIDENDS  1518   0.002   0.076  -0.624  -0.006   0.000   0.008   0.528
INVESTMENTS  1838   0.103   0.221   0.000   0.024   0.043   0.079   1.607
CHG_INVESTMENTS  1515  -0.004   0.140  -1.489  -0.011  -0.001   0.007   1.524
CEO_MAINDB  1511   0.607   0.489   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000
FUNDED  1521   0.346   0.476   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000   1.000
FUNDING_RATIO  1510   0.980   0.191   0.528   0.846   0.975   1.110   1.450
CEO_SALARY  1374   0.001   0.001   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.001   0.007
CEO_EQUITY  1371   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
CEO_TENURE  1519   5.178   5.363   0.000   1.000   4.000   7.000   33.00
FIRM_SIZE  1521   6.813   1.691   2.996   5.565   6.724   7.943   11.22
BM  1515   0.620   0.589  -0.301   0.266   0.462   0.802   3.458
ROA  1518   0.042   0.080  -0.320   0.019   0.048   0.081   0.263
CFOP  1520   0.081   0.068  -0.153   0.042   0.081   0.118   0.285
LOSS  1521   0.095   0.294   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
LEVERAGE  1516   0.635   1.823  -7.243   0.107   0.428   0.796   12.29
DIV_PAYABLE  1517   98.40   244.7   0.000   5.573  19.182   70.80   1837
CAPEX  1520   0.055   0.044   0.000   0.025   0.044   0.072  0.218
UNOB_INV  1514   2.431   1.193   1.080   1.784   2.138   2.659   8.405
CURRENT_RATIO  1493   1.398   0.832   0.344   0.868   1.220   1.639   5.317
Z_SCORE  1520   3.634 10.104 -30.053   0.367   3.263   7.061 32.092
BETA  1520   0.930   0.270   0.240   0.760   0.950   1.110   1.600
RETURN  1811   0.041   0.396  -1.389  -0.166   0.076   0.281   1.029
FIRM_AGE  1843   52.17   61.21   1.000  10.00   20.00   79.00   262.0
SALARY_CAP  1510   0.053   0.224   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000
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Table 4.5: Dividends and investments analysis - Pairwise correlations 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
INVESTMENTS (1) 1.00
CHG_INVESTMENTS (2) 0.31*** 1.00
PAYOUT (3) 0.01 0.02 1
CHG_PAYOUT (4) 0.01 0.01 0.47*** 1.00
YIELD (5) -0.02 0.04 0.26*** 0.01 1
CHG_YIELD (6) 0.01 0.04 0.09*** 0.08** 0.38*** 1.00
NET_DIVIDENDS (7) -0.05** -0.00 0.11*** 0.00 0.23*** 0.03 1
CHG_NET_DIVIDENDS (8) 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.06** 0.56*** 1.00
CEO_MAINDB (9) 0.01 0.01 0.09*** -0.01 0.11*** 0.04 0.11*** -0.02 1.00
FUNDED (10) -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.04* 0.02 -0.03 1.00
FUNDING_RATIO (11) 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.11*** 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.77*** 1.00
CEO_SALARY (12) -0.03 -0.02 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.16*** 0.01 -0.06** -0.01 -0.05* 0.01 -0.02 1.00
CEO_EQUITY (13) -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.05* -0.04* 0.00 -0.00 -0.04* 0.05* 0.09*** 1.00
CEO_TENURE (14) 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.10** 0.07** -0.09*** 0.10*** 0.03 1.00
FIRM_SIZE (15) 0.02 0.04* 0.14*** 0.00 0.04* 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.03 -0.02 -0.52*** -0.04* -0.07** 1.00
BM (16) 0.14*** -0.02*** -0.08 -0.02*** 0.14 -0.18*** -0.04*** 0.00 -0.07** -0.05* 0.06** -0.12*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.28***
ROA (17) -0.05** 0.05* 0.11*** -0.03 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.25*** -0.06** 0.09*** -0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.04 0.11*** 0.20***
CFOP (18) -0.07** 0.04 0.11*** 0.02 0.18*** 0.04 0.22*** -0.07** 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05* 0.00 0.14*** 0.15***
LOSS (19) 0.03 -0.06 -0.17*** 0.10*** -0.24*** -0.08** -0.16*** 0.01 -0.07** 0.01 -0.03 0.12*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.18***
LEVERAGE (20) 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.06** -0.10*** -0.04 0.01 0.07**
DIV_PAYABLE (21) 0.03 0.02 0.13*** -0.01 0.09*** 0.04 0.13*** 0.00 0.13*** 0.07** -0.02 -0.23*** -0.01 -0.04 0.60***
CAPEX (22) 0.24*** -0.17*** 0.05* -0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.05* 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.03 0.15*** -0.02 -0.06**
UNOB_INV (23) 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.25*** 0.09*** 0.05** 0.02 0.02 -0.08** 0.06** 0.37*** 0.02 0.08** 0.14***
CURRENT_RATIO (24) -0.01 -0.03 -0.13*** -0.02 -0.10*** -0.01 -0.02 0.05* -0.00 -0.06** 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.03 -0.26***
Z_SCORE (25) -0.08** 0.05* -0.00 0.03 -0.11*** 0.06** 0.10*** 0.02 0.05* -0.12*** 0.11*** 0.32*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.08**
BETA (26) -0.17*** -0.01 -0.09*** 0.01 -0.13*** -0.02 -0.07** -0.02 -0.13*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06** -0.06**
RETURN (27) -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.07** 0.02 0.01 0.13***
FIRM_AGE (28) -0.08*** 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.06** -0.02 0.09*** -0.01 -0.04* -0.03 0.06** -0.11*** 0.03 -0.06** 0.05*
SALARY_CAP (29) -0.04* 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.10*** -0.10*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.11***
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Table 4.5: Dividends and investments analysis - Pairwise correlations (continued) 
 
 
Notes: Table 4.5 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample used for the dividends and investment analyses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). All variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
  
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
BM (16) 1.00
ROA (17) -0.25*** 1.00
CFOP (18) -0.25*** 0.44*** 1.00
LOSS (19) 0.21*** -0.62*** -0.32*** 1.00
LEVERAGE (20) -0.01 -0.05* -0.02 -0.02 1.00
DIV_PAYABLE (21) -0.07** 0.05** 0.04* -0.05** 0.05* 1.00
CAPEX (22) 0.12*** 0.40*** -0.07** -0.05** 0.04 0.03 1.00
UNOB_INV (23) -0.36*** 0.29*** 0.18*** -0.02 -0.12*** 0.00 0.18*** 1.00
CURRENT_RATIO (24) 0.10*** 0.01 -0.23*** 0.17*** -0.02 -0.18*** -0.22*** 0.10*** 1.00
BETA (26) 0.05** -0.17*** -0.14*** 0.14*** -0.02 -0.09*** -0.22*** -0.08** 0.15*** -0.09*** 1.00
RETURN (27) -0.34*** 0.23*** 0.12*** -0.25*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.23*** 0.03 0.22*** -0.07** 1.00
FIRM_AGE (28) 0.05* 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.10*** -0.07** 0.01 -0.01 0.16*** -0.01 1.00
SALARY_CAP (29) -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.04* 0.04 0.07** -0.05** -0.05** -0.07** -0.03 0.06** -0.01 0.06** 1.00
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Table 4.6: Effects on credit ratings 
 
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4)
FULLY_OPEN -1.127* -1.307** -1.167* -1.435**
(-1.85) (-2.02) (-1.85) (-2.18)
PARTLY_OPEN -0.467** -0.325 -0.518** -0.465*
(-2.00) (-1.35) (-2.16) (-1.95)
FUNDED 0.069 0.423 0.076 0.060
(0.59) (1.52) (0.63) (0.49)
FUNDED*FULLY_OPEN -0.641*
(-1.88)
FUNDED*PARTLY_OPEN -0.228
(-0.69)
CEO_MAINDB 0.235 -0.580
(1.43) (-1.28)
CEO_TENURE -0.0166 -0.0187
(-1.05) (-1.17)
CEO_MAINDB*FULLY_OPEN 1.069**
(2.41)
CEO_MAINDB*PARTLY_OPEN 0.471
(0.92)
FIRM_SIZE 0.794*** 0.790*** 0.795*** 0.803***
(11.19) (11.17) (11.30) (11.61)
CAP_INTENSITY 0.202 0.194 0.196 0.181
(0.93) (0.89) (0.90) (0.85)
ICR 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(3.92) (3.80) (3.84) (3.45)
ROA -0.240 -0.166 -0.239 -0.356
(-0.36) (-0.25) (-0.35) (-0.52)
LOSS -0.088 -0.075 -0.089 -0.083
(-0.54) (-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.50)
LEVERAGE 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.019
(0.95) (1.03) (1.02) (0.86)
SUBORD -0.869*** -0.863*** -0.893*** -0.975***
(-2.71) (-2.72) (-2.72) (-3.00)
FUNDING_RATIO 1.225* 1.803** 1.143 1.197
(1.71) (2.25) (1.49) (1.49)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 945 945 945 945
Pseudo R2  0.314 0.316 0.317 0.321
Dependent Variable: Credit rating (RATING)
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Notes: Table 4.6 presents the ordered probit regression results for the analysis of the effects of DB plan 
retentions and CEO participation in them on the credit ratings. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t- statistics are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
The estimated models are shown below:  
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                      (4.1)                                              
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡* 
𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡* 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                                     (4.2)                                                                 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡)+𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘   
(Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                   (4.3)                                                                                                                            
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3  (𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5  
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡* 𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6  (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡* 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (4.4) 
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Table 4.7: Effects on dividends and investments 
 
Panel A : Effect on dividends (PAYOUT)
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB 0.072* 0.084* -0.034 -0.061
(1.84) (1.79) (-0.82) (-1.04)
FUNDED 0.042 0.059 -0.036 -0.076
(0.77) (0.86) (-0.42) (-0.77)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.033 0.0726
(-0.45) (0.65)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.172 0.169 -0.247 -0.242
(1.00) (0.98) (-1.04) (-1.02)
CEO_SALARY -4.165 -4.523 -3.804 -3.004
(-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.13)
CEO_EQUITY‡ 0.517 0.525 -0.761 -0.779
(0.67) (0.68) (-0.53) (-0.54)
CEO_TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.37) (0.37) (0.25) (0.25)
FIRM_SIZE 0.026 0.026 0.016 0.016
(1.45) (1.44) (0.79) (0.79)
BM -0.019 -0.018 -0.038 -0.040
(-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.84) (-0.87)
ROA -0.097 -0.099 0.295 0.300
(-0.33) (-0.33) (0.41) (0.42)
CFOP 0.507 0.510 1.129** 1.122**
(1.60) (1.61) (2.37) (2.35)
LOSS -0.215** -0.217** 0.635*** 0.639***
(-2.28) (-2.30) (3.41) (3.41)
LEVERAGE -0.013* -0.013* -0.006 -0.005
(-1.71) (-1.74) (-0.54) (-0.51)
DIV_PAYABLE 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(1.75) (1.77) (-0.10) (-0.13)
CAPEX 0.336 0.347 -0.545 -0.570
(0.74) (0.76) (-0.79) (-0.83)
UNOB_INV -0.009 -0.009 0.028 0.028
(-0.44) (-0.43) (0.84) (0.81)
BETA -0.137* -0.138* -0.0370 -0.0338
(-1.92) (-1.92) (-0.47) (-0.43)
RETURN -0.006 -0.006 0.107 0.107
(-0.11) (-0.11) (0.94) (0.93)
SALARY_CAP 0.050 0.053 0.060 0.055
(0.65) (0.69) (1.00) (0.91)
INTERCEPT 0.675** 0.380 -0.263 0.074
(2.33) (1.57) (-0.72) (0.21)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1357 1357 1357 1357
adj. R2  0.052 0.051 0.003 0.002
Dependent variable: Dividend payout ratio Dependent variable: Change in dividend payout ratio
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Panel B : Effect on dividends (YIELD)
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB       0.005***       0.005*** 0.001 0.001
(3.07) (2.73) (0.14) (0.62)
FUNDED -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-1.18) (-0.95) (-1.38) (-0.72)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.000 -0.001
(-0.13) (-0.74)
FUNDING_RATIO -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.49)
CEO_SALARY 0.885 0.882 0.958 0.946**
(0.81) (0.81) (2.11) (2.06)
CEO_EQUITY‡ 0.006 0.006 0.036* 0.037*
(0.20) (0.21) (1.72) (1.73)
CEO_TENURE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.03) (0.03) (1.08) (1.06)
FIRM_SIZE 0.001 0.001      0.001***      0.001***
(1.27) (1.28) (4.53) (4.52)
BM 0.005** 0.005** -0.005*** -0.004***
(1.99) (1.99) (-2.92) (-2.87)
ROA 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.43) (0.43) (0.50) (0.49)
CFOP       0.049***      0.049*** -0.006 -0.006
(3.42) (3.42) (-0.70) (-0.69)
LOSS -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.002 -0.002
(-3.81) (-3.82) (-0.57) (-0.60)
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.25) (0.24) (0.68) (0.67)
CAPEX 0.014 0.014 -0.003 -0.003
(0.76) (0.76) (-0.29) (-0.25)
UNOB_INV -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000
(-3.76) (-3.76) (-0.45) (-0.41)
Z_SCORE -0.000 -0.000    0.000**     0.000**
(-0.09) (-0.09) (2.10) (2.12)
RETURN -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.95) (-0.95) (-1.43) (-1.42)
FIRM_AGE -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.22) (-0.23) (0.70) (0.66)
SALARY_CAP 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.30) (0.31) (-0.30) (-0.21)
INTERCEPT 0.012 0.025*** -0.006 -0.012**
(1.11) (3.00) (-0.98) (-2.18)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1346 1346 1342 1342
adj. R2  0.225 0.224 0.076 0.075
Dependent variable: Dividend yield Dependent variable: Change in dividend yield
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Panel C : Effect on dividends (NET DIVIDENDS)
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB       0.011***      0.014*** -0.004 -0.001
(3.13) (3.29) (-1.35) (-0.16)
FUNDED -0.009* -0.004 -0.001 0.003
(-1.68) (-0.72) (-0.21) (0.41)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.010 -0.010
(-1.36) (-1.12)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.001 -0.000 -0.008 -0.009
(0.03) (-0.01) (-0.64) (-0.69)
CEO_SALARY -3.313 -3.404 -1.251 -1.342
(-0.72) (-0.74) (-0.38) (-0.40)
CEO_EQUITY‡ -0.144 -0.140 0.035 0.037
(-1.44) (-1.40) (0.27) (0.29)
CEO_TENURE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.13) (0.12) (-0.26) (-0.26)
FIRM_SIZE 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(1.48) (1.49) (0.58) (0.60)
BM 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(1.03) (1.07) (-0.18) (-0.14)
ROA    0.143**    0.143** -0.128** -0.128**
(2.32) (2.32) (-2.23) (-2.23)
CFOP     0.164***      0.164*** -0.079* -0.079*
(3.49) (3.50) (-1.88) (-1.86)
LOSS -0.003 -0.003 -0.021** -0.022**
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-2.23) (-2.32)
LEVERAGE -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.09) (-0.13) (0.34) (0.31)
CAPEX -0.035 -0.031 -0.001 0.002
(-0.68) (-0.60) (-0.03) (0.05)
UNOB_INV 0.003 0.003     0.006***    0.006***
(0.60) (0.62) (2.69) (2.71)
Z_SCORE 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.27) (0.27) (3.27) (3.28)
RETURN -0.016** -0.015** -0.007 -0.007
(-2.28) (-2.27) (-1.02) (-1.01)
FIRM_AGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.53) (0.48) (-1.15) (-1.22)
SALARY_CAP -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(-0.71) (-0.62) (-0.77) (-0.66)
INTERCEPT 0.021 -0.019 0.024 -0.000
(0.59) (-0.67) (0.80) (-0.00)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1356 1356 1355 1355
adj. R2  0.118 0.119 0.013 0.013
Dependent variable: Net dividends Dependent variable: Change in net dividends
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(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB -0.015 -0.015 0.003 0.013*
(-0.84) (-0.74) (0.58) (1.94)
FUNDED 0.028 0.029 0.013 0.028*
(1.04) (0.89) (1.13) (1.94)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.002 -0.027**
(-0.06) (-2.10)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.008
(0.04) (0.04) (0.39) (0.32)
CEO_SALARY -4.726 -4.739 -1.544 -1.780
(-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.47) (-0.52)
CEO_EQUITY‡ 0.159 0.186 -0.024 -0.017
(0.56) (0.57) (-0.34) (-0.24)
CEO_TENURE 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.60) (0.60) (-1.45) (-1.43)
PAYOUT -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.18) (-0.29)
FIRM_SIZE 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001
(1.13) (1.13) (0.21) (0.24)
BM     0.078***     0.078*** 0.003 0.004
(3.52) (3.51) (0.30) (0.35)
ROA -0.052 -0.052 -0.033 -0.035
(-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.30)
CFOP 0.038 0.038 -0.067 -0.061
(0.27) (0.28) (-0.91) (-0.82)
LOSS 0.019 0.019 -0.001 -0.003
(0.67) (0.66) (-0.05) (-0.13)
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.60) (0.60) (-1.49) (-1.62)
UNOB_INV 0.017 0.017 0.003 0.003
(1.20) (1.20) (0.52) (0.55)
CURRENT_RATIO -0.036** -0.036** -0.008 -0.007
(-2.01) (-2.03) (-0.67) (-0.63)
Z_SCORE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.85) (0.86) (1.44) (1.42)
BETA -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.011 -0.012
(-3.70) (-3.73) (-0.97) (-1.10)
FIRM_AGE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.90) (-0.97)
SALARY_CAP 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.000
(0.06) (0.07) (-0.35) (-0.04)
INTERCEPT 0.077 0.065 0.017 -0.006
(0.57) (0.64) (0.62) (-0.23)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1337 1337 1336 1336
adj. R2  0.177 0.177 -0.009 -0.008
Dependent variable: Investments Dependent variable: Change in Investments 
Panel D: Effect on investments 
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‡Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for easiness of interpretation. 
 
Notes: Table 4.7 presents the panel regressions results for the analysis of the effects of DB plan retentions and 
CEO participation in them on dividends (Panels A, B and C) and on investments (Panel D). ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in parentheses. All 
variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
 
The models that I estimate are as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE 
+ YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (4.5)               
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2  ( 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (4.6)                                                                                                     
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (4.7)            
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (4.8)     
136 
 
Table 4.8: Additional analysis - Effects on aggregate irregular payouts 
 
‡Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for easiness of interpretation. 
 
Notes: Table 4.8 presents the panel regressions results for the analysis of the effects of DB plan retentions and 
CEO participation in them on firms’ aggregate irregular payouts. Aggregate irregular payouts are measured as 
the sum of stock repurchases and special dividends scaled by total assets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in parentheses. All other variables 
are defined in Table 4.1.  
 
The models that I estimate are as follows: 
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(1.18) (1.32) (-0.49) (-0.43)
FUNDED -0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.004
(-0.51) (-0.03) (1.49) (1.36)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.002 0.000
(-0.73) (0.05)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.007
(1.37) (1.34) (0.83) (0.83)
CEO_SALARY -0.000 -0.016 -0.609 -0.608
(-0.00) (-0.01) (-0.67) (-0.66)
CEO_EQUITY‡ -0.055** -0.054** 0.014 0.013
(-2.40) (-2.35) (0.94) (0.93)
CEO_TENURE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.27) (0.27) (0.53) (0.53)
FIRM_SIZE 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.36) (1.38) (0.45) (0.45)
BM 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.65) (0.68) (1.31) (1.30)
ROA 0.034** 0.034** -0.033 -0.033
(2.03) (2.04) (-1.46) (-1.46)
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002*
(1.09) (1.08) (1.68) (1.68)
YIELD 0.038 0.038 -0.018 -0.018
(0.72) (0.73) (-0.44) (-0.44)
RETURN -0.006** -0.006** -0.003 -0.003
(-2.17) (-2.16) (-0.88) (-0.88)
UNOB_INV 0.003** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002***
(2.33) (2.36) (3.06) (3.02)
SALARY_CAP -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.35) (-1.30) (-0.89) (-0.89)
INTERCEPT -0.021 -0.018 -0.022 -0.017
(-1.51) (-1.65) (-1.50) (-1.26)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1343 1343 1343 1343
adj. R2  0.047 0.047 0.012 0.012
Dependent variable: Aggregate irregular payouts Dependent variable: Change in aggregate irregular payouts
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𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE 
+ YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (4.5)               
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2  ( 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (4.6)                                                                                                     
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (4.7)            
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (4.8)     
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Table 4.9: Additional analysis – Effect on investments 
  
Panel A: Effect on investments (R&D)
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.000
(-0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (-0.02)
FUNDED 0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.001
(0.02) (0.64) (-0.64) (-0.55)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.009 0.000
(-1.42) (0.38)
FUNDING_RATIO -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(-0.12) (-0.16) (0.58) (0.61)
CEO_SALARY 3.046 2.973 -0.551 -0.547
(0.76) (0.74) (-0.88) (-0.89)
CEO_EQUITY‡ -0.045 -0.043 -0.007 -0.007
(-1.23) (-1.20) (-0.51) (-0.52)
CEO_TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(1.31) (1.33) (1.40) (1.40)
FIRM_SIZE 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.37) (0.38) (-0.46) (-0.46)
BM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.10) (0.16) (0.41) (0.39)
ROA -0.066 -0.065 0.005 0.005
(-1.63) (-1.62) (0.86) (0.86)
CFOP -0.103** -0.102** -0.00510 -0.00519
(-2.45) (-2.42) (-0.74) (-0.74)
LEVERAGE -0.000438 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.31) (-1.38) (1.24) (1.26)
UNOB_INV 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
(1.24) (1.26) (1.01) (1.02)
SALARY_CAP 0.013 0.013 -0.001 -0.001
(1.05) (1.08) (-0.82) (-0.85)
INTERCEPT 0.019 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(1.04) (-0.32) (-0.75) (-0.19)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1355 1355 1357 1357
adj. R2  0.268 0.270 0.011 0.010
Dependent variable: R&D Dependent variable: Change in R&D
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‡Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for easiness of interpretation. 
 
Notes: Table 4.9 presents the panel regressions results for the analysis of the effects of DB plan retentions and 
CEO participation in them on investments measured as R&D divided by sales (Panel A) and Rate of undertaking 
new investments (RUNI) measured as: (Capital Expenditures + Acquisitions+ Advertising+R&D)/Total Assets 
(Panel B). 
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.002
(-0.07) (-0.28) (0.23) (0.36)
FUNDED 0.021** 0.019* 0.010 0.012
(2.47) (1.74) (1.34) (1.20)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED 0.004 -0.003
(0.34) (-0.30)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.043* 0.043* 0.037** 0.037**
(1.77) (1.80) (2.02) (2.02)
CEO_SALARY -1.77 -1.77 -0.82 -0.85
(-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.29)
CEO_EQUITY‡ 0.010 0.089 0.031 0.031
(0.65) (0.65) (0.19) (0.19)
CEO_TENURE 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001**
(0.77) (0.77) (-2.16) (-2.15)
FIRM_SIZE -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000
(-1.46) (-1.47) (0.21) (0.21)
BM -0.009 -0.009 0.005 0.005
(-1.59) (-1.60) (1.42) (1.43)
ROA 0.005 0.005 0.068* 0.068**
(0.13) (0.12) (1.96) (1.97)
CFOP 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.147*** 0.148***
(3.97) (3.96) (3.19) (3.19)
LEVERAGE -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.57) (-0.58)
CURRENT_RATIO -0.005 -0.005 0.016*** 0.016***
(-1.01) (-1.02) (4.75) (4.76)
UNOB_INV 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.004 0.004
(3.98) (3.97) (1.53) (1.53)
SALARY_CAP 0.014 0.014 -0.001 -0.001
(1.02) (0.99) (-0.20) (-0.16)
INTERCEPT 0.005 -0.008 -0.106** -0.080***
(0.12) (-0.26) (-2.08) (-2.87)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1337 1337 1337 1337
adj. R2  0.237 0.236 0.033 0.033
Panel B: Effect on investments (RUNI)
Dependent varibale: RUNI Dependent variable: Change in RUNI
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 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. All other variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
 
The estimated models are shown below: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE 
+ YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (4.5)               
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2  ( 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (4.6)                                                                                                     
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (4.7)            
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘   (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (4.8) 
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Table 4.10: Additional analysis – Tobit models 
  
Panel A: Effect on dividends (PAYOUT)
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB 0.073* 0.084* -0.034 -0.060
(1.84) (1.74) (-0.82) (-1.05)
FUNDED 0.047 0.063 -0.036 -0.076
(0.85) (0.89) (-0.43) (-0.79)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED -0.030 0.072
(-0.41) (0.66)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.196 0.194 -0.248 -0.243
(1.12) (1.11) (-1.06) (-1.04)
CEO_SALARY -5.585 -5.912 -4.045 -3.251
(-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.17) (-0.14)
CEO_EQUITY‡ 0.540 0.547 -0.759 -0.777
(0.71) (0.72) (-0.54) (-0.55)
CEO_TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.39) (0.39) (0.26) (0.26)
FIRM_SIZE 0.026 0.026 0.015 0.015
(1.39) (1.38) (0.78) (0.79)
BM -0.023 -0.022 -0.039 -0.040
(-0.62) (-0.60) (-0.86) (-0.88)
ROA -0.057 -0.059 0.296 0.301
(-0.19) (-0.19) (0.42) (0.42)
CFOP 0.504 0.507 1.129** 1.122**
(1.57) (1.58) (2.40) (2.39)
LOSS -0.201** -0.203** 0.635*** 0.640***
(-2.11) (-2.13) (3.46) (3.47)
LEVERAGE -0.014* -0.014* -0.006 -0.005
(-1.71) (-1.73) (-0.55) (-0.52)
CAPEX 0.351 0.362 -0.543 -0.568
(0.77) (0.79) (-0.80) (-0.84)
UNOB_INV -0.009 -0.009 0.028 0.028
(-0.47) (-0.45) (0.86) (0.83)
DIV_PAYABLE 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(1.77) (1.79) (-0.09) (-0.13)
RETURN -0.000 0.000 0.107 0.107
(-0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.95)
BETA -0.147** -0.148** -0.037 -0.034
(-2.06) (-2.06) (-0.48) (-0.44)
SALARY_CAP 0.056 0.058 0.060 0.055
(0.72) (0.76) (1.02) (0.93)
INTERCEPT 0.372 0.369 0.070 0.077
(1.53) (1.52) (0.20) (0.22)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1357 1357 1357 1357
Pseudo R2  0.0426 0.0427 0.0115 0.0115
Dependent variable: Dividend payout ratio Dependent variable: Change in dividend payout ratio 
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‡Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for easiness of interpretation. 
 
Notes: Table 4.10 presents the Tobit regressions results for the analysis of the effects of DB plan retentions and 
CEO participation in them on dividend payout  (Panel A)  and aggregate irregular payouts (Panel B).  ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
All other variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
 
The models that I estimate are as follows: 
 
Panel B: Effect on aggregate irregular payouts
(4.5) (4.6) (4.7)  (4.8)
CEO_MAINDB 0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(1.31) (1.01) (-0.51) (-0.45)
FUNDED 0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.004
(0.03) (-0.06) (1.52) (1.38)
CEO_MAINDB*FUNDED 0.001 0.000
(0.15) (0.06)
FUNDING_RATIO 0.028 0.028 0.007 0.007
(1.54) (1.53) (0.85) (0.85)
CEO_SALARY -6.422* -6.430* -0.616 -0.615
(-1.79) (-1.79) (-0.68) (-0.67)
CEO_EQUITY‡ -0.087 -0.087 0.014 0.014
(-0.90) (-0.90) (0.98) (0.97)
CEO_TENURE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.23) (0.23) (0.57) (0.57)
FIRM_SIZE 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000
(1.56) (1.56) (0.46) (0.46)
BM 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
(1.22) (1.22) (1.30) (1.29)
ROA 0.136*** 0.136*** -0.034 -0.034
(3.17) (3.17) (-1.50) (-1.49)
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.002*
(0.34) (0.35) (1.70) (1.70)
YIELD 0.126 0.126 -0.017 -0.017
(0.95) (0.95) (-0.43) (-0.43)
RETURN -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.89) (-0.89)
UNOB_INV 0.005** 0.005** 0.002*** 0.002***
(2.50) (2.50) (3.09) (3.04)
SALARY_CAP -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004
(-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.90) (-0.90)
INTERCEPT -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.017 -0.017
(-3.13) (-3.15) (-1.28) (-1.28)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1343 1343 1343 1343
Pseudo R2  0.2192 0.2192 0.0110 0.0110
Dependent variable: Aggregate irregular payouts Dependent variable: Change in aggregate irregular payouts
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𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE 
+ YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (4.5)               
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  ( 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2  ( 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (4.6)                                                                                                     
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + 
INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (4.7)            
𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 / 𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1* 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘  (Controls) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                     (4.8)                                        
 
  
144 
 
Chapter 5: Determinants of pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The cost of providing DB plans has increased significantly in the last few 
decades for sponsoring companies in the UK and elsewhere (Kiosse and Peasnell, 
2009). More transparent accounting standards, fluctuations in financial markets and 
increases in life expectancy have had a major and immediate impact on a firm’s 
pension liabilities and led to the reduction in the benefits provided to new and/or 
existing members (Munnell, 2006; Glaum, 2009; Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009; Yermo 
and Severinson, 2010). In response to those challenges, companies have taken 
significant steps to reduce the pension risk. The closure of DB plans to new entrants, 
pensionable salary caps and freezing the accrual of future benefits to existing 
members have become very common (Klumpes et al., 2009). More recently, pension 
de-risking strategies are gaining ground among UK’s biggest companies. Common 
de-risking strategies involve shifts in pension assets from risky equities to bonds, 
longevity swaps and pension buy-ins or buy-outs (partly or fully) (Monk 2009; Blake 
et al., 2013). For example, UK pensions have reduced assets allocated to equity 
investments from 66% in 2005 to 43% at the end of 2015 while asset allocation in 
bonds has increased from 25% in 2005 to 37% in 2015 (Willis Towers Watson, 
2016). This strategy is not beneficial for all firms in order to limit pension risk. In 
general, the nature of liabilities should determine the asset allocation type. For 
example, mature funds will not require any significant new contributions and thus the 
objective will be less risky assets while the opposite will be the case for less mature 
pension plans. Longevity swaps involve the transfer of longevity risk to an insurance 
company. Pension assets remain with the firm along with the investment risk 
associated with them. Both buy-ins and buy-outs involve firms that sponsor DB plans 
buying bulk annuities from insurance companies. A pension buy-in is a strategy that 
takes place when trustees purchase an insurance policy as an investment of the plan 
generally by paying an upfront premium. In this case, the beneficiaries remain 
members of the pension scheme, and the links between the sponsor and the trustees 
are maintained. A pension buy-out refers to companies transferring either part 
(partial buy-out) or all (full buy-out) of their pension liabilities to an insurance 
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company for a premium.65 Once the insurance policies take effect, the insurance 
company is responsible for ensuring the payment of pension benefits. Hence, there 
are no more links between the pension scheme beneficiaries and the former sponsor 
firm and trustees after the buy-out occurs. In both cases, there are benefits for the 
plan members since contrary to the sponsoring company the insurance company is 
required to hold surplus assets to support the insurance policy.  
The ultimate goal of such transactions is to hedge/insure against pension risk. 
Existing literature suggests that factors such as managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 
1984), taxes (Smith and Witt, 1985), bankruptcy costs (Mayers and Smith, 1982), 
investment opportunities (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1993) and earnings management (DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) are among others 
some of the determinants of corporate demand for hedging/ insurance. Regarding 
pension risk hedging transactions, the risk management/ transfer is different in each 
strategy. The effectiveness of pension asset allocation from equity to bonds as a 
pension risk management strategy is not always guaranteed and will depend on the 
characteristics of the pension fund and market conditions. Likewise, longevity swaps 
transfer only longevity risk. On the other hand, buy-ins and buy-outs transfer not only 
longevity but other pension risks such as interest rate risk, inflation risk and 
investment risk (Lin, MacMinn and Tian, 2015). Nevertheless, de-risking strategies 
involve significant costs, and benefits do not always outperform costs (Lin, Macminn 
and Tian, 2015). 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an in-depth analysis of the UK buy-in and 
buy-out market by examining firm and pension plan characteristics of companies 
who undertake such transactions. Using a sample of UK firms that undertook a buy-
out or a buy-in transaction during the period 2005 – 2015, I find that firms that 
implement buy-ins have larger and more funded pension plans, are more profitable 
and have higher union densities. Moreover, firms that complete buy-outs have larger 
                                                          
65 The buy-out premium is estimated to be around 30% to 50% of the value of the liabilities based 
on FRS 17/ IAS 19 pension standards (The Actuary, 2016);  If only pensioner liabilities are 
considered this premium reduces to around 10% above the FRS 17 / IAS 19 accounting liabilities, 
(LCP, 2008) 
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pension plans and allocate less pension assets in equity. Moreover, the number of 
employees is negatively associated with both transactions implying it is costlier for 
those firms to conduct either a buy-in or buy-out transaction. While union density is 
positively associated with buy-ins, it has a negative effect on the likelihood of buy-
outs suggesting that unions do support buy-in but not buy-out transactions possibly 
because the latter are associated with plan winding-ups. Overall, these findings 
suggest that there are differences in the underlying determinants of pension buy-ins 
and buy-outs although the strategies seem to be similar in nature. 
The study contributes to the emerging literature on pension de-risking 
strategies by examining their determinants. Although these transactions have 
several benefits for plan members, those benefits are not straightforward for 
sponsoring firms due to the costs that they involve. In addition, de-risking strategies 
could protect the sustainability of DB plans in both developing and developed 
countries (Blake et al., 2013; Monk, 2009) and therefore understanding determinants 
of these strategies is important not only for market participants to make informed 
investment decisions but also for policy makers to be able to make relevant 
adjustments which favour and/or may reduce the costs of such transactions. 
Moreover, the study extends the literature on corporate demand for 
hedging/insurance (e.g. Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; Dalton and Holland, 2017) by 
documenting characteristics of firms that hedge against pension risk. The remainder 
of the study is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides the background to pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs; Section 5.3 refers to the literature review and the development 
of the hypothesis; Section 5.4, presents the research design; Section 5.5, discusses 
the sample and descriptive statistics; Section 5.6, presents the empirical findings; 
finally, section 5.7 concludes.  
5.2 Background and developments of buy-in/ buy-out strategies in the 
UK and comparison with the US. 
 
Pension buy-ins are insurance transactions where the sponsoring firm 
purchases a bulk annuity to hedge the risks (typically) associated with a subset of 
the plan’s liabilities, usually focused on pensioner members. The pension fund in this 
case remains with the sponsoring firm while the annuities become an asset of the 
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plan. The insurance company pays a stream of income to the plan exactly matching 
the insured liabilities. In this case, the insurance company has no direct relationship 
with pension fund members. Rather, it is the firm and trustees that have legal 
responsibility for paying member benefits.   
The most common solution for dealing with pension longevity risk in a DB 
pension plan is to sell the liability via an insurance or reinsurance contract (Blake et 
al., 2013). This is commonly known as a pension buy-out. Pension buy-outs became 
known in the UK market in 2006 where many insurance companies were set up 
specifically for this purpose (Blake et al., 2013). Essentially, in a buy-out transaction, 
the firm sells its pension liabilities to an insurance company for a specific premium. 
This is a final settlement of the pension liabilities and the promise to the pension fund 
member is transferred from the pension fund to the insurance company. In the case 
where the company does not have the financial resources to pay the full cost of the 
buy-out, the pension deficit (on a buy-out basis) is replaced by a loan that, unlike 
pension liabilities, is an obligation that can be easily understood by investors (Blake 
et al., 2013). The result is that pension liabilities are removed from the sponsor 
company’s financial statements. Then the pension fund is typically wound up and 
the trustees are discharged. Pension assets are transferred to the insurance 
company, which becomes responsible for paying pensions. Each plan member has 
now an individual policy with the insurance company. There are two main types of 
pension buy-outs66: full and partial. Full buy-outs involve the full transfer of the 
schemes’ liabilities to an insurer, usually followed by the plan winding up. Historically, 
full buy-outs have been the most common type of buy-outs. On the other hand, 
partial buy-outs refer to the partial transfer of a cross-section of the plan’s liabilities 
to an insurance company, usually as part of a phased strategy to reduce pension 
risk. Most often partial buy-outs are structured as an investment of a firm covering 
part or all of the plan’s pensioners. A full buy-out can be achieved from a large 
pension plan by combining a number of partial buy-outs across several insurance 
firms. In terms of cost, pensioner buy-ins are considered more affordable compared 
                                                          
66 Buy-outs that are conducted with a non- FSA authorised insurance companies are known as non-
insured buy-outs. This route is considered cheaper compared to the ones conducted with a 
regulated insurer. The Pension Regulator has taken measures to more closely regulate such 
transactions.  
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to full buy-outs. Conditions are more favourable for pension buy-ins if pension plan 
assets are invested on gilts67 while this is not the case for pension buy-outs. Most 
pension plans do not hold fully matching investments, so falling gilt yields and 
subdued equity markets have driven up buy-out deficits (Lane, Clark and Peacock 
(LCP), 2013). 
The pension buy-in/ buy-out market became active in the UK in 2006. At that 
time, the only insurance companies that offered these services were Prudential (UK) 
and Legal & General, and they were involved in a large number of transactions which 
approximated £1.5 to £2 billion a year with the majority being pension schemes that 
were winding-up due to the insolvency of the sponsoring companies (LCP, 2008). 
The opportunities that were offered in the UK buy-out market started to attract new 
insurers with some of them being set up solely for the purpose of pension de-risking. 
For example, Paternostar, (now acquired by Rothesay Life) Pension Insurance 
Corporation (PIC), Synesis (acquired by PIC), Lucida (stopped business in 2012) 
and MetLife. These companies were backed by investment banks and private equity 
investors (Blake et al., 2013). Goldman Sachs also established its own pension 
insurer, Rothesay Life, in July 2007. Established insurers such as Norwich Union, 
AEGON and AIG Life also joined the pension de-risking market. In 2012, Partnership 
and Just Retirement joined the buy-in and buy-out market bringing in their medical 
underwriting expertise. Medical underwriting, which is now common place in the 
individual annuity market (i.e., in relation to defined contribution pensions), has the 
potential to reduce the cost to the scheme of the longevity hedge compared to 
standard annuities, on the grounds that certain members might have lower than 
average life expectancy as a result of their lifestyle or some serious life-shortening 
illness (Blake et al. 2013). Canada Life and Scottish Widows joined the market in 
2015. Currently, there are nine insurers operating in the pension de-risking market. 
Table 5.1 shows the buy-in and buy-out volumes from 2007 until 2015 by insurer 
and market totals. In general, the table shows that the market share of these 
insurance companies has been changing during the years with PIC and Legal & 
General leading the market more recently. In addition, the table shows that levels of 
                                                          
67 A gilt is a UK Government liability in sterling, issued by HM Treasury and listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
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buy-in and buy-out transactions have been volatile during the sample period. Major 
events such as the financial crisis, quantitative easing and the subsequent economic 
recovery as well as the introduction of Solvency II68 have had significant impact in 
transaction volumes.  More specifically, buy-in and buy-out volumes increased 
significantly in 2008 (£7.9 bn) compared to 2007 (£2.9bn). The LCP (2008) report 
suggests that among the main factors that contributed to this are: higher life 
expectancy assumptions, intense competition in the de-risking market and more 
sophisticated investment techniques used by insurers. In addition, another 
contributing factor for the increase in the buy-outs market is the difference in 
discounting factors used by insurers and sponsoring firms. Insurers use investment 
grade corporate bonds and other assets which have higher yields while sponsoring 
firms use government bonds (UK gilts). Timing differences in the values of those 
assets create short- term opportunities for favourable pricings in buy-in deals. Buy-
in and buy-out volumes were lower in 2009 (£3.7 billion) than in 2008 (£7.9 billion). 
This reflects the effects of the financial crisis on both the demand and the supply 
side: reduced demand from pension schemes being cautious in the light of market 
uncertainties and insurers facing capital constraints and being under pressure to 
preserve capital (LCP, 2010).69 Another source of uncertainty in this period was the 
introduction of Solvency II in 2009 which had a major impact on insurance firms’ 
capital requirements. Although it was not formally implemented in the EU until 
January 1, 2016, insurance companies had to go through a period of adjustment. In 
terms of buy-ins and buy-outs Solvency II increases the security of benefits that are 
insured through a buy-out or buy-in because, in general, it increases the level of 
minimum capital required by insurance companies to protect pension liabilities as 
compared to the minimum requirements of Solvency I. Buy-in and buy-out volumes 
seem to be slightly lower in 2011 as compared to 2010, however, it should be noted 
that 2011 was a cornerstone year for the de-risking market as the volume of 
transactions including longevity swaps reached £12.3bn. The increased activity in 
                                                          
68 The Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) is a Directive in European Union law that codifies and 
harmonises the EU insurance regulation. It primarily concerns the amount of capital that EU 
insurance companies must hold to reduce the risk of insolvency. 
69 The significant effect that the financial crisis had on the buy-out market can be illustrated by the 
example of Paternostar who although having almost 50% of the market share in 2007, in May 2009 
entered in an agreement with FSA that it would not write any business for the time being.  
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the market is principally a result of rising corporate bond spreads which contributed 
to competitive pricing from insurers. This led to an increase in the number of pension 
buy-ins, especially for plans holding gilts. On the other hand, there was a reduction 
in full buy-out transactions due to adverse conditions in equity markets and very low 
gilt yields (LCP, 2012). Total buy-in and buy-out volumes were £4.4bn in 2012 
compared to £5.2bn in 2011. However, despite the lower total volumes, 2012 saw a 
four year-high for the number of large over £100m buy-in and buy-outs (LCP, 2013). 
The total transaction volume almost doubled in 2013 (£7.5bn) compared to 2012 
(£4.4bn) which reflects the effects of the economic recovery. The impact of the 
economic recovery is further reflected in the transactions volumes in 2014 and 2015 
which both exceed £10bn. 
“Insert Table 5.1 here” 
In the US, although it is considered the largest global retirement market in 
terms of pension assets, the buy-in and buy-out activity has been very slow (Agius, 
2016). The first de-risking transaction in the US market took place in May 2011, when 
Prudential (U.S.) announced a $75 million buy-in. This was followed by other large 
buy-outs such as Verizon ($7.5bn) and General Motors ($26bn) in 2012; Bristol 
Myers ($1.4bn), Motorola ($3.1bn) in 2014; Kimberly Clark ($2.5bn) and Phillips 
($1.1bn) in 2015. The US market has been dominated by pension buy-outs while 
buy-ins tend to be fewer (Sullivan, 2013). In addition, buy-ins are generally 
undertaken by plan sponsors with a foreign parent outside the US who reports under 
IFRS rather than US GAAP (LCP, 2015). This might simply reflect the ability to carry 
out a buy-out at affordable prices (LCP, 2015). 
In general, there are many differences in the structure or governance of US 
and UK DB pension plans that affect the buy-in and buy-out activity levels (Monk, 
2009). According to Agius (2016), the US pension system is less complex and as 
such should make the de-risking activities simpler. However, a more complex 
pension system and set of regulations might be a triggering factor for such risk 
management transactions. For example, a major difference between the two 
countries is related to the indexation of pension plans. In the US, benefits are 
typically not inflation-linked, reducing the pension plan’s exposure to longevity risk 
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while this is not common in the UK (Agius, 2016). To illustrate this, Clark and Monk 
(2006) refer to the work of Feldstein (1981) who showed that by switching to a fully 
indexed pension for a male aged 65 years (assuming 6 per cent per annum) from a 
nominal pension benefit would increase the pension cost by 50 percent. Indexation, 
even when subject to a capped rate, is a particular problem when combined with the 
effect of salary growth and the consequently high final salary levels that many times 
are used as the basis for calculating the pension benefits.  
Moreover, another significant difference among the DB plan systems in the 
above two countries is the crucial role of the trustees in the UK (Cocco and Volpin, 
2007). In the US, the pension trust is fully an asset of the corporation. The directors 
of the sponsoring company usually make decisions regarding the pension plan, for 
example on how to invest its assets. In contrast, in the UK trustees manage the 
pension plan, and they have significant powers that they are (in theory) obliged to 
execute in the best interests of the plan beneficiaries. Thus, in the US, decisions for 
buy-ins and buy-outs are made by firms’ management while in the UK such decisions 
are made by trustees. This is another source of complexity of UK pension plans 
which might affect the differences observed between the US and UK buy-in/buy-out 
activity level. In addition, there are also differences related to the insurance sectors 
in the UK and the US. The US insurance industry offers weaker insurance 
guarantees as compared to the UK (Monk, 2009). As a result, existing plan members 
may oppose buy-in and buy-out transactions. Moreover, there are more general 
differences such as cultural and legislative. For example, there are differences 
between the UK and the US legal systems and as in other cases differences in 
institutional and legislative settings might have a potential effect in the differences 
observed in the buy-in and buy-out markets in the two countries. Finally, Monk 
(2009) in an analysis of the buy-outs market in the UK concludes that DB plans are 
considered a burden for both US and UK firms. However, as the author concludes, 
while UK policymakers consider buy-outs as a way to manage the burden of DB 
schemes, the US legislators are committed to the idea that DB pensions can be 
saved and as such they see buy-outs as threat to the sustainability of DB pensions. 
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5.3 Literature review and research objectives 
 
There are three streams of literature relevant to this study. The first is the 
literature that focuses on the corporate demand for hedging; the second refers to 
studies about de-risking strategies; finally, the third refers to studies that examine 
the closure of DB plans. The following subsections discuss each stream of the 
literature and develop the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter. 
5.3.1 Corporate demand for hedging 
 
Every corporation faces risks for which they take the necessary measures to 
manage. In general, firms tend to use hedging to manage risks. Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) refer to corporate hedging as the use of off-balance sheet 
mechanisms like options, futures, forwards and swaps to reduce volatility in firm 
value. Alternatively, firms can hedge against risks by modifying the way they fund 
assets to reduce risk exposure or by buying insurance contracts (Mayers and Smith, 
1982). Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stultz (1985) argue that the use of 
hedging has several benefits such as reduction in expected costs of bankruptcy, 
reduction in agency costs as well as reduction in expected taxes and optimal risk 
sharing. In particular, they argue that for a solvent firm the use of hedging limits the 
probability of going bankrupt by reducing the volatility of the firm value and as a result 
decreasing the cost of financial distress. Similarly, transaction costs of bankruptcy 
can prompt corporations to buy insurance, shifting the risk of incurring those costs 
to the insurance company (Mayers and Smith, 1990). Warner (1977) shows that the 
direct costs of financial distress (e.g. legal costs required for re-organisation or 
liquidation) are less than proportional to size indicating that small firms are more 
likely to hedge. Likewise, Hadlock and Pierce (2010), using a sample of US firms 
from 1995-2004, find that size is also important for costly external financing because 
larger firms have better access to capital markets and are less likely to face financial 
constraints. Thus, it is more likely for larger firms to be unhedged or only partially 
hedged. On the contrary, Block and Gallagher (1986), Booth, Smith and Stoltz 
(1984) and Nance et al. (1993) find that larger firms are more likely to hedge. In 
particular, they argue that hedging activities involve informational scale economies 
and larger firms are more likely to employ specialised managers to manage hedging 
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programs. Moreover, the swap, forwards and futures over-the-counter options 
markets exhibit significant scale economies in the structure of transaction costs, 
implying that large firms are more likely to hedge with these instruments.   
Myers (1977) shows that companies have incentives to give up investment 
opportunities with positive net present value (NPV). He argues that in some cases, 
with risky debt in the capital structure, undertaking a positive NPV project makes 
shareholders worse off because the projects benefits accrue to the bondholders. 
Mayers and Smith (1987) show that in certain cases, the purchase of insurance 
contracts controls this underinvestment case by restricting the circumstances at 
which the firm would default on bond payments. As a result, firms with more growth 
opportunities are more likely to hedge, with the aim of reducing firm value volatility. 
Moreover, since the underinvestment problem is more pronounced in firms with more 
debt in their capital structure, firms with higher debt are more likely to hedge. For 
example, Nance et al. (1993) find for a sample of US firms in 1986, that firms which 
hedge have more growth options in their investment opportunities. Similarly, Graham 
and Rogers (2002) examine corporate derivative holdings of US firms for the period 
March- December 1995 and find that hedging increases with investment 
opportunities and financial leverage. Moreover, Dalton and Holland (2017) using a 
sample of US firms over the period 1992-2005, find that firms with more investment 
opportunities are more likely to hedge the risk of health benefit payments through 
insurance contracts. However, they find a negative relation between market leverage 
and health risk hedging.  
5.3.2 Literature on buy-ins and buy-outs 
 
Although corporate hedging in general has attracted significant attention in 
the literature, it is only recently that the huge economic significance of longevity risk 
for corporations has begun to be recognised and quantified (Blake et al., 2013). As 
a result, the literature on pension de-risking strategies is very scarce and the 
available studies constitute mainly of historical reviews of those strategies (e.g. 
Blake et al., 2013) or comparisons of the UK and US buy-outs market (e.g. Monk 
2009). In particular, Blake et al. (2013) provide a review on the development of the 
‘Life Market’ as the authors refer to the de-risking strategy market. They conclude 
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that the establishment of a traded market in longevity-linked capital market 
instruments could protect the sustainability of pension funds in both developing and 
developed countries. Monk (2009) arrives at a similar conclusion using descriptive 
qualitative analysis. More specifically, the author traces the development of the buy-
out market from a transaction for insolvent plans to a transaction for solvent plan 
sponsors with funded plans. Comparing the UK and US buy-out market he concludes 
that insured buy-outs can significantly contribute to the continued existence of DB 
plans.  
Kirkpatrick (2007) analyses how the pension buy-out market in the UK might 
be affected by the amendment to Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS 17) in 
December 2006. The author concludes that greater transparency in financial 
reporting of DB plans may encourage buy-outs and other risk management 
solutions. Greater transparency may highlight issues related to pension risk, which 
would force firms to take the necessary actions to remedy these issues, which would 
otherwise, have been ignored, detriment to the plan members and possibly 
shareholders. 
Lin et al. (2015) find an appropriate de-risking method using an optimisation 
model that minimises the expected total pension cost subject to a conditional value-
at-risk constraint on pension funding level. The authors conclude that the total 
pension cost (hedge ratio) increases (decreases) with the transaction cost, the 
counter-party default probability and the underfunding ratio. Moreover, they find that 
buy-ins are more sensitive to the default risk and that longevity hedging and buy-ins 
over perform buy-outs for underfunded plans.  
Overall, the existing literature points out the importance of de-risking 
strategies and concludes that these strategies will play a significant role in the 
survival of DB plans 
5.3.3 DB plan terminations 
 
Another stream of literature relevant to this chapter is the one that analyses 
DB plan closures. Some of these studies have already been discussed in chapter 3; 
however, given their relevance to the present study, it is important to refer to some 
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of them again in this chapter. DB plan closure, either only to new entrants or new 
and existing entrants, is one of the most common ways that firms use to manage 
pension risk. Thus, determinants of such strategies are relevant to de-risking 
strategies as well. There has been a significant decrease in the amount of DB plans 
sponsored over the last three decades (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). Consequently, 
the main focus of existing literature tends to be on the reasons (determinants) of DB 
plan terminations, and their findings provide, in general, mixed evidence. The earlier 
studies analyse the termination of overfunded plans which were popular during the 
1980s. The main findings indicate that plan terminations were attempts by financially 
distressed firms to access excess plan assets, potentially transferring wealth from 
employees to shareholders (Alderson and Chen, 1986; Hamdallah and Ruland, 
1986; VanDerhei, 1987; Hsieh et al., 1990; Mittelstaedt, 1989; Thomas, 1989; 
Mittelstaedt and Regier, 1990; Petersen, 1992; Datta et al., 1995). 
The economics behind DB plans have changed drastically over the last few 
years. Strict regulation amendments coupled with recent developments in the 
financial markets has resulted in severely underfunded DB plans (Munnell and Soto, 
2007). More recent studies on DB plan terminations, such as Munnell and Soto 
(2007) and Comprix and Muller (2011), explore the potential effects that firm and 
pension plan characteristics have on the decision to close a DB plan, while other 
studies consider the effect of changes in labour characteristics and preferences on 
the decision to close a DB plan (e.g. Cowan and Power, 2003; Coronado and 
Copeland, 2004; Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; Kapinos, 2012; D’Souza, Jacob 
and Lougee, 2013). Kiosse and Peasnell (2009) suggest that increased costs related 
with DB plans seems to be in the main reason behind DB freezes in the UK and the 
US, and, although accounting regulation has had some influence, it does not appear 
to be the main reason. Moreover, Munnell and Soto (2007) examine firm, plan and 
industry characteristics of a sample of US firms during 2004 and 2005 and find that 
larger firms, firms that have low credit coverage relative to income, considerable 
legacy costs, low funding ratios and operate in R&D intensive industries are more 
likely to freeze their DB plans, while they do not find any significant effect of 
profitability on the decision to freeze DB plans.  
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Comprix and Muller (2011) however, find that large firms are less likely to 
freeze their DB plans and that the funding ratio does not affect the probability of 
freezing. Moreover, Beaudoin et al. (2010) and Comprix and Muller (2011) find that 
the profitability of the sponsor firm plays an important role in the decision to freeze. 
D’Souza et al. (2013) suggest that firms for whom pension terminations incorporate 
costs in relation to employee resistance, political visibility or explicit tax costs and 
firms that will likely have benefits from retaining DB plans, are more likely to convert 
to CB plans than terminate their plans altogether. It should be noted that the findings 
of prior literature, which is largely US-based, do not point to a single factor alone that 
drives DB plan terminations, but rather to a number of different factors combined.  
While the existing literature examines determinants of demand for corporate 
hedging or corporate insurance and some studies explore pension buy-in and buy-
out activities as well as their associated risks, little is known about the firm and plan 
characteristics that influence such activities. Understanding which firms carry out 
these transactions is not straightforward and is important. In particular, while 
traditionally there was a belief that only insolvent firms would undertake such 
activities (especially buy-outs), we now observe that financially healthy firms are also 
implementing buy-ins or buy-outs (Monk, 2009). In addition, de-risking strategies 
involve significant costs and benefits and do not always outperform the costs (Lin et 
al., 2015). Thus, it is of interest to understand their determinants from a firm’s 
perspective. In addition, buy-ins and buy-outs have essential differences. A pension 
buy-out transaction removes the pension liabilities from the balance sheet and firms 
that undertake them are not subject to counter-party risk. However, in a pension buy-
in the liabilities remain with the sponsoring company. As obligations of buy-in 
insurers are usually not fully collateralized, a significant credit risk arises (Roy, 2012). 
Therefore, determinants of a buy-in compared to a buy-out transaction should 
normally differ. To my knowledge, existing literature does not provide any evidence 
on the determinants of buy-ins or buy-outs. Therefore, this is an interesting research 
question in which I seek to shed light in this chapter.  
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5.4 Research design 
 
I examine the determinants of a buy-in or buy-out using the following probit 
models: 
𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + + 
𝛽5 (𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽7 (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8 (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽9 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽10 (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (5.1)                                                                                        
𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 
+ 𝛽5 (𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽7 (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8 (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽9 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽10 (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (5.2)                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Where, BUYIN (BUYOUT) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm has implemented either a partial or full buy-in (buy-out) transaction and zero 
otherwise. Following the existing literature and market reports on de-risking 
strategies, I include several explanatory variables. The first set of explanatory 
variables refers to variables associated with the magnitude of the pension plan 
assets and liabilities. Existing literature on corporate demand for hedging/insurance 
provides mixed results with regards to the effect of size. Hadlock and Pierce (2002) 
show that larger firms are less likely to face financial constraints related to external 
finance and as such have more funds available. This makes larger firms less likely 
to hedge. However, Nance et al. (1993) find that larger firms are more likely to hedge 
given that they can use specialised management knowledge to undertake hedging 
activities. PLAN_SIZE70 is measured as the natural logarithm of the fair value of plan 
assets. Larger plans tend to be associated with larger pension costs and as such 
firms with large pension plans are more likely to enter in de-risking transaction. On 
the other hand, larger firms with large pension funds have more access to external 
funds making an insurance contract relatively more expensive and therefore might 
deter firms with large plans to enter in such transactions. In addition, Comprix and 
Muller (2011) show that larger firms and firms with larger DB pension plans will face 
more resistance and will potentially experience higher reputational costs due to 
                                                          
70 Plan size and firm size were significantly positively correlated in this sample. This shows that 
larger firms have large pension plans (in terms of pension assets). I selected plan size for the 
empirical analysis given that it better represents the magnitude of pension and inferences can also 
be made about the firm size. 
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greater potential negative media coverage. Therefore, I do not have any a priori 
expectations with regards to the sign of 𝛽1. Moreover, PBO is the present benefit 
obligation scaled by total liabilities. This variable is used to examine how the size of 
the pension liability in relation to total liabilities affects the likelihood of a buy-in/ buy-
out transaction. A firm with a proportionally larger pension liability will face higher 
costs for maintaining this plan, as such, it might be in the firm’s interest to enter into 
a buy-in or buy-out transaction. On the other hand, the size of the pension liability is 
positively associated with the pricing of a buy-in/buy-out (LCP, 2013) and so, a 
higher price might act as a deterrent for a firm to perform such transaction. Hence, I 
do not make any predictions with regards to the sign of 𝛽2 .  
To capture the financial health of the pension plan I include FUNDING_RATIO 
which is measured as the fair value of pension plan assets divided by the present 
benefit obligation. Cowan and Power (2003), Comprix and Muller (2011), and 
D’Souza et al. (2013) suggest that employers are more likely to close DB plans that 
are costlier. The higher the pension plan deficit, the higher the cost. In addition, Rauh 
(2006) finds that contributions to DB pension plans pose a real constraint on firms’ 
capital expenditures. To the extent that an overfunded plan is an indication of a 
healthier plan, firms with healthier pension plans might not be in need of de-risking. 
On the other hand, the uncertainty and risks associated with pensions might lead 
firms with overfunded plans to carry out such transactions. In addition, higher funding 
ratio is associated with better pricing (LCP, 2013). Therefore, once again, I do not 
have any a priori expectations with regards to the sign of on the coefficient on 
FUNDING_RATIO.   
According to LCP (2009 and 2016) there are periods during which firms that 
have most of their assets invested in gilts benefit from better pricing. Consequently, 
asset allocation is another important determinant for buy-in/ buy-out transactions. I 
include EQUITY71 which is the proportion of pension plan assets invested in equities. 
Such investments are considered riskier compared to fixed rate investments and 
                                                          
71 Investment in gilts cannot be determined with accuracy because the available data reports them 
under the general category of bonds. For all firms in our sample the majority of pension assets are 
allocated in either bonds or equity with another small percentage being invested in property or other 
type of investment.  
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thus firms that invest their pension assets in equities might be less likely to enter into 
a buy-in/ buy-out transaction because they would face a less lucrative offer. I 
therefore predict a negative sign on 𝛽4.  
Moreover, I use two variables to capture the effect that the firm’s 
plan/workforce maturity and number of employees have on the buy-in/ buy-out 
decisions. Pension plans that consist mainly of mature workforce are more likely to 
receive favourable pricing offers since their longevity risk is lower (LCP, 2008). In 
addition, Munnell and Soto (2007) show that plans that are offered to a greater 
number of employees will face greater constraints if they proceed in DB pension 
closures compared to plans that are offered to a smaller part of the workforce. I use 
HORIZON measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of PBO to current service 
cost as a proxy for plan maturity following Amir, Guan and Oswald, (2010).  Overall, 
an older (younger) workforce should lead to a smaller (larger) ratio of PBO to service 
cost, indicating a shorter (longer) investment horizon. According to LCP (2008) firms 
with a more mature workforce receive better pricing offers. However, firms with 
younger workforces will be more inclined to hedge against longevity and enter into 
de-risking activities. Therefore, I expect a negative sign on the coefficient on 
HORIZON. Moreover, the higher the number of EMPLOYEES (measured in millions) 
the more expensive such transactions will be for the firm. Thus, I predict a negative 
sign for 𝛽6. 
Plans that are subject to collective-bargaining must negotiate with trade 
unions for any major decisions affecting the plan including pension buy-ins and buy-
outs. Existing literature shows that plans that are covered by unions are arguably 
more difficult to freeze compared to plans that are not covered by unions (Munnell 
and Soto, 2007; Kapinos 2009 and 2012; Comprix and Muller, 2011). UNION is 
measured as the union density per industry. As long as de-risking transactions are 
considered to have positive effects on the long-term sustainability of DB plans, then 
unions will support such transactions. However, anecdotal evidence shows that 
unions might question the transactions’ benefits to employees. For example, in the 
US, the scheme beneficiaries of the telecoms group Verizon challenged the group’s 
$7.5bn pension buy-out claiming that “the company failed in its fiduciary duty” 
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(Sullivan, 2013). Therefore, I do not make any predictions with regards to the sign of 
𝛽7 . 
Moreover, following literature on corporate hedging, I include (LEVERAGE) 
measured as the book debt divided by the sum of the book debt and the market 
value of equity, where the book debt excludes the effect of pensions, following Rauh 
(2008); return on assets (ROA) measured as net income to total assets and market 
to book value of equity to capture growth opportunities (GROWTH).72 In the general 
context of corporate hedging, firms with higher leverage, lower profitability and more 
growth (more investment opportunities) are more likely to hedge (e.g. Nance, 1993; 
Graham and Rogers, 2002; Dalton and Holland, 2017). On the other hand, existing 
literature shows that profitable firms do also take measures in order to reduce 
pension risk (Munnell and Soto, 2007). Hence, I predict a positive coefficient on 
LEVERAGE and GROWTH while I do not make any predictions with regards to the 
sign of the coefficient in ROA. Table 5.2 presents variable definitions. 
All independent variables are measured at time t-1 to capture conditions that 
prevail before the transaction is completed and to avoid reverse causality issues. All 
models have industry and year fixed effects to control for cross-sectional differences 
within industries and time series differences within years. All models use robust 
standard errors clustered by firm to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation (Rogers, 1993).  
“Insert Table 5.2 here” 
5.5 Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
To perform the analysis on the determinants of buy-ins/buy-outs, I use a 
sample of FTSE All-Share firms which have sponsored a UK DB plan from 2005 until 
2015. I choose 2005 as the starting year because this is the first year that firms use 
IFRS and also because de-risking transactions started in the UK only in 200673. Data 
on buy-ins and buy-outs are hand collected from LCP reports (2008-2016) as well 
                                                          
72 I also examined this using Tobin’s q and there were no statistical differences. 
73 In 2006 there were only a few transactions conducted by private firms. As such the buy-in/buy-out 
transactions in the sample start in 2007. 
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as individual insurance companies’ websites. The sample refers only to insured 
(Financial Services Authority (FSA) approved) buy-in and buy-out transactions from 
UK publicly traded firms. The rest of the data is extracted from Worldscope.  
Tables 5.3 presents the number of firms that implemented a buy-in or buy-out 
transaction by year (PANEL A) and industry74 (Panel B). This Table shows that the 
first buy-out transactions took place in 2007 while buy-ins only appeared in the UK 
market in 2008. Later on, there is a decline in the number of buy-outs, most probably 
as a result of the financial crisis as explained in a previous section. The number of 
buy-ins dropped although it seems that some transactions took place despite the 
effects of the market downturn. These were mainly as a result of low gilt yields and 
the adverse returns in the equity markets. The opposite can be observed from 2013 
onwards when the number of buy-outs increase, and the number of buy-ins 
decreases which is because of the economic recovery. In total, there are 19 buy-in 
and 15 buy-out transactions during the sample period. 
Panel B shows that the Manufacturing and Finance industries have 
implemented the most buy-in and buy-out transactions. A reason for this could be 
that Manufacturing is a mature industry and mature plans may benefit from better 
pricing offers due to lower longevity risk compared to newer industries, while Finance 
might benefit from better knowledge of hedging transactions. Industries such as 
Utilities and Chemicals have not implemented any such transactions during the 
sample period. 
“Insert Table 5.3 here” 
Table 5.4 Panels A and B, show the means, medians and the associated tests 
of differences in means and medians for buy-in and buy-out samples, respectively. 
In Panel A, PLAN_SIZE is significantly higher, on average, for firms that undertook 
a buy-in (7.159) as compared to firms that did not (5.938). Also, FUNDING_RATIO 
is significantly higher for buy-in firms (96.6%) relative to non-buy-in firms (87.5%). 
Moreover, firms that completed a buy-out have a lover proportion of assets invested 
in equity (38.85%) as compared to firms that did not (52.22%). In addition, 
                                                          
74 Industries are based on the Fama and French 12 industry classification. 
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HORIZON, ROA and MB are significantly higher for buy-in firms (174.5, 8.6% and 
4.421, respectively) as compared to non-buy-in firms (128.1, 5.5% and 2.697, 
respectively). These results suggest, on average, firms that carry out a buy-in have 
larger pension plans and are more funded as compared to firms that did not 
undertake such transactions. In addition, those firms are more profitable and have 
more growth opportunities. The difference in HORIZON shows that firms that 
implement a buy-in have a younger workforce (longer investments horizon) as 
compared to those that do not, suggesting insuring pensions for a mature workforce 
is more expensive.  
Panel B, shows that FUNDING_RATIO and HORIZON are, on average, 
significantly higher for firms that implemented a buy-out (95.1% and 237.1, 
respectively) relative to those that did not (87.7% and 127.6, respectively). Moreover, 
EQUITY, UNION and LEVERAGE are, on average, significantly lower for firms that 
undertook a buy-out (22.72%, 18.19% and 0.227, respectively) relative to firms that 
did not (52.34%, 19.19% and 2.785). These results suggest that firms that implement 
a pension buy-out have more funded pension plans and have younger workforce. In 
addition, those firms invest a lower proportion of their assets in equity, have lower 
union density and lower leverage. These findings indicate that, on average, there 
are differences in pension plan and firm characteristics when comparing firms that 
implement a buy-in or buy-out transaction with firms that did not. In particular, firms 
that undertake buy-ins have, on average, larger plans, higher funding ratios, invest 
less in equities, and have a younger workforce, higher profitability and higher growth 
opportunities relative to firms that do not implement buy-in transactions. While firms 
that implement buy-outs have higher funding ratios on average, lower allocation of 
pension plan assets in equities, a younger workforce, lower union density and lower 
leverage.  
“Insert Table 5.4 here” 
Table 5.5 shows the pairwise correlations for the sample used in the empirical 
analysis. In particular, it shows that PLAN_SIZE (0.13, p=0.001), FUNDING_RATIO 
(0.13, p=0.001), HORIZON (0.06, p=0.05), LEVERAGE (0.05, p=0.05), ROA (0.07, 
p=0.05) and MB (0.06, p=0.05) are positively correlated to BUYIN; while EQUITY is 
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negatively correlated to BUYIN (-0.15, p=0.001). Moreover, FUNDING_RATIO 
(0.08, p=0.001) and HORIZON (0.06, p=0.05) are positively correlated with 
BUYOUT; while UNION (-0.04, p=0.1) and LEVERAGE (-0.05, p=0.05) are 
negatively correlated with BUYOUT. In general, these results provide some evidence 
that firms with more funded pension plans and longer investment horizons (younger 
workforce) are more likely to undertake a buy-in or buy-out transaction. Moreover, 
these results show that there is a positive association between profitability and 
pension buy-ins but not buy-outs while, leverage is positively associated with buy-
ins but negatively with buy-outs. 
The analysis discussed in this section provides descriptive information about 
the variables, without considering how those factors jointly may influence the 
likelihood of a buy-in or a buy-out. The next section reports the results of the 
multivariate probit model where variables that may have an impact on a firm’s 
decision to implement a buy-in/buy-out transaction are modelled jointly. 
“Insert Table 5.5 here” 
 
5.6 Findings 
 
Table 5.6 presents the results of the probit model on the determinants of buy-
ins and buy-outs. Columns (1) and (2) present the findings when the dependent 
variable is BUYIN and BUYOUT, respectively. Column (1) shows that PLAN_SIZE, 
FUNDING_RATIO, UNION and ROA and MB have a positive effect on the probability 
of a pension buy-in while EMPLOYEES and LEVERAGE have a negative effect. 
These results imply that the probability of a firm implementing a buy-out increases 
for firms with larger pension plans, higher funding ratios and more profitable firms 
suggesting that financially healthy firms with financially healthy pension plans are 
more likely to proceed with a buy-in transaction. This is in line with literature which 
suggests that healthy firms are taking measures to control pension risk (e.g. Munnell 
and Soto, 2007). In addition, firms with higher union densities are more likely to 
undertake a buy-in, suggesting that unions support such transactions. Larger 
164 
 
workforce is a deterrent factor for buy-ins suggesting that it becomes more costly for 
firms to insure pension benefits as the employees numbers increase. I do not find 
evidence that factors such as the size of the pension liability (PBO), the pension 
asset allocation (EQUITY), the maturity of the plan (HORIZON), LEVERAGE and 
GROWTH have any effect on the likelihood of a pension buy-in. Column (2) shows 
that PLAN_SIZE and MB have positive and statistically significant coefficients (at 5% 
and 10% levels of significance, respectively) while EQUITY, EMPLOYEES, UNION 
and LEVERAGE have negative and statistically significant coefficients (at 1%, 1%, 
10% and 10% levels of significance, respectively). These results suggest that firms 
with larger pension plans and firms with plan assets allocated in less risky assets 
are more likely to undertake a buy-out. Like buy-ins firms that have larger numbers 
of employees are less likely to undertake pension buy-outs. Moreover, lower 
leverage and more growth opportunities increase the likelihood of a pension buy-
out. Contrary to the results for buy-ins unions do not favour buy-out transactions, 
suggesting that they perceive buy-outs to be riskier than buy-ins. Finally, I do not 
find any statistical evidence that the PBO, FUNDING, HORIZON and ROA have any 
effect on buy-outs.   
Overall, these results suggest that firms that undertake pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs are, in general, large firms with healthier pension plans and better financial 
conditions which contradict the traditional view that insolvent firms are more likely to 
implement such de-risking transactions.  
“Insert Table 5.6 here” 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter analyses pension buy-in and buy-out transactions in the UK 
during 2005 to 2015. More specifically, I analyse pension buy-in and buy-out market 
developments and empirically examine the determinants of those transactions 
during the period 2005-2015.  
The UK has experienced a large amount of such transactions which were in 
part interrupted by the financial crisis but resumed soon after. On the other hand, in 
the US buy-out transactions are very few and buy-in transactions almost non-
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existent. This is mainly because of the differences in the governance and regulation 
of pension schemes as well as cultural and legislative differences across the two 
countries. Although, it is believed that the way the US pension system is organised 
should provide more ground for de-risking transactions. In practice, this is not 
happening given the low numbers of buy-in and buy-out transactions in the US. 
These differences are also an indication of beliefs that policymakers and companies 
have in both countries regarding the survival of DB plans (Monk, 2009).  
The findings on empirical analysis on the determinants of buy-ins and buy-
outs show that firms with larger plans, higher funding ratios, lower leverage and 
higher profitability and union densities are more likely to conduct a buy-in 
transaction. Likewise, buy-out transactions are positively associated with larger 
plans and plans that invest fewer assets in equity. The number of employees is 
negatively associated with both transactions implying that it is more costly for firms 
to conduct either a buy-in or buy-out transaction. While union density is positively 
associated with buy-ins, it has a negative effect on the likelihood of buy-outs 
suggesting that unions support buy-in but not buy-out transactions. In addition, both 
transactions are associated with firms that have lower leverage and higher 
profitability. 
Overall, this study is an initial attempt to document the financial determinants 
of buy-in and buy-out transactions. It should be noted that these results should be 
interpreted with caution due to the small sample size.  
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Appendix IV 
Table 5.1: Market share for buy-in/buy-out activities for individual insurers 
 
  
Name of insurer Date of entry 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Legal and General 1986 1,207 1,940 880 898 1,461 1,011 1,320 5,969 1,977
Prudential 1997 55 1,125 900 338 412 245 1,706 1,515
Paternostar Jun-06 1,436 1,061
Aviva (formerly Norwich Union) May-06 100 826 176 872 1,099 187 379 874 984
Pension Insurance Corporation Oct-06 1,676 1,119 721 666 1,469 3,745 2,567 3,811
Synesis Late 2006
Rothesay Life Jul-07 700 370 1,365 980 1,025 1,674 1,400 2,338
MetLife Jul-07 231 488 364 625 256 39
AEGON Jan-07 99 124 155 23
Lucida Nov-07 165 500 100 45 40
Alico (formerly AIG Life) Apr-07 33 39 40 19
Partnership 2012 84 247 277
Just Retirement 2012 6 441 956
Canada Life 2015 32
Scottish Widows Nov-15 394
Total 2,930 7,887 3,728 5,262 5,214 4,400 7,492 13,204 12,284
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Table 5.2: Variable definitions and sources  
Variable  Description Source 
BUYIN An indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm has 
implemented a pension buy-in 
and 0 otherwise. 
Lane, Clark and Peacock 
(LCP) reports (2008-2016) 
and individual insurance 
companies’ websites. 
BUYOUT An indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm has 
implemented a pension buy-
out and 0 otherwise. 
Lane, Clark and Peacock 
(LCP) reports (2008-2016) 
and individual insurance 
companies’ websites. 
PLAN_SIZE PLAN_SIZE is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the fair 
value of plan assets.  
Worldscope 
PBO PBO is the present benefit 
obligation scaled by total 
liabilities. 
Worldscope 
FUNDING_RATIO FUNDING_RATIO is 
measured as the fair value of 
pension plan assets divided 
by the present benefit 
obligation. 
Worldscope 
EQUITY EQUITY is the proportion of 
pension plan assets invested 
in equities. 
Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Following Rauh (2008) this is 
calculated as follows:  
(Book Debt) / (Book Debt+ 
Market Value of Equity), 
where the book debt excludes 
the effect of pensions.  
Worldscope 
ROA Net income divided by total 
assets. 
Worldscope 
HORIZON The ratio of PBO to the 
current service cost (Amir, 
Guan and Oswald, 2010). 
Worldscope 
EMPLOYEES The number of firms’ 
employees in millions 
Worldscope 
UNION UNION is measured as the 
union density per industry. 
Office of National   Statistics: 
Trade Union Statistics 1999-
2013 
PARTLY_CLOSED An indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the plan is closed 
to new entrants only and 0 
otherwise.  
Hand- collected from Annual 
Reports. 
FULLY_CLOSED An indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the plan is closed 
to existing and new entrants 
and 0 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Reports. 
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Table 5.3: Number of buy-ins and buy-outs by year and industry 
 
  
Notes: Table 5.3 presents descriptive information on pension buy-in and buy-out transactions by year (Panel 
A) and by industry (Panel B). 
  
  Year Buy-ins Buy-outs Total 
  2005
  2006
  2007 6 6
  2008 7 3 10
  2009 2 0 2
  2010 4 2 6
  2011 1 0 1
  2012 3 0 3
  2013 2 1 3
  2014 0 1 1
  2015 0 2 2
  Total 19 15 34
Panel A: Buy-in and Buy-out transactions by year 
Panel B: Buy-in and buy-out transactions by industry
Industry Buy-ins Buyouts Total
Consumer Non-Durables 3 1 4
Consumer Durables 0 0 0
Manufacturing 3 3 6
Energy - Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 0 2 2
Chemicals and Allied Products 0 0 0
Business Equipment 0 1 1
Telecoms 1 0 1
Utilities 0 0 0
Wholesale & Retail Trade 2 1 3
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 2 0 2
Finance 4 1 5
Other 4 6 10
Total 19 15 34
169 
 
Table 5.4: Tests of differences in means and medians 
 
Table 5.4 reports the means and medians and their respective tests of differences for firms that implemented a 
pension buy-in (BUYIN) and firms that did not (NON-BUYIN) (Panel A) and for firms that implemented a pension 
(BUYOUT) and firms that did not (NON-BUYOUT) (Panel B). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoit the effect of 
outliers. All variables are defined in Table 5.2.  
  
    (1)     (2) diff ((2) -(1))   tstat     (1)     (2) diff ((2) -(1)) chi-square
PLAN_SIZE   7.159   5.938 -1.221 -5.816**   6.613   5.905 -0.708 57.55***
PBO   0.627   0.652  0.025 -0.224   0.492   0.471 -0.021 2.846*
FUNDING_RATIO   0.966   0.875 -0.091 -5.665***   0.951   0.878 -0.073 33.85***
EQUITY   38.85   52.22  13.37  6.249***   41.65   54.00  12.35 38.69***
HORIZON   174.5   128.1 -46.40 -2.748**   85.98   63.71 -22.27 12.03***
EMPLOYEES   25542.8   23172.3 -2370.5  0.562   18454.5   8162.0 -10292.5 10.31***
UNION   20.29   19.13 -1.160  1.283   18.60   18.60  0.000 4.767**
LEVERAGE   2.997   2.722 -0.275 -0.060   2.683   1.690 -0.993 10.88***
ROA   0.086   0.055 -0.031 -3.238***   0.072   0.054 -0.018 0.869
MB   4.421   2.697 -1.724 -2.617**   2.452   2.235 -0.217 3.441*
    (1)     (2) diff ((2) -(1)) tstat     (1)     (2) diff ((2) -(1)) chi-square
PLAN_SIZE   6.163   5.979 -0.184 -0.1769   6.196   5.964 -0.232 2.705*
PBO   0.840   0.648 -0.192  0.6113   0.582   0.468 -0.114 0.019
FUNDING_RATIO   0.951   0.877 -0.074 -3.601***   0.989   0.880 -0.109 6.450*
EQUITY   22.72   52.34  29.62  9.621***   23.972   53.933  29.961 26.10***
HORIZON   237.1  127.6 -109.5 -2.145**  125.5   63.07 -62.43 30.92***
EMPLOYEES   8433.3  23573.1  15139.8 -0.066  9087.5   8319.0 -768.5 12.13***
UNION   18.19  19.19  1.000  1.786*  19.800   18.600 -1.200 0.037
LEVERAGE   0.227  2.785  2.558  1.766*  1.384   1.740  0.356 17.35***
ROA   0.079  0.056 -0.023  0.971  0.063   0.054 -0.009 0.015
MB   2.012  2.776  0.764  0.785  1.808   2.259  0.451 7.262**
PANEL A: Tests of means and medians for BUYIN (1) vs. NON BUY-IN (2) FIRMS
PANEL B: Tests of means and medians BUYOUT (1) vs. NON BUY-OUT (2) FIRMS
Test of means Test of medians
Test of means Test of medians
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Table 5.5: Correlation analysis 
 
Notes: Table 5.5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). All variables are defined 
in Table 5.3.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
BUYIN (1) 1.00
BUYOUT (2) -0.03 1.00
PLAN_SIZE (3) 0.13*** 0.00 1.00
PBO (4) 0.01 -0.01 0.20*** 1.00
FUNDING_RATIO (5) 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.22*** 0.02 1.00
EQUITY (6) -0.15*** -0.22 -0.23*** -0.09*** -0.33*** 1.00
HORIZON (7) 0.06** 0.05** 0.00 0.27*** 0.05** -0.23*** 1.00
EMPLOYEES (8) -0.01 0.00 0.58*** -0.09*** 0.03 -0.07** -0.13*** 1.00
UNION (9) -0.03 -0.04* 0.19*** 0.07** 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
LEVERAGE (10) 0.05** -0.05** 0.16*** -0.10*** 0.05** -0.03 -0.02 0.06** 0.09*** 1.00
ROA (11) 0.07** -0.02 0.02 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.02 -0.05** -0.07*** 1.00
MB (12) 0.06** -0.02 0.05** 0.05** -0.00 0.07** -0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.63*** 0.21*** 1.00
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Table 5.6: Empirical findings: Determinants of pension buy-ins/ buy-outs  
 
Notes: Table 5.5 reports the Probit regressions results for the analysis of the determinants of pension buy-ins 
and buy-outs). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed). t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined in Table 5.2.  
 
The models that I estimate are as follows: 
Dependent variable: BUYIN BUYOUT
(5.1) (5.2)
PLAN_SIZE 0.452*** 0.386**
(3.72) (2.36)
PBO -0.165 -0.229
(-0.63) (-0.75)
FUNDING 3.444*** 0.629
(2.99) (0.29)
EQUITY -0.012 -0.048***
(-1.39) (-5.30)
HORIZON 0.000 0.000
(0.42) (0.62)
EMPLOYEES -0.001** -0.001***
(-2.29) (-2.60)
UNION 0.058*** -0.019*
(2.70) (-1.89)
LEVERAGE -0.071*** -0.090*
(-3.10) (-1.79)
ROA 3.457** 0.075
(2.04) (0.06)
MB 0.078** 0.086*
(2.33) (1.79)
INTERCEPT -11.53*** 2.957
(-6.37) (1.21)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
SE Clustered by fitm Yes Yes
N 950 1040
Pseudo R2  0.324 0.483
172 
 
𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + + 
𝛽5 (𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽7 (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8 (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽9 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽10 (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (5.1)                                                                                        
𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽2 (𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 (𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 
+ 𝛽5 (𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽7 (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8 (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽9 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) +𝛽10 (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1) + INDUSTRY_FE + YEAR_FE + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (5.2)                                                                   
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of findings and implications 
 
In this thesis I analyse issues related to DB plan provision in the UK. Historically, 
most UK firms have sponsored DB pension plans (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). The 
increase in average life expectancy as well as adverse circumstances in the general 
economic climate has increased the cost of those plans (Yermo and Severinson, 
2010). As a consequence, many firms have taken steps to reduce those costs 
(Klumpes et al., 2009). Pensionable salary caps as well as the closure of DB plans 
to new and existing entrants are very have become very common among UK firms 
(Klumpes et al., 2009). Several studies examine the factors behind DB plan closures 
and among others they identify managerial incentives (Hamdallah and Ruland, 
1986); cash needs (Thomas, 1989); avoidance of future obligations (Petersen; 
1992); changes in accounting regulation (Munnell and Soto, 2007; Beaudoin, 
Chandar and Werner, 2010; Comprix and Muller, 2011); and changes in labour 
characteristics and preferences (e.g., Cowan and Power, 2003; Coronado and 
Copeland, 2004; Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; Kapinos, 2012; D’Souza, Jacob 
and Lougee, 2013). However, despite the decline in DB pension provision DB plans 
remain important part of compensation for UK employees. For example, in 2015, in 
the UK, DB plan assets represent 68% of total pension plan assets (Willis Towers 
Watson, 2016). More recently, pension de-risking strategies have become very 
popular in the UK. The most common de-risking strategies involve shifts in pension 
assets from risky equities to bonds, longevity swaps and pension buy-ins or buy-
outs (partly or fully) (Monk 2009; Blake et al., 2013). In this study I examine issues 
related to DB plan retention and pension buy-ins and buy-out. Specifically, in chapter 
2 I discuss the main features of DB plans and I provide an overview of the changes 
in pension accounting standards and legislation in the UK. Having provided the 
necessary background information, in chapter 3, I examine the determinants of DB 
plan retentions in the UK. Specifically, I analyse the effect that labour market 
incentives, managerial incentives and the adoption of FRS 17 by UK firms have on 
the decision to retain DB plans. In addition, I investigate the effect that insider-
trustees (i.e. corporate executives that are also trustees) have on DB plan retention 
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decisions. I find that firms in industries where human capital is important are more 
likely to retain DB plans fully open (i.e. to both new and existing members). These 
results suggest that DB plans are considered an important instrument to retain highly 
skilled employees consistent with the labour market literature. Moreover, I find that 
the likelihood of DB plan retention increases if the CEO and CFO are members of 
the main DB plan as the rest of the employees. On the contrary, if they are members 
of an exclusive executive DB plan they are more likely to close these plans to new 
entrants. This suggests that they fear that there might be repercussions to their own 
plans. On the contrary, I do not find any evidence that the adoption of FRS 17 has 
any effect on DB plan retention decisions. Moreover, I find that insider-trustees have 
a positive influence in the decision to maintain DB plans especially when they are 
members of these plans. 
Drawing on the findings of chapter 3, in chapter 4 I examine the effects that 
DB plan retention and CEO participation in them have on firms’ credit ratings as well 
as the impact that they have on corporate decisions such as capital investments and 
dividends. I find that DB plan retentions, either full or part, have adverse effects on 
credit ratings. However, when the CEO is a member of this plan there is a positive 
effect on credit rating suggesting that credit rating agencies do not incorporate in 
their credit assessments only quantitative information such as the costs associated 
with open DB plans but also qualitative information such as the fact that the CEO 
itself is a member of this plan. The latter is also supported by findings of prior 
research that executives that are members of DB plans are risk averse (e.g. Bebchuk 
and Jackson, 2005, Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2007; Wei and 
Yermack, 2009). 
Chapter 5 is motivated by recent developments in the market for pension plan 
risk hedging. Specifically, in this chapter I provide a thorough discussion of the 
developments in the pension buy-in and buy-out market in the UK and I empirically 
examine determinants of such transactions from a firm and plan perspective. The 
buy-in and buy-out market became active in the UK since 2006 and although there 
was a slow down due to the financial crisis these transactions have resumed in even 
higher volumes. On the contrary, de-risking strategies are not very common in the 
USA (Agius, 2016). The main reasons for this are associated with differences in the 
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pension structure, pension plan governance as well as relevant legislations (Agius, 
2016). Moreover, empirical findings in this chapter show that firms with large pension 
plans are more likely to implement a buy-in or buy-out transaction. Moreover, 
companies with higher funding ratios and higher profitability are more likely to 
implement a pension buy-in; while firms that complete buy-outs allocate less pension 
assets in equity investments. Even though union density is positively associated with 
buy-ins, it has a negative effect on the likelihood of buy-outs suggesting that unions 
do support buy-in but not buy-out transactions possibly because the latter are 
associated with plan winding-ups.  
Given the importance of DB plans from a welfare point of view as well as the 
magnitude of pension liabilities the present study is of interest and has significant 
implications for pension beneficiaries, market participants and standard setters. The 
findings have significant implications for the design of compensation packages in 
general including those of executives. In particular, executives can influence the 
retention of DB plans and hence have an impact on the deferred compensation of 
employees and their welfare. Likewise, the findings have implications on the role of 
accounting in restraining (or encouraging) managerial risk taking with improved 
disclosures on managerial compensation. In addition, the study has implications for 
corporate governance arrangements. Specifically, the study highlights the role of 
insider trustees with regards to DB plan retentions. Moreover, the study has 
implications for shareholders and other stakeholders drawing on the analysis of the 
impact on dividends and capital investments provided in chapter 4. Finally, given 
that de-risking strategies may possibly protect the sustainability of DB plans, findings 
in chapter 5 have important implications not only for market participants to make 
informed investment decisions but also for policy makers to be able to make relevant 
adjustments which favour and/or may reduce the costs of such transactions.  
6.2 Limitations 
It should be noted that the findings in this thesis are subject to certain 
limitations. The generalisation of its findings is reduced by the use of a relatively 
small sample size in some of the empirical studies presented in this thesis. The small 
sample size is mainly because of the limited data availability on pensions and the 
significant amount of time required for the hand – collection of the pension 
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information. In particular, the analysis of the effect of insider trustees required 
extensive hand-collection of data on pension trustees. Moreover, this information 
was not available for all FTSE All-Share firms that sponsor a DB plan which is the 
initial sample in the study.  
Furthermore, to the extent that a partial closure and a full closure are 
considered competing risks, a model such as the one developed from Fine and Gray 
(1999) would have been more appropriate. However, although such models are used 
heavily in biomedical science their use in accounting research is not possible now 
because of the time varying nature of the covariates. 
Regarding chapter 5, to date there is limited number of transactions for 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs which significantly restricts the empirical analysis. 
Pension buy-in and buy-out data are limited because the market is relatively small 
compared to the total size of DB pension liabilities, although it is growing 
significantly. 
 
6.3 Future research ideas 
The limitations of this study provide opportunities for future research. Future 
research can further explore and analyse pension de-risking transactions. Data 
availability in the future could allow the use of more sophisticated methods for the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of de-risking transactions. In addition, 
availability of data in the future could facilitate the analysis of market effects of such 
transactions. 
The present study analysed pension buy-in and buy-out transactions only. 
However, longevity is now recognised as an important risk that is faced by insurers, 
corporations and governments (Blake et al., 2013). The market for longevity swaps 
is developing to mitigate this risk. Therefore, the growth of this market provides an 
opportunity to include longevity swaps in future research on pension de-risking 
strategies. 
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